This book traces the development of Marx's ethics as they underwent various shifts and changes during different periods of his thought. In his early writings, his ethics were based on a concept of essence much like Aristotle's, which Marx tried to link to a principle of universalization similar to Kant's "categorical imperative." In the period 1845-46, Marx abandoned this view, holding morality to be incompatible with his historical materialism. In the later work he was less of a determinist. Though he no longer wished to reject morality, he did want to transcend a morality of burdensome obligation and constraint in order to realize a community built upon spontaneous bonds of solidarity.
Philip J. Kain deftly demonstrates the historical antecedents to and continuing relevance of Karl Marx's thought. Kain reveals the unappreciated pluralism of Marx, how it has endured and how it will continue to adapt to the challenges of modern day thought such as feminist theory.
Nietzsche believed in the horror of existence: a world filled with meaningless sufferingA suffering for no reason at all. He also believed in eternal recurrence, the view that that our lives will repeat infinitely, and that in each life every detail will be exactly the same. Furthermore, it was not enough for Nietzsche that eternal recurrence simply be acceptedA he demanded that it be loved. Thus the philosopher who introduces eternal recurrence is the very same philosopher who also believes in the horror of existence. In this groundbreaking study, Philip Kain develops an insightful account of Nietzsche's strange and paradoxical view that a life of pain and suffering is perhaps the only life it really makes sense to want to live again.
An especially accessible introduction to Hegels moral and political philosophy. In this book, Philip J. Kain introduces Hegels Philosophy of Right by focusing on disagreements, both with standard interpretations of his work and with Hegel himself. Arguing that Hegels justification for punishment ultimately fails, Kain shows how this failure brings into focus the inherent difficulties in justifying punishment at all, thus producing a valuable Hegelian argument against punishment. Whereas many of Hegels critics have argued that he misunderstands Kants categorical imperative, Kain argues the opposite: that Hegel has a sophisticated understanding of it and simply attempts to provide a broader ethical context for Kants position. In addressing these and other questions, such as whether Hegels theory of recognition, properly understood, can provide philosophical support for same-sex marriage, and whether supporting monarchy over democracy means that Hegel seeks less rather than greater power for the state, Kain makes Hegels work more approachable by drawing out philosophical points of independent importance.
Many think Marx a totalitarian and Soviet Marxism the predictable outcome of his thought. How might one combat this completely mistaken image? What if one could demonstrate that Western European social democracy represents Marx's thought far more than did Soviet Marxism? What if one shows that Marx and social democracy are quite compatible? What if one shows that Marx actually supported social democratic parties? If social democracy is closer to being the true face of Marxism after Marx, then all claims of totalitarianism evaporate. There is nothing remotely totalitarian about social democracy. And from the start, social democrats were highly critical of the undemocratic tactics of Soviet Marxism. To demonstrate the relationship between Marx and social democracy it will be necessary to show that for Marx socialist society is compatible with a market economy-as long as markets are controlled to eliminate alienation. It will also be necessary to show that markets can be controlled democratically, that Marx was very much a democrat, and that he and Engels worked quite actively with democratic parties. It will also be necessary to show that Marx developed a theory of revolution compatible with a democratic electoral movement engaged in by a social democratic party. It will also be necessary to show that Marx and Engels, from the late 1860s on, worked extensively with and supported the Social Democratic Party of Germany-which eventually became the largest party in Germany and the largest socialist party in the world"--
Many think Marx a totalitarian and Soviet Marxism the predictable outcome of his thought. How might one combat this completely mistaken image? What if one could demonstrate that Western European social democracy represents Marx's thought far more than did Soviet Marxism? What if one shows that Marx and social democracy are quite compatible? What if one shows that Marx actually supported social democratic parties? If social democracy is closer to being the true face of Marxism after Marx, then all claims of totalitarianism evaporate. There is nothing remotely totalitarian about social democracy. And from the start, social democrats were highly critical of the undemocratic tactics of Soviet Marxism. To demonstrate the relationship between Marx and social democracy it will be necessary to show that for Marx socialist society is compatible with a market economy-as long as markets are controlled to eliminate alienation. It will also be necessary to show that markets can be controlled democratically, that Marx was very much a democrat, and that he and Engels worked quite actively with democratic parties. It will also be necessary to show that Marx developed a theory of revolution compatible with a democratic electoral movement engaged in by a social democratic party. It will also be necessary to show that Marx and Engels, from the late 1860s on, worked extensively with and supported the Social Democratic Party of Germany-which eventually became the largest party in Germany and the largest socialist party in the world"--
This book traces the development of Marx's ethics as they underwent various shifts and changes during different periods of his thought. In his early writings, his ethics were based on a concept of essence much like Aristotle's, which Marx tried to link to a principle of universalization similar to Kant's "categorical imperative." In the period 1845-46, Marx abandoned this view, holding morality to be incompatible with his historical materialism. In the later work he was less of a determinist. Though he no longer wished to reject morality, he did want to transcend a morality of burdensome obligation and constraint in order to realize a community built upon spontaneous bonds of solidarity.
This volume by Philip J. Kain is one of the most accessibly written books on Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit available. Avoiding technical jargon without diluting Hegel's thought, Kain shows the Phenomenology responding to Kant in far more places than are usually recognized. This perspective makes Hegel's text easier to understand. Kain also argues against the traditional understanding of the absolute and touches on Hegel's relation to contemporary feminist and postmodern themes.
Nietzsche believed in the horror of existence: a world filled with meaningless sufferingA suffering for no reason at all. He also believed in eternal recurrence, the view that that our lives will repeat infinitely, and that in each life every detail will be exactly the same. Furthermore, it was not enough for Nietzsche that eternal recurrence simply be acceptedA he demanded that it be loved. Thus the philosopher who introduces eternal recurrence is the very same philosopher who also believes in the horror of existence. In this groundbreaking study, Philip Kain develops an insightful account of Nietzsche's strange and paradoxical view that a life of pain and suffering is perhaps the only life it really makes sense to want to live again.
In this book, Philip J. Kain introduces Hegel's Philosophy of Right by focusing on disagreements, both with standard interpretations of his work and with Hegel himself. Arguing that Hegel's justification for punishment ultimately fails, Kain shows how this failure brings into focus the inherent difficulties in justifying punishment at all, thus producing a valuable Hegelian argument against punishment. Whereas many of Hegel's critics have argued that he misunderstands Kant's categorical imperative, Kain argues the opposite: that Hegel has a sophisticated understanding of it and simply attempts to provide a broader ethical context for Kant's position. In addressing these and other questions, such as whether Hegel's theory of recognition, properly understood, can provide philosophical support for same-sex marriage, and whether supporting monarchy over democracy means that Hegel seeks less rather than greater power for the state, Kain makes Hegel's work more approachable by drawing out philosophical points of independent importance.
Schiller, Hegel and Marx looked back to ancient Greek culture, viewing it as the historical embodiment of certain ideals central to aesthetic theory. This volume investigates their viewpoints and how they use Greek culture as an ideal model for remaking t
Philip J. Kain deftly demonstrates the historical antecedents to and continuing relevance of Karl Marx's thought. Kain reveals the unappreciated pluralism of Marx, how it has endured and how it will continue to adapt to the challenges of modern day thought such as feminist theory.
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