Peter Unger's provocative new book poses a serious challenge to contemporary analytic philosophy, arguing that to its detriment it focuses the predominance of its energy on "empty ideas." In the mid-twentieth century, philosophers generally agreed that, by contrast with science, philosophy should offer no substantial thoughts about the general nature of concrete reality. Leading philosophers were concerned with little more than the semantics of ordinary words. For example: Our word "perceives" differs from our word "believes" in that the first word is used more strictly than the second. While someone may be correct in saying "I believe there's a table before me" whether or not there is a table before her, she will be correct in saying "I perceive there's a table before me" only if there is a table there. Though just a parochial idea, whether or not it is correct does make a difference to how things are with concrete reality. In Unger's terms, it is a concretely substantial idea. Alongside each such parochial substantial idea, there is an analytic or conceptual thought, as with the thought that someone may believe there is a table before her whether or not there is one, but she will perceive there is a table before her only if there is a table there. Empty of import as to how things are with concrete reality, those thoughts are what Unger calls concretely empty ideas. It is widely assumed that, since about 1970, things had changed thanks to the advent of such thoughts as the content externalism championed by Hilary Putnam and Donald Davidson, various essentialist thoughts offered by Saul Kripke, and so on. Against that assumption, Unger argues that, with hardly any exceptions aside from David Lewis's theory of a plurality of concrete worlds, all of these recent offerings are concretely empty ideas. Except when offering parochial ideas, Peter Unger maintains that mainstream philosophy still offers hardly anything beyond concretely empty ideas.
The view known as Liberationism, which holds that moral intuitions are often unreflective of basic values, contrasts with the more common view known as Preservationism, which maintains that our moral intuitions accord with our basic moral values. This book explores the inconsistencies in the Preservationist position.
Collected in two volumes, this work includes articles spanning over 40 years of philosopher Peter Unger's long career. Dividing the articles thematically, this first volume collects work in epistemology and ethics, among other topics, while the second volume focuses on metaphysics.
Unger provocatively breaks with what he terms the conservatism of present day philosophy, and returns to central themes from Descartes, Locke, Hume and others. He sets out to answer profoundly difficult human questions about ourselves and the world in this philosophical journey into the nature of reality.
In this volume Peter Unger questions the objective answers that have been given to traditional problems in philosophy. He casts doubt on the unquestioned view that fundamental questions pertaining to meaning and existence have direct solutions.
The topic of personal identity has prompted some of the liveliest and most interesting debates in recent philosophy. In a fascinating new contribution to the discussion, Peter Unger presents a psychologically aimed, but physically based, account of our identity over time. While supporting the account, he explains why many influential contemporary philosophers have underrated the importance of physical continuity to our survival, casting a new light on the work of Lewis, Nagel, Nozick, Parfit, Perry, Shoemaker, and others. Deriving from his discussion of our identity itself, Unger produces a novel but commonsensical theory of the relations between identity and some of our deepest concerns. In a conservative but flexible spirit, he explores the implications of his theory for questions of value and of the good life.
Argues for the thesis of universal ignorance, i.e., for the claim that nobody can ever know anything. To this effect, puts forward versions of the classical Cartesian argument for skepticism as well as novel arguments involving normative premises and the concept of certainty.
Unger provocatively breaks with what he terms the conservatism of present day philosophy, and returns to central themes from Descartes, Locke, Hume and others. He sets out to answer profoundly difficult human questions about ourselves and the world in this philosophical journey into the nature of reality.
