Chapter Introduction: Strategic history -- chapter 1 Themes and contexts of strategic history -- chapter 2 Carl von Clausewitz and the theory of war -- chapter 3 From limited war to national war: The French Revolution and the Napoleonic way of war -- chapter 4 The nineteenth century, I: A strategic view -- chapter 5 The nineteenth century, II: Technology, warfare and international order -- chapter 6 World War I, I: Controversies -- chapter 7 World War I, II: Modern warfare -- chapter 8 The twenty-year armistice, 1919-39 -- chapter 9 The mechanization of war -- chapter 10 World War II in Europe, I: The structure and course of total war -- chapter 11 World War II in Europe, II: Understanding the war -- chapter 12 World War II in Asia-Pacific, I: Japan and the politics of empire -- chapter 13 World War II in Asia-Pacific, II: Strategy and warfare -- chapter 14 The Cold War, I: Politics and ideology -- chapter 15 The Cold War, II: The nuclear revolution -- chapter 16 War and peace after the Cold War: An interwar decade -- chapter 17 9/11 and the age of terror -- chapter 18 Irregular warfare: Guerrillas, insurgents and terrorists -- chapter 19 War, peace and international order -- chapter 20 Conclusion: Must future strategic history resemble the past?.
Chapter Introduction: Strategic history -- chapter 1 Themes and contexts of strategic history -- chapter 2 Carl von Clausewitz and the theory of war -- chapter 3 From limited war to national war: The French Revolution and the Napoleonic way of war -- chapter 4 The nineteenth century, I: A strategic view -- chapter 5 The nineteenth century, II: Technology, warfare and international order -- chapter 6 World War I, I: Controversies -- chapter 7 World War I, II: Modern warfare -- chapter 8 The twenty-year armistice, 1919-39 -- chapter 9 The mechanization of war -- chapter 10 World War II in Europe, I: The structure and course of total war -- chapter 11 World War II in Europe, II: Understanding the war -- chapter 12 World War II in Asia-Pacific, I: Japan and the politics of empire -- chapter 13 World War II in Asia-Pacific, II: Strategy and warfare -- chapter 14 The Cold War, I: Politics and ideology -- chapter 15 The Cold War, II: The nuclear revolution -- chapter 16 War and peace after the Cold War: An interwar decade -- chapter 17 9/11 and the age of terror -- chapter 18 Irregular warfare: Guerrillas, insurgents and terrorists -- chapter 19 War, peace and international order -- chapter 20 Conclusion: Must future strategic history resemble the past?.
The possibility of achieving decisive results from short warning attacks appears to have improved greatly with technological advances. Indeed, strategic surprise offers both golden opportunities and lethal dangers, so it attracts much attention in today's world. In this monograph, Dr. Colin Gray takes a broad view of strategic surprise, and relates it to the current military transformation. He argues that the kind of strategic surprise to which the United States is most at risk and which is most damaging to our national security is the deep and pervasive connection between war and politics. Although America is usually superior at making war, it is far less superior in making peace out of war. Dr. Gray concludes that the current military transformation shows no plausible promise of helping to correct the long-standing U.S. weakness in the proper use of forces as an instrument of policy. This monograph was written under the Strategic Studies Institute's External Research Associates Program (ERAP).
Nuclear weapons are here to stay. They have survived into the twenty-first century as instruments of influence for the US, Russia, and other major military powers. But, unlike the Cold War era, future nuclear forces will be developed and deployed within a digital-driven world of enhanced conventional weapons. As such, established nuclear powers will have smaller numbers of nuclear weapons for the purpose of deterrence working in parallel with smarter conventional weapons and elite military personnel. The challenge is to agree proportional reductions in nuclear inventories or abstinence requiring an effective nonproliferation regime to contain aspiring or threshold nuclear weapons states. This is the most comprehensive view of nuclear weapons policy and strategy currently available. The author’s division of the nuclear issue into the three ages is a never seen before analytical construct. With President Obama reelected, the reduction and even elimination of nuclear weapons will now rise to the top of the agenda once more. Moreover, given the likelihood of reductions in US defense spending, the subject of the triad, which is covered in Chapter One, will no doubt be an important subject of debate, as will the issue of missile defense, covered in Chapter 10. This book provides an excellent analysis of the spread of nuclear weapons in Asia and the Middle East and the potential dangers of a North Korean or Iranian breakout, subjects that dominate current policy debates.
