This book shows how a stormy parliamentary debate over the sale of German properties in Nigeria on 8 November 1916 began the process which brought down Asquith and made Lloyd George prime minister. The colonial secretary, Bonar Law, who was also leader of the Conservative Party, wanted neutral firms to bid. Usually presented as a policy imposed on him by doctrinaire Liberal free-traders, it was in fact that of the colonial government, which hoped that encouraging foreign competition would prevent the Nigerian export economy becoming controlled by a ring of mainly Liverpool firms. Seeing itself as the defender of Nigerian interests, the Colonial Office endorsed this. The large British companies got up an agitation, which was taken over by Sir Edward Carson, the one significant opposition politician, as part of his attack on supposed German influence in high places. Law counter-attacked by arguing that a supposedly patriotic cause masked the greed of an emergent cartel. He succeeded because smaller British and African firms, trying to break into the now profitable produce export trade, had already painted that picture. By defeating Carson in the debate, Law became again an effective party leader, who hoped to re-invigorate the coalition, but instead found himself working with Lloyd George to sideline Asquith. Based on underused sources, and overturning established interpretations, the book situates the debate within the context of the development of the Nigerian economy, the conflicts between the major firms, the role of oils and fats in wartime, and the emergence of Nigerian nationalism.
Peter Yearwood reconsiders the League of Nations, not as an attempt to realize an idea but as an element in the day-to-day conduct of Britain's foreign policy and domestic politics during the period 1914-25. He challenges the usual view that London reluctantly adopted the idea in response to pressure from Woodrow Wilson and from domestic public opinion, and that it was particularly wary of ideas of collective security. Instead he examines how London actively promoted the idea to manage Anglo-American relations in war and to provide the context for an enduring hegemonic partnership. The book breaks new ground in examining how London tried to use the League in the crises of the early 1920s: Armenia, Persia, Vilna, Upper Silesia, Albania, and Corfu. It shows how in the negotiations leading to the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, the Geneva Protocol, and the Locarno accords, Robert Cecil, Ramsay MacDonald, and Austen Chamberlain tried to solve the Franco-German security question through the League. This involves a re-examination of how these leaders tried to use the League as an issue in British domestic politics and why it emerged as central to British foreign policy. Based on extensive, detailed archival research, this book provides a new and authoritative account of a largely misunderstood topic.
This book shows how a stormy parliamentary debate over the sale of German properties in Nigeria on 8 November 1916 began the process which brought down Asquith and made Lloyd George prime minister. The colonial secretary, Bonar Law, who was also leader of the Conservative Party, wanted neutral firms to bid. Usually presented as a policy imposed on him by doctrinaire Liberal free-traders, it was in fact that of the colonial government, which hoped that encouraging foreign competition would prevent the Nigerian export economy becoming controlled by a ring of mainly Liverpool firms. Seeing itself as the defender of Nigerian interests, the Colonial Office endorsed this. The large British companies got up an agitation, which was taken over by Sir Edward Carson, the one significant opposition politician, as part of his attack on supposed German influence in high places. Law counter-attacked by arguing that a supposedly patriotic cause masked the greed of an emergent cartel. He succeeded because smaller British and African firms, trying to break into the now profitable produce export trade, had already painted that picture. By defeating Carson in the debate, Law became again an effective party leader, who hoped to re-invigorate the coalition, but instead found himself working with Lloyd George to sideline Asquith. Based on underused sources, and overturning established interpretations, the book situates the debate within the context of the development of the Nigerian economy, the conflicts between the major firms, the role of oils and fats in wartime, and the emergence of Nigerian nationalism.
The book breaks new ground in examining how London tried to use the League in the crises of the early 1920s: Armenia, Persia, Vilna, Upper Silesia, Albania, and Corfu. It shows how in the negotiations leading to the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, the Geneva Protocol, and the Locarno accords, Robert Cecil, Ramsay MacDonald, and Austen Chamberlain tried to solve the Franco-German security question through the League. This involves a re-examination of how these leaders tried to use the League as an issue in British domestic politics and why it emerged as central to British foreign policy."--pub. desc.
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