Peter Unger's provocative new book poses a serious challenge to contemporary analytic philosophy, arguing that to its detriment it focuses the predominance of its energy on "empty ideas." In the mid-twentieth century, philosophers generally agreed that, by contrast with science, philosophy should offer no substantial thoughts about the general nature of concrete reality. Leading philosophers were concerned with little more than the semantics of ordinary words. For example: Our word "perceives" differs from our word "believes" in that the first word is used more strictly than the second. While someone may be correct in saying "I believe there's a table before me" whether or not there is a table before her, she will be correct in saying "I perceive there's a table before me" only if there is a table there. Though just a parochial idea, whether or not it is correct does make a difference to how things are with concrete reality. In Unger's terms, it is a concretely substantial idea. Alongside each such parochial substantial idea, there is an analytic or conceptual thought, as with the thought that someone may believe there is a table before her whether or not there is one, but she will perceive there is a table before her only if there is a table there. Empty of import as to how things are with concrete reality, those thoughts are what Unger calls concretely empty ideas. It is widely assumed that, since about 1970, things had changed thanks to the advent of such thoughts as the content externalism championed by Hilary Putnam and Donald Davidson, various essentialist thoughts offered by Saul Kripke, and so on. Against that assumption, Unger argues that, with hardly any exceptions aside from David Lewis's theory of a plurality of concrete worlds, all of these recent offerings are concretely empty ideas. Except when offering parochial ideas, Peter Unger maintains that mainstream philosophy still offers hardly anything beyond concretely empty ideas.
It is widely recognized that analytical technologies and techniques are playing a pioneering role in a range of today's foremost challenging scientific endeavours, including especially biological and biomedical research. Worthy of mention, for example, are the role that high performance separation techniques played in mapping the human genome and the pioneering work done within mass spectrometry. It is also apparent that state-of-the-art pharmaceutical and biomedical research is the major driving force of the development of new analytical techniques. Advancements in genomics research has provided the opportunity for a call for new drug targets for new technologies, which has speeded up drug discovery and helped to counteract the trend towards inflation of R&D costs.This book has been designed to be a reference covering a wide range of protein and genomic material analysis techniques. Emerging developments are presented with applications where relevant, and biological examples are included. It was developed to meet the ever growing need for a comprehensive and balanced text on an analytical technique which has generated a tremendous amount of interest in recent years.In addition, this book also serves as a modern textbook for advanced undergraduate and graduate courses in various disciplines including chemistry, biology and pharmacy.Authors of the individual chapters are recognized champions of their individual research disciplines and also represent contemporary major research centres in this field.·Contains state-of-the-art knowledge of the field and detailed descriptions of new technologies·Provides examples of relevant applications and case studies·Contributing authors are leading scientists in their own respective research fields
Peter Cornwell tells the story of the greatest air battle of the Second World War when six nations were locked in combat over north-western Europe for a traumatic six weeks in 1940. He describes the day-to-day events as the battle unfolds, and details the losses suffered by all six nations involved: Britain, France, Holland, Belgium, Germany and, rather belatedly, Italy. As far as RAF fighter squadrons in France were concerned, it was an all-Hurricane show, yet it was the Blenheim and Battle crews who suffered the brunt of the casualties. Every aircraft lost or damaged through enemy action while operating in France is listed together with the fate of the crews. The RAF lost more than a thousand aircraft of all types over the Western Front during the six-week battle, the French Air Force 1,400, but Luftwaffe losses were even higher at over 1,800 aircraft.
The view known as Liberationism, which holds that moral intuitions are often unreflective of basic values, contrasts with the more common view known as Preservationism, which maintains that our moral intuitions accord with our basic moral values. This book explores the inconsistencies in the Preservationist position.
Collected in two volumes, this work includes articles spanning over 40 years of philosopher Peter Unger's long career. Dividing the articles thematically, this first volume collects work in epistemology and ethics, among other topics, while the second volume focuses on metaphysics.
The topic of personal identity has prompted some of the liveliest and most interesting debates in recent philosophy. In a fascinating new contribution to the discussion, Peter Unger presents a psychologically aimed, but physically based, account of our identity over time. While supporting the account, he explains why many influential contemporary philosophers have underrated the importance of physical continuity to our survival, casting a new light on the work of Lewis, Nagel, Nozick, Parfit, Perry, Shoemaker, and others. Deriving from his discussion of our identity itself, Unger produces a novel but commonsensical theory of the relations between identity and some of our deepest concerns. In a conservative but flexible spirit, he explores the implications of his theory for questions of value and of the good life.
Collected in two volumes, this work includes articles spanning over 40 years of philosopher Peter Unger's long career. Dividing the articles thematically, this first volume collects work in epistemology and ethics, among other topics, while the second volume focuses on metaphysics.
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