We present a novel approach that incorporates individual entity stress testing and losses from systemic risk effects (SE losses) into macroprudential stress testing. SE losses are measured using a reduced-form model to value financial entity assets, conditional on macroeconomic stress and the distress of other entities in the system. This valuation is made possible by a multivariate density which characterizes the asset values of the financial entities making up the system. In this paper this density is estimated using CIMDO, a statistical approach, which infers densities that are consistent with entities’ probabilities of default, which in this case are estimated using market-based data. Hence, SE losses capture the effects of interconnectedness structures that are consistent with markets’ perceptions of risk. We then show how SE losses can be decomposed into the likelihood of distress and the magnitude of losses, thereby quantifying the contribution of specific entities to systemic contagion. To illustrate the approach, we quantify SE losses due to Lehman Brothers’ default.
Motivated by the global inflation episode of 2007-08 and concern that high levels of inflation could undermine growth, this paper uses a panel of 165 countries and data for 1960-2007 to revisit the nexus between inflation and growth. We use a smooth transition model to investigate the speed at which inflation beyond a threshold becomes harmful to growth, an important consideration in the policy response to rising inflation as the world economy recovers. We estimate that for all country groups (except for advanced countries) inflation above a threshold of about 10 percent quickly becomes harmful to growth, suggesting the need for a prompt policy response to inflation at or above the relevant threshold. For the advanced economies, the threshold is much lower. For oil exporting countries, the estimates are less robust, possibly reflecting heterogeneity among oil producers, but the effect of higher inflation for oil producers is found to be stronger.
We investigate the extent of regional financial integration in the member countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council. The limited volume data available suggests that regional integration is non-negligible. Bahrain and Kuwait investments especially are oriented towards the region. The development of stock markets in the region will also improve the extent of financial integration. Interest rate data shows that convergence exists and that interest rate differentials are relatively short-lived-especially compared to the ECCU, another emerging market region sharing a common currency. Equities data using cross-listed stocks confirms that stock markets are fairly integrated compared to other emerging market regions, although financial integration is hampered by market illiquidity.
We propose an original method to estimate the market price of risk under stress, which is needed to correct for risk aversion the CDS-implied probabilities of distress. The method is based, for simplicity, on a one-factor asset pricing model. The market price of risk under stress (the expectation of the market price of risk, conditional on it exceeding a certain threshold) is computed from the price of risk (which is the variance of the market price of risk) and the discount factor (which is the inverse of the expected market price of risk). The threshold is endogenously determined so that the probability of the price of risk exceeding it is also the probability of distress of the asset. The price of risk can be estimated via different methods, for instance derived from the VIX or from the factors in a Fama-MacBeth regression.
The COVID-19 pandemic and the subsequent need for policy support have called the traditional separation between fiscal and monetary policies into question. Based on simulations of an open economy DSGE model calibrated to emerging and advance economies and case study evidence, the analysis shows when constraints are binding a more integrated approach of looking at policies can lead to a better policy mix and ultimately better macroeconomic outcomes under certain circumstances. Nonetheless, such an approach entails risks, necessitating a clear assessment of each country’s circumstances as well as safeguards to protect the credibility of the existing institutional framework.
Provides original insights into the functioning of the GCC macro-economy. It covers structural, long-term, issues such as the determinants of economic growth, the impact of foreign workers on labour markets, wages, and competitiveness, and the economic impact of a rich state that wants to distribute oil money.
During the COVID-19 pandemic and global financial crisis, governments swiftly served as financiers of last resort through large financial support measures (FSMs) such as loan and guarantee programs and equity injections in firms. This Staff Discussion Note argues that such FSMs prevented bankruptcies and attenuated the recession by increasing firms’ liquidity, reducing risk premiums, and boosting confidence. But FSMs also carry large and long-lasting fiscal costs and risks. The note presents recommendations for managing the legacies of the COVID-19 programs and preparing for future crises. Ideally, FSMs should be assessed and included in budget plans, though a balance needs to be struck between speed and scrutiny.
