In The End of Grand Strategy, Simon Reich and Peter Dombrowski challenge the common view of grand strategy as unitary. They eschew prescription of any one specific approach, chosen from a spectrum that stretches from global primacy to restraint and isolationism, in favor of describing what America’s military actually does, day to day. They argue that a series of fundamental recent changes in the global system, the inevitable jostling of bureaucratic politics, and the practical limitations of field operations combine to ensure that each presidential administration inevitably resorts to a variety of strategies. Proponents of different American grand strategies have historically focused on the pivotal role of the Navy. In response, Reich and Dombrowski examine six major maritime operations, each of which reflects one major strategy. One size does not fit all, say the authors—the attempt to impose a single overarching blueprint is no longer feasible. Reich and Dombrowski declare that grand strategy, as we know it, is dead. The End of Grand Strategy is essential reading for policymakers, military strategists, and analysts and critics at advocacy groups and think tanks.
Since the late 1950s the world's banks have expanded their global operations, with US institutions leading the way. As the recent global economic crisis shows, actions of private bankers can threaten capital markets, weaken national regulatory systems, and strain international cooperation-seriously endangering the world economy and the interests of nation states.
The field of grand strategy is exceptionally American-centric theoretically, methodologically and empirically. Indeed, many scholars treat the United States as a unique case, and thus incomparable. This Element addresses the shortcomings of this approach by developing a novel framework for the purpose of systematic comparison, both within and among different countries. Using the United States as a benchmark, three dimensions are considered in which grand strategy can be compared: first, attributes of the major types commonly discussed in the literature; second, similarities and differences in the implementation of grand strategies over time, using US strategic relations with contemporary Russia as an example; and finally, across space, properties of the grand strategies that are interactively employed by other major powers in relation to the United States in the Indo-Pacific. The Element can be used by scholars and students alike to expand analysis beyond the confines that currently dominate the field.
In Buying Military Transformation, Peter Dombrowski and Eugene Gholz analyze the United States military's ongoing effort to capitalize on information technology. New ideas about military doctrine derived from comparisons to Internet Age business practices can be implemented only if the military buys technologically innovative weapons systems. Buying Military Transformation examines how political and military leaders work with the defense industry to develop the small ships, unmanned aerial vehicles, advanced communications equipment, and systems-of-systems integration that will enable the new military format. Dombrowski and Gholz's analysis integrates the political relationship between the defense industry and Congress, the bureaucratic relationship between the firms and the military services, and the technical capabilities of different types of businesses. Many government officials and analysts believe that only entrepreneurial start-up firms or leaders in commercial information technology markets can produce the new, network-oriented military equipment. But Dombrowski and Gholz find that the existing defense industry will be best able to lead military-technology development, even for equipment modeled on the civilian Internet. The U.S. government is already spending billions of dollars each year on its "military transformation" program-money that could be easily misdirected and wasted if policymakers spend it on the wrong projects or work with the wrong firms. In addition to this practical implication, Buying Military Transformation offers key lessons for the theory of "Revolutions in Military Affairs." A series of military analysts have argued that major social and economic changes, like the shift from the Agricultural Age to the Industrial Age, inherently force related changes in the military. Buying Military Transformation undermines this technologically determinist claim: commercial innovation does not directly determine military innovation; instead, political leadership and military organizations choose the trajectory of defense investment. Militaries should invest in new technology in response to strategic threats and military leaders' professional judgments about the equipment needed to improve military effectiveness. Commercial technological progress by itself does not generate an imperative for military transformation. Clear, cogent, and engaging, Buying Military Transformation is essential reading for journalists, legislators, policymakers, and scholars.
The last six years have witnessed a virtually unending debate over U.S. policy toward Iraq, a debate that is likely to continue well into the new administration and perhaps the next, notwithstanding recent improvements on the ground. Too often, however, the debate has been narrowly framed in terms of the situation in Iraq and what steps the United States should take there next, leaving the broader impact of the war on American interests largely overlooked. Ultimately, though, the success and failure of the war will have to be judged in terms of its overall contribution to U.S. national security, including those repercussions that extend far beyond the borders of Iraq. This book addresses this gap by providing a comprehensive evaluation of the consequences of the Iraq war for the national security of the United States. It is aimed at both those who have not yet made up their minds about the merits of the war and those who wish to ground their opinions in a clearer understanding of what effects the war has actually had. Balance Sheet examines both how the war has advanced or retarded the achievement of other important goals of U.S. national security policy and its impact on the ability of the United States to pursue its security interests now and in the future. Individual chapters by expert authors address such key issues as the war on terror, nuclear non-proliferation, stability in the Middle East, the health of the U.S. military, America's standing in the world, and U.S. public opinion. By doing justice to the full range of stakes involved, this book not only reframes the debate over the Iraq war but provides a necessary foundation for future U.S. policymaking toward Iraq and beyond.
