There are demands on central banks and financial regulators to take on new responsibilities for supporting the transition to a low-carbon economy. Regulators can indeed facilitate the reorientation of financial flows necessary for the transition. But their powers should not be overestimated. Their diagnostic and policy toolkits are still in their infancy. They cannot (and should not) expand their mandate unilaterally. Taking on these new responsibilities can also have potential pitfalls and unintended consequences. Ultimately, financial regulators cannot deliver a low-carbon economy by themselves and should not risk being caught again in the role of ‘the only game in town.’
Climate change presents risks and opportunities for the real economies and financial sectors of the IMF’s global membership. Understanding the risks is key to prepare for a successful transition to a lower carbon global economy. This will unlock the many opportunities for technological progress and structural transformation along the path that financial sectors around the world will need to adapt to and support. This note lays out the IMF staff’s emerging approach to assessing the impact of climate change on banking sector stability risks conducted in the context of the IMF’s Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP). The note starts with a primer on climate change risk, both transition and physical, explaining some of the technical terms and concepts used in this work. It explains the approach to standard risk analysis in FSAPs, and how this would be modified in broad terms to incorporate climate risk. The note then discusses different approaches to the analysis of physical versus transition risk, their implications for the macro-economy and across sectors in the real economy and different geographies, and how all these effects map into the banking sector. The note illustrates concepts with examples of applications from recent FSAPs and takes note of the many challenges confronting this work, including data gaps and uncertainty regarding climate projections and long simulation horizons in conducting the climate risk analysis. As such the note is focused on methods that IMF staff are deploying to raise awareness of the risks, and adaptation needs, including need for banks to develop tools to manage climate risks and for financial sector supervisory authorities to adequately supervise this risk.
The transition to a low-carbon economy, which is needed to mitigate climate change and meet the Paris Agreement temperature goals, has been affected by the supply chain and energy supply disruptions that originated during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the subsequent energy crisis and exacerbation of geopolitical tensions. These developments, and the broader context of the ongoing “polycrisis,” can affect future decarbonization scenarios. This reflects three main factors: (1) pullbacks in climate mitigation policies and increased carbon lock-in in fossil fuel infrastructure and policymaking; (2) the decreasing likelihood of continuous cost reduction in renewable energy technologies; and (3) the likely intensification of macroeconomic shocks amid increasing geoeconomic fragmentation, and the associated policy responses. In this context, the note assesses the implications of the polycrisis for hypothetical scenarios used to assess climate-related financial risks. Following an analysis of the channels through which these effects are likely to materialize over short- and long-term horizons and some policy implications, the note proposes potential adjustments to the design of the climate scenarios used by financial institutions, central banks, and financial sector supervisors and regulators within their risk management frameworks.
Concentration risk is an important feature of many banking sectors, especially in emerging and small economies. Under the Basel Framework, Pillar 1 capital requirements for credit risk do not cover concentration risk, and those calculated under the Internal Ratings Based (IRB) approach explicitly exclude it. Banks are expected to compensate for this by autonomously estimating and setting aside appropriate capital buffers, which supervisors are required to assess and possibly challenge within the Pillar 2 process. Inadequate reflection of this risk can lead to insufficient capital levels even when the capital ratios seem high. We propose a flexible technique, based on a combination of “full” credit portfolio modeling and asymptotic results, to calculate capital requirements for name and sector concentration risk in banks’ portfolios. The proposed approach lends itself to be used in bilateral surveillance, as a potential area for technical assistance on banking supervision, and as a policy tool to gauge the degree of concentration risk in different banking systems.
This paper explores three possible transmission channels for transition risk shocks to the financial system in Norway. First, we estimate the direct firm-level impact of a substantial increase in domestic carbon prices under severe assumptions. Second, we map the impact of a drastic increase in global carbon prices on the domestic economy via the Norwegian oil sector. Third, we model the impact of a forced reduction in Norwegian oil firms’ output on shareholder portfolios. Results show that such a sharp increase in carbon prices would have a significant but manageable impact on banks. Finally, the paper discusses ways to advance the still evolving field of transition risk stress testing.
There are demands on central banks and financial regulators to take on new responsibilities for supporting the transition to a low-carbon economy. Regulators can indeed facilitate the reorientation of financial flows necessary for the transition. But their powers should not be overestimated. Their diagnostic and policy toolkits are still in their infancy. They cannot (and should not) expand their mandate unilaterally. Taking on these new responsibilities can also have potential pitfalls and unintended consequences. Ultimately, financial regulators cannot deliver a low-carbon economy by themselves and should not risk being caught again in the role of ‘the only game in town.’
Concentration risk is an important feature of many banking sectors, especially in emerging and small economies. Under the Basel Framework, Pillar 1 capital requirements for credit risk do not cover concentration risk, and those calculated under the Internal Ratings Based (IRB) approach explicitly exclude it. Banks are expected to compensate for this by autonomously estimating and setting aside appropriate capital buffers, which supervisors are required to assess and possibly challenge within the Pillar 2 process. Inadequate reflection of this risk can lead to insufficient capital levels even when the capital ratios seem high. We propose a flexible technique, based on a combination of “full” credit portfolio modeling and asymptotic results, to calculate capital requirements for name and sector concentration risk in banks’ portfolios. The proposed approach lends itself to be used in bilateral surveillance, as a potential area for technical assistance on banking supervision, and as a policy tool to gauge the degree of concentration risk in different banking systems.
The transition to a low-carbon economy, which is needed to mitigate climate change and meet the Paris Agreement temperature goals, has been affected by the supply chain and energy supply disruptions that originated during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the subsequent energy crisis and exacerbation of geopolitical tensions. These developments, and the broader context of the ongoing “polycrisis,” can affect future decarbonization scenarios. This reflects three main factors: (1) pullbacks in climate mitigation policies and increased carbon lock-in in fossil fuel infrastructure and policymaking; (2) the decreasing likelihood of continuous cost reduction in renewable energy technologies; and (3) the likely intensification of macroeconomic shocks amid increasing geoeconomic fragmentation, and the associated policy responses. In this context, the note assesses the implications of the polycrisis for hypothetical scenarios used to assess climate-related financial risks. Following an analysis of the channels through which these effects are likely to materialize over short- and long-term horizons and some policy implications, the note proposes potential adjustments to the design of the climate scenarios used by financial institutions, central banks, and financial sector supervisors and regulators within their risk management frameworks.
Climate change presents risks and opportunities for the real economies and financial sectors of the IMF’s global membership. Understanding the risks is key to prepare for a successful transition to a lower carbon global economy. This will unlock the many opportunities for technological progress and structural transformation along the path that financial sectors around the world will need to adapt to and support. This note lays out the IMF staff’s emerging approach to assessing the impact of climate change on banking sector stability risks conducted in the context of the IMF’s Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP). The note starts with a primer on climate change risk, both transition and physical, explaining some of the technical terms and concepts used in this work. It explains the approach to standard risk analysis in FSAPs, and how this would be modified in broad terms to incorporate climate risk. The note then discusses different approaches to the analysis of physical versus transition risk, their implications for the macro-economy and across sectors in the real economy and different geographies, and how all these effects map into the banking sector. The note illustrates concepts with examples of applications from recent FSAPs and takes note of the many challenges confronting this work, including data gaps and uncertainty regarding climate projections and long simulation horizons in conducting the climate risk analysis. As such the note is focused on methods that IMF staff are deploying to raise awareness of the risks, and adaptation needs, including need for banks to develop tools to manage climate risks and for financial sector supervisory authorities to adequately supervise this risk.
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