Does history repeat itself? This monograph clearly answers 'no,' firmly. However, it does not argue that an absence of repetition in the sense of analogy means that history can have no utility for the soldier today. This monograph argues for a 'historical parallelism,' in place of shaky or false analogy. The past, even the distant and ancient past, provides evidence of the potency of lasting virtues of good conduct. This monograph concludes by offering four recommendations: 1. Behave prudently; 2. Remember the concept of the great stream of time; 3. Do not forget that war nearly always is a gamble; 4. War should only be waged with strategic sense"--Publisher's web site.
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) was the most widely used, and abused, acronym in the U.S. defense community in the 1990s. Subsequently, transformation has superceded it as the preferred term of art. For the better part of 2 decades, American defense professionals have been excited by the prospect of effecting a revolutionary change in the conduct and character of warfare. In this monograph, Dr. Colin S. Gray provides a critical audit of the great RMA debate and of some actual RMA behavior. He argues that the contexts of warfare are crucially important. Indeed so vital are the contexts that only a military transformation that allows for flexibility and adaptability will meet future strategic demands. Dr. Gray warns against a transformation that is highly potent only in a narrow range of strategic cases. In addition, he advises that the historical record demonstrates clearly that every revolutionary change in warfare eventually is more or less neutralized by antidotes of one kind...
If RMA (revolution in military affairs) was the acronym and concept of choice in the U.S. defense community in the 1990s, so preemption has threatened to supercede it in the 2000s. The trouble is that officials and many analysts have confused preemption, which is not controversial, with prevention, which is. In this monograph, Dr. Colin S. Gray draws a sharp distinction between preemption and prevention, and explains that the political, military, moral, and strategic arguments have really all been about the latter, not the former. Dr. Gray provides definitions, reviews the history of the preventive war option, and considers the merit, or lack thereof, in the principal charges laid against the concept when it is proclaimed to be policy. Dr. Gray concludes that there is a place for preventive war in U.S. strategy, but that it is an option that should be exercised only very occasionally. However, there are times when only force seems likely to resolve a maturing danger.
In this magisterial tour d'horizon of the air weapon's steady rise in effectiveness since its fledgling days, Colin Gray, a prolific strate gist of long-standing scholarly achievement and international repute, has rightly taken a long view of today's pattern of regional conflict by appraising airpower in the broader context in which its operational payoff will ultimately be registered. His careful development of airpower's “strategic narrative,” as he calls it, shows convincingly how the relative criticality of the air weapon in joint warfare is neither universal nor unchanging but rather is crucially dependent on the particular circumstances of a confrontation. More to the point, viewed situationally, airpower can be everything from single-handedly decisive to largely irrelevant to a combatant commander's needs, depending on his most pressing challenges of the moment. Because its relative import, like that of all other force elements, hinges directly on how its comparative advantages relate to a commander's most immediate here-and-now concerns, airpower does not disappoint when it is not the main producer of desired outcomes. Indeed, the idea that airpower should be able to perform effectively in all forms of combat unaided by other force elements is both an absurd measure of its operational merit and a baseless arguing point that its most outspoken advocates, from Giulio Douhet and Billy Mitchell onward, have done their cause a major disservice by misguidedly espousing over many decades. Although the air weapon today may have been temporarily overshadowed by more land-centric forms of force employment, given the kinds of lower-intensity conflicts that the United States and its allies have been obliged to contend with in recent years, there will most assuredly be future times when new challenges yet to arise will again test America's air posture to the fullest extent of its deterrent and combat potential. Professor Gray's central theme is that airpower generates strategic effect. More specifically, he maintains, airpower is a tactical equity that operates—ideally—with strategic consequences. To him, “strategic” does not inhere in the equity's physical characteristics, such as an aircraft's range or payload, but rather in what it can do by way of producing desired results. From his perspective, a strategic effect is, first and foremost, that which enables outcome-determining results. And producing such results is quintessentially the stock in trade of American airpower as it has progressively evolved since Vietnam. Airpower for Strategic Effect offers an uncommonly thoughtful application of informed intellect to an explanation of how modern air warfare capabilities should be understood. Along the way, it puts forward a roster of observations about the air weapon that warrant careful reflection by all who would presume to find it wanting. Among the most notable of those observations are that context rules in every case and that whether airpower should be regarded as supported by or supporting of other force elements is not a question that can ever have a single answer for all time. Rather, as noted above, the answer will hinge invariably on the unique conditions of any given conflict.
