Central banks play an important role in the course of national economies and the global economy. Their leaders are regularly feted or vilified, their policy pronouncements highly anticipated and routinely scrutinized. This is all the more so since the global financial crisis. The past fifteen years in monetary policy is essentially the story of two mistakes and one triumph, argues Pierre L. Siklos, a professor of economics at Wilfrid Laurier University. One mistake was that central bankers underestimated the connection between finance and the real economy. The other was a failure to realize how inter-connected the world's financial system had become. The triumph, in turn, was the recognition that price stability is a desirable objective. As a result of the financial crisis, central banks stepped into the breach to provide services other institutions were unwilling or unable to carry out. In doing so, the responsibilities for governing monetary policy and financial system stability became more elastic without due consideration for the appropriateness of the division of responsibilities. Central banks no longer influence just prices they also change financial system quantities. This leads to rising policy uncertainty. And low economic growth, an insufficiently unsubstantiated expansion of central bank responsibilities, and worries over future financial instability are sources of concern that contribute to a loss of confidence in the monetary authorities around the globe. Because no coherent new framework for central bank policy has since emerged, central banking is not broken, but it is in need of repair. Central Banks into the Breach provides an overarching analysis of the current and vulnerable state of central banks and offers potential solutions to stabilize the uncertain future of central banking.
Central banks have emerged as the key players in national and international policy making. This book explores their evolution since World War II in 20 industrial countries. The study considers the mix of economic, political and institutional forces that have affected central bank behaviour and its relationship with government. The analysis reconciles vastly different views about the role of central banks in the making of economic policies. One finding is that monetary policy is an evolutionary process.
The economic influence of central banks has received ever more attention given their centrality during the financial crises that led to the Great Recession, strains in the European Union, and the challenges to the Euro. The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Central Banking reflects the state of the art in the theory and practice and covers a wide range of topics that will provide insight to students, scholars, and practitioners. As an up to date reference of the current and potential challenges faced by central banks in the conduct of monetary policy and in the search for the maintenance of financial system stability, this Oxford Handbook covers a wide range of essential issues. The first section provides insights into central bank governance, the differing degrees of central bank independence, and the internal dynamics of their decision making. The next section focuses on questions of whether central banks can ameliorate fiscal burdens, various strategies to affect monetary policy, and how the global financial crisis affected the relationship between the traditional focus on inflation targeting and unconventional policy instruments such as quantitative easing (QE), foreign exchange market interventions, negative interest rates, and forward guidance. The next two sections turn to central bank communications and management of expectations and then mechanisms of policy transmission. The fifth part explores the challenges of recent developments in the economy and debates about the roles central banks should play, focusing on micro- and macro-prudential arguments. The implications of recent developments for policy modeling are covered in the last section. The breadth and depth enhances understanding of the challenges and opportunities facing central banks.
This paper surveys three types of monetary arrangements. It considers how the choice of an exchange rate regime, the degree of central bank independence, or choice of currency unions or boards depends not only on economic considerations but also on political economy considerations. In economic terms, the choice of monetary regime will depend on the policy that is best suited to reducing or stabilizing inflation. In political economy terms, the choice of monetary arrangement will ultimately depend on how independent a country wishes to be from shocks emanating from the rest of the world and the weight politicians attach to influencing economic conditions in their own country.
This paper compares Hungary’s experience with sterilization with that of other capital inflow episodes. The study focuses on the short-run impact of sterilization on monetary policy. The empirical data indicate that sterilized interventions by the National Bank of Hungary (NBH) were not significant until mid-1994, sometime after the return to power of the former Communist leaders. Thus, in the second half of 1994, the NBH began to demonstrate more firmly its independence by tightening monetary policy. By the beginning of 1995, the direction of fiscal policy had begun to show consonance with the overall aims of monetary policy.
This book explores the evolution of central banks since World War II in 20 industrial countries. The study considers the mix of economic, political, and institutional forces that have affected central bank behavior and its relationship with government.
Central banks play an important role in the course of national economies and the global economy. Their leaders are regularly feted or vilified, their policy pronouncements highly anticipated and routinely scrutinized. This is all the more so since the global financial crisis. The past fifteen years in monetary policy is essentially the story of two mistakes and one triumph, argues Pierre L. Siklos, a professor of economics at Wilfrid Laurier University. One mistake was that central bankers underestimated the connection between finance and the real economy. The other was a failure to realize how inter-connected the world's financial system had become. The triumph, in turn, was the recognition that price stability is a desirable objective. As a result of the financial crisis, central banks stepped into the breach to provide services other institutions were unwilling or unable to carry out. In doing so, the responsibilities for governing monetary policy and financial system stability became more elastic without due consideration for the appropriateness of the division of responsibilities. Central banks no longer influence just prices they also change financial system quantities. This leads to rising policy uncertainty. And low economic growth, an insufficiently unsubstantiated expansion of central bank responsibilities, and worries over future financial instability are sources of concern that contribute to a loss of confidence in the monetary authorities around the globe. Because no coherent new framework for central bank policy has since emerged, central banking is not broken, but it is in need of repair. Central Banks into the Breach provides an overarching analysis of the current and vulnerable state of central banks and offers potential solutions to stabilize the uncertain future of central banking.
Experts analyze the recent emphasis on central communication as an additional policy and accountability device. In recent years central bankers have placed new emphasis on communication with financial markets and the general public. They have done this not only through the traditional channel of monetary policy pronouncements but also by increasing the quantity of information they make public. Yet as central banks strive to provide more and clearer information about the outlook for the economy, they must balance their capacity to steer economic expectations with their natural caution about committing to future monetary policy paths. This volume offers a variety of perspectives on the economic implications of increased central bank communication. Contributors offer theoretical analyses of the effect of central bank communication on the general macroeconomic environment; consider a variety of novel empirical approaches to the issue; and analyze communication, decision making, and governance practices of the Greenspan-era U.S. Federal Reserve, the fledgling European Central Bank, and a variety of smaller central banks, including those of the Czech Republic, Sweden, England, and New Zealand. Contributors Helge Berger, Michelle Bligh, Marianna Blix-Grimaldi, Ales Bulír, Robert Chirinko, Martin Cihák, Christopher Curran, Paul De Grauwe, Jakob de Haan, Michael Ehrmann, Marcel Fratzscher, Petra Geraats, Gregory Hess, Roman Horváth, David-Jan Jansen, Özer Karagedikli, Michael Lamla, David Mayes, Alberto Montagnoli, Pierre L. Siklos, Katerina Smídková, Jan-Egbert Sturm, Jan Zápal
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