This paper explores the impact of fiscal and labor market policies on efficiency, inequality, and fiscal outcomes in France. We extend the general equilibrium model calibrated for France by Alla and others (2015), with measures of labor and capital income for different groups in the economy (the unemployed, unskilled workers, skilled workers, public servants). For each of these groups we combine data on the income distribution with the outcomes of policy simulations to assess the impact of a suite of stylized policies on output, the fiscal balance, the Gini coefficient, and the shape of the Lorenz curve. We find that most types of fiscal expansions, while adding to the deficit and debt in the near term, generally reduce inequality, the main exception being capital income tax cuts. A reduction of the minimum wage has an ambiguous impact on the income distribution: the Gini coefficient increases, but the lowest income quintile improves its relative position in the income distribution thanks to positive employment effects. The paper also finds scope for “win-win” policy packages that could improve overall efficiency, inequality, and fiscal outcomes, for instance if targeted labor tax reductions are offset by cuts in the public wage bill.
We develop an open economy New Keynesian Model with foreign exchange intervention in the presence of a financial accelerator mechanism. We obtain closed-form solutions for the optimal interest rate policy and FX intervention under discretionary policy, in the face of shocks to risk appetite in international capital markets. The solution shows that FX intervention can help reduce the volatility of the economy and mitigate the welfare losses associated with such shocks. We also show that, when the financial accelerator is strong, the risk of multiple equilibria (self-fulfilling currency and inflation movements) is high. We determine the conditions under which indeterminacy can occur and highlight how the use of FX intervention reinforces the central bank’s credibility and limits the risk of multiple equilibria.
According to a dynamic panel estimated over 1995 - 2008 on around 80 banks in the GCC region, the NPL ratio worsens as economic growth becomes lower and interest rates and risk aversion increase. Our model implies that the cumulative effect of macroeconomic shocks over a three year horizon is indeed large. Firm-specific factors related to risk-taking and efficiency are also related to future NPLs. The paper finally investigates the feedback effect of increasing NPLs on growth using a VAR model. According to the panel VAR, there could be a strong, albeit short-lived feedback effect from losses in banks’ balance sheets on economic activity, with a semi-elasticity of around 0.4.
We propose a framework to link empirical models of systemic risk to theoretical network/ general equilibrium models used to understand the channels of transmission of systemic risk. The theoretical model allows for systemic risk due to interbank counterparty risk, common asset exposures/fire sales, and a “Minsky" cycle of optimism. The empirical model uses stock market and CDS spreads data to estimate a multivariate density of equity returns and to compute the expected equity return for each bank, conditional on a bad macro-outcome. Theses “cross-sectional" moments are used to re-calibrate the theoretical model and estimate the importance of the Minsky cycle of optimism in driving systemic risk.
We develop a new measure of financial conditions (FCs) that targets the growth of financial liabilities using the partial least square methodology. We then estimate financial condition indexes (FCIs) across European economies, both at the aggregate and sectoral levels. We decompose the changes in FCs into several factors including credit availability and costs, price of risk, policy stance, and funding constraints. Our results show that FCs loosened during the pandemic thanks to policy support but started to tighten significantly since mid-2021. Using the inverse probability weighting method over the sample period from 2000 to 2023, we find that a shift from a neutral to a tight FCI regime such as the ongoing episode for most European countries will on average lower output and inflation by 2.2 percent and 0.7 percentage points respectively and increase unemployment by 0.3 percentage points over a three-year horizon.
This paper analyzes the use of unconventional policy instruments in New Keynesian setups in which the ‘divine coincidence’ breaks down. The paper discusses the role of a second instrument and its coordination with conventional interest rate policy, and presents theoretical results on equilibrium determinacy, the inflation bias, the stabilization bias, and the optimal central banker’s preferences when both instruments are available. We show that the use of an unconventional instrument can help reduce the zone of equilibrium indeterminacy and the volatility of the economy. However, in some circumstances, committing not to use the second instrument may be welfare improving (a result akin to Rogoff (1985a) example of counterproductive coordination). We further show that the optimal central banker should be both aggressive against inflation, and interventionist in using the unconventional policy instrument. As long as price setting depends on expectations about the future, there are gains from establishing credibility by using any instrument that affects these expectations.
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