At present and probably for some years to come, America's enemies are of an irregular character. These irregular enemies necessarily wage war in modes that are largely unconventional. In this monograph, Dr. Colin S. Gray considers irregular warfare in the light of the general theory of strategy and finds that that theory is fully adequate to explain the phenomenon. Rather less adequate, Dr. Gray suggests, is the traditional American way of war. The monograph offers a detailed comparison between the character of irregular warfare, insurgency in particular, and the principal enduring features of "the American way." It concludes that there is a serious mismatch between that "way" and the kind of behavior that is most effective in countering irregular foes. Dr. Gray poses the question, Can the American way of war adapt to a strategic threat context dominated by irregular enemies? He suggests that the answer is "perhaps, but only with difficulty.
To define future threat is, in a sense, an impossible task, yet it is one that must be done. In this monograph, Dr. Colin S. Gray explains that the only sources of empirical evidence accessible to us are the past and the present. We cannot obtain understanding about the future from the future. Dr. Gray draws noticeably upon the understanding of strategic history obtainable from Thucydides' great History of the Peloponnesian War. The monograph advises prudence as the operating light for American definition of future threat, and the author believes that there are historical parallels between the time of Thucydides and our own that can help us avoid much peril. The future must always be unpredictable to us in any detail, but the many and potent continuities in history's great stream of time can serve to alert us to what may well happen in kind.
All would-be strategies would benefit by some formal education. However, for education in strategy to be well-directed, it needs to rest upon sound assumptions concerning the eternal nature yet ever shifting character, meaning, and function of strategy, as well as the range of behaviors required for effective strategic performance. The author emphasizes the necessity for strategic education to help develop the strategic approach, the way of thinking that can solve or illuminate strategic problems. He advises that such education should not strive for a spurious relevance by presenting a military variant of current affairs. He believes that the strategist will perform better in today's world if he has mastered and can employ strategy's general theory.
American Landpower is a strategic instrument of state policy and needs to be considered as such. This monograph explores and explains the nature of Landpower, both in general terms and also with particular regard to the American case. The monograph argues that: (1) Landpower is unique in the character of the quality it brings to the American joint team for national security; (2) the U.S. has a permanent need for the human quality in Landpower that this element provides inherently; (3) Landpower is always and, indeed, necessarily strategic in its meaning and implications -- it is a quintessentially strategic instrument of state policy and politics; (4) strategic Landpower is unavoidably and beneficially joint in its functioning, this simply is so much the contemporary character of American strategic Landpower that we should consider jointness integral to its permanent nature; and, (5) notwithstanding the nuclear context since 1945, Landpower retained, indeed retains, most of the strategic utility it has possessed through all of history: this is a prudent judgment resting empirically on the evidence of 70 years' experience. In short, the strategic Landpower maintained today safely can be assumed to be necessary for security long into the future. No matter how familiar the concept of strategic Landpower is when identified and expressed thus, it is a physical and psychological reality that has persisted to strategic effect through all of the strategic history to which we have access"--Publisher's web site.
Defense planning unavoidably must be in the nature of a mystery tour. The inability to know the future is a permanent condition for defense planning, but it is one with which we must cope. This monograph by Dr. Colin S. Gray explores and examines the implications of our irreducible ignorance about the future. His purpose is to identify an approach to this critically important subject of security that leans heavily upon what we can and should know about the past and present, in order to anticipate future conditions. The monograph finds that, although the past does not repeat itself in detail, there are profound persisting reasons why it is repeated approximately in the challenges and dangers that security communities must face. Dr. Gray concludes that notwithstanding the facts of contextual change in strategic history, the "great stream of time" from the past, through the present, into the future commands critically significant continuities in history that yield an approach to the future...
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