This is the first attempt to understand the full scope of the USSR’s offensive biological weapons research, from inception in the 1920s. Gorbachev tried to end the program, but the U.S. and U.K. never obtained clear evidence that he succeeded, raising the question whether the means for waging biological warfare could be present in Russia today.
Genetically Engineered Marine Organisms: Environmental and Economic Risks and Benefits provides a comprehensive, multidisciplinary overview of the environmental, economic, and regulatory implications of advances in marine biotechnology. The book has been specifically designed to bridge the gap between the rapidly advancing marine biotechnology industry and the government agencies that are responsible for risk assessment and regulation. Editors Raymond Zilinskas and Peter Balint have brought together experts in risk assessment, marine ecology, biotechnology, economics, and the law, to provide a unique way of examining complex issues in marine biotechnology. The contributors present innovative and challenging recommendations for protecting public health and the environment, while encouraging the development of beneficial new products in the field of marine biotechnology. As an added feature, each chapter includes a comprehensive, up-to-date bibliography. Genetically Engineered Marine Organisms: Environmental and Economic Risks and Benefits will prove invaluable to students, researchers and public employees involved with risk assessment. The book will appeal to industry personnel involved with the preparation of marine biotechnology products; scientists and administrators involved with applied research in marine biotechnology; policy analysts concerned with the economics of marine fisheries; and university personnel who focus on the interaction of risk, technology, and public policy.
Russian officials claim today that the USSR never possessed an offensive biological weapons program. In fact, the Soviet government spent billions of rubles and hard currency to fund a hugely expensive weapons program that added nothing to the country’s security. This history is the first attempt to understand the broad scope of the USSR’s offensive biological weapons research—its inception in the 1920s, its growth between 1970 and 1990, and its possible remnants in present-day Russia. We learn that the U.S. and U.K. governments never obtained clear evidence of the program’s closure from 1990 to the present day, raising the critical question whether the means for waging biological warfare could be resurrected in Russia in the future. Based on interviews with important Soviet scientists and managers, papers from the Soviet Central Committee, and U.S. and U.K. declassified documents, this book peels back layers of lies, to reveal how and why Soviet leaders decided to develop biological weapons, the scientific resources they dedicated to this task, and the multitude of research institutes that applied themselves to its fulfillment. We learn that Biopreparat, an ostensibly civilian organization, was established to manage a top secret program, code-named Ferment, whose objective was to apply genetic engineering to develop strains of pathogenic agents that had never existed in nature. Leitenberg and Zilinskas consider the performance of the U.S. intelligence community in discovering and assessing these activities, and they examine in detail the crucial years 1985 to 1992, when Mikhail Gorbachev’s attempts to put an end to the program were thwarted as they were under Yeltsin.
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