But what is wrong with this army if five divisions manage to be pulverized in two days? (Galeazzo Ciano, Diary, 11 December 1940). Fox killed in the open. (Telegram from Gen. Richard O’Connor, commander of the XIII Army Corps, to Gen. Archibal Wavell commander of the British FFAA in the Middle East, February 8, 1941) The defeat suffered in Egypt and Cyrenaica by the army of Marshal Rodolfo Graziani by the Western Desert Force, which culminated in the annihilation of the 10th Army in Beda Fomm in February 1941, constitutes the most serious defeat of the Italian army in the course of its history even worse than that which occurred on October 24, 1917 in the battle of Caporetto: an army of 150,000 men left in the hands of an enemy only 36,000 strong 133,298 prisoners, 420 tanks, 845 guns and 564 airplanes in the space of exactly two months , from 9 December 1940 to 9 February 1941, undergoing its strategic initiative and moral superiority. For Italy, the defeat in Cyrenaica was a severe downsizing and the end of the guerra parallela, with strategic subordination to the German Reich. But as for Caporetto, the Royal Army, far from being defeated, recovered immediately also and above all thanks to the help of the Third Reich and to the example provided by the Deutsches Afrika Korps units. The volume analyzes the forces on the field, the political pressures made by Rome on Graziani to push him to attack, and the military operations, from the Italian invasion of Egypt until the decisive battles of Bardia, Tobruk, el Mechili and Beda Fomm. From Sidi el Barrani to Beda Fomm has the objective to present a wiew of Wawell’s whirlwind victory from the other side of the hill. The Italian perspective.
But what is wrong with this army if five divisions manage to be pulverized in two days? (Galeazzo Ciano, Diary, 11 December 1940). Fox killed in the open. (Telegram from Gen. Richard O’Connor, commander of the XIII Army Corps, to Gen. Archibal Wavell commander of the British FFAA in the Middle East, February 8, 1941) The defeat suffered in Egypt and Cyrenaica by the army of Marshal Rodolfo Graziani by the Western Desert Force, which culminated in the annihilation of the 10th Army in Beda Fomm in February 1941, constitutes the most serious defeat of the Italian army in the course of its history even worse than that which occurred on October 24, 1917 in the battle of Caporetto: an army of 150,000 men left in the hands of an enemy only 36,000 strong 133,298 prisoners, 420 tanks, 845 guns and 564 airplanes in the space of exactly two months , from 9 December 1940 to 9 February 1941, undergoing its strategic initiative and moral superiority. For Italy, the defeat in Cyrenaica was a severe downsizing and the end of the guerra parallela, with strategic subordination to the German Reich. But as for Caporetto, the Royal Army, far from being defeated, recovered immediately also and above all thanks to the help of the Third Reich and to the example provided by the Deutsches Afrika Korps units. The volume analyzes the forces on the field, the political pressures made by Rome on Graziani to push him to attack, and the military operations, from the Italian invasion of Egypt until the decisive battles of Bardia, Tobruk, el Mechili and Beda Fomm. From Sidi el Barrani to Beda Fomm has the objective to present a wiew of Wawell’s whirlwind victory from the other side of the hill. The Italian perspective.
The Black Shirts were sent to the Eastern Front to constitute the ideological spearhead of the struggle between fascism and Soviet communism: summed up by Mussolini with the slogan: Or Rome or Moscow. After the good results obtained in 1941 by the 63rd Tagliamento Legion, other units were sent to Russia in the course of 1942 coming to form the Groupings 3 Gennaio and 23 Marzo, which were practically two brigades that, together with the Croatian Legion of MVSN, distinguished themselves during the advance towards Don and Volga and during the defensive battles of summer-winter 1942, and that suffered heavy losses during the Italian retreat of winter 1942-43.
The Black Shirts were sent to the Eastern Front to constitute the ideological spearhead of the struggle between fascism and Soviet communism: summed up by Mussolini with the slogan: Or Rome or Moscow. After the good results obtained in 1941 by the 63rd Tagliamento Legion, other units were sent to Russia in the course of 1942 coming to form the Groupings 3 Gennaio and 23 Marzo, which were practically two brigades that, together with the Croatian Legion of MVSN, distinguished themselves during the advance towards Don and Volga and during the defensive battles of summer-winter 1942, and that suffered heavy losses during the Italian retreat of winter 1942-43.
The Monte Cervino Ski Battalion was certainly an exception in the poorly equipped Italian Armed Forces in the Second World War. Made up of highly specialized personnel - ski instructors and alpine guides - coming from the Alpine School of Aosta, the battalion received equipment that was decidedly superior to that of the average Italian soldiers: from camouflage suits to boots with vibram insulating rubber soles up to the number of MAB 38 submachine guns distributed in an unparalleled extent compared to other departments. Nicknamed by the Soviets Satanas Bielij "white devils" for their winter suits, the Monte Cervino's men proudly belonged to the best unit of the Italian Royal Army, and the most decorated in relation to his strength: 4 Golden medals for military bravery, 43 Silver, 69 Bronze, 81 War Crosses; and Monte Cervino can be considered the best mountain unit not only of the Axis armies but in all probability in the entire world during the world war...
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