Though still adjusting to the end of the Cold War, the defense industry is now confronted with the prospect of military transformation. Since the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, many firms have seen business improve in response to the subsequent large increase in the defense budget. But in the longer run, the defense sector's military customers intend to reinvent themselves for a future that may require the acquisition of unfamiliar weapons and support systems. Joint and service visions of the military after next raise serious questions that require the attention of the Defense Department's civilian and uniformed leadership and industry executives alike: What are the defense industrial implications of military transformation? Will military transformation lead to major changes in the composition of the defense industrial base? This study employs network-centric warfare, a Navy transformation vision that is being adopted increasingly in the joint world as a vehicle for exploring the defense industrial implications of military transformation. We focus on three defense industrial sectors: shipbuilding, unmanned vehicles, and systems integration. The transformation to NCW will require both sustaining and disruptive innovation—that is, innovation that improves performance measured by existing standards and innovation that defines new quality metrics for defense systems. The dominant type of innovation needed to support transformation varies across industrial sectors; some sectors face more sustaining than disruptive innovation, while some sectors will need more disruptive than sustaining innovation as they supply systems for the “Navy after Next.” Military transformation does not entail wholesale defense industrial transformation. In the systems integrations sector, much of the innovation required to effect networkcentric warfare is likely to be sustaining rather than disruptive. In the parts of the defense industrial base that build platforms, on the other hand, the standards by which proposals are evaluated for the Navy after Next will be somewhat different than the standards used in the past. As a result, transformation could significantly change the industrial landscape of shipbuilding. The unmanned-vehicle sector falls somewhere in between; because unmanned vehicles have not been acquired in quantity in the past, their performance metrics are not well established. Existing suppliers of unmanned vehicles will have a role in the future industry, but some innovative concepts and technologies may come from nontraditional suppliers, such as start-up firms. The U.S. Navy bears the responsibility of transforming itself. Internally, it must find ways to deconflict the needs of the current Navy and the “Next Navy” from the needs of the Navy after Next if industry is to support its long-term transformation requirements. Externally, pervasive organizational and political obstacles to transformation require that the Navy carefully manage its relationships with Congress and industry. Recognition that military transformation need not drive existing defense firms out of business will facilitate that task.
The theme of the book is the creation of tactics for littoral warfare – as opposed to the more common blue ocean perspective. Themes are how NATO perceived the goals of the enemy; the purposes of the NATO organisations, the military instruments they had to organise, the organization of cooperation among units from sovereign states, and how they tested their military capabilities. Research is based on war plans and tactics of the Danish and West German navies and their planned support from air forces. We follow the modernisations of the navies from guns to missiles. Tactical discussions among military top offi cers are laid bare, and intelligence reports about the Warsaw Pact and its military capabilities are presented. Exercises are analysed based on the military reports.
When the 1st Marine Division began its invasion of Peleliu in September 1944, the operation in the South Pacific was to take but four days. In fact, capturing this small coral island in the Palaus with its strategic airstrip took two months and involved some of the bloodiest fighting of the Second World War in the Pacific. Rather than the easy conquest they were led to expect, the Marines who landed on Peleliu faced a war of attrition from the island's Japanese defenders, who had dug tunnels and fortified the island's rugged terrain. When the Marines' advance stalled after a week of heavy casualties, the "Wildcats" of the 81st Infantry Division were called in, at first as support. Eventually, the 1st Marines Division was evacuated and the 81st Infantry secured the island. Now Bobby C. Blair and John Peter DeCioccio tell the story of this campaign through the eyes of the 81st Infantry to offer a revised assessment. Previous accounts of the battle have focused on the 1st Marines, all but ignoring the 81st Infantry Division's contributions. Victory at Peleliu demonstrates that without the army's help the marines could not have succeeded on Peleliu. Blair and DeCioccio have mined the 81st Division's unit records and interviewed scores of veteran participants. The new data they offer challenge the orthodox view that the 81st Infantry merely mopped up an already broken enemy. Allowing their interviewees to tell much of the story, the authors also give a human face to a brutal battle. Although American efforts in the Palau Islands proved largely unnecessary to ultimately defeating the Japanese, the lessons learned on Peleliu were crucial in subsequent fighting on Iwo Jima and Okinawa. The 81st Infantry's contributions are now part of that larger story.
This book examines the crisis of democracy that has arisen in Hungary since the election of the Fidesz government in 2010. After moving swiftly to transform the Hungarian constitution, Fidesz created a new political system which has led its critics to argue that the era of democracy in Hungary is over. US Senator John McCain has gone so far as to describe Hungary as an illiberal democracy on a path toward fascism. The author argues that Fidesz has sought to challenge the capitalist and democratic transformation that shaped Hungary for 20 years after the fall of communism by increasing the power of the state over crucial aspects of the economy, society, and the political system. In so doing Fidesz’ actions resemble those undertaken by many authoritarian states that have emerged since the end of the Second World War, all aiming to build up a national capitalism and protect their economies whilst undertaking nation-building. To make sense of this the author draws upon two traditions of thought, world systems-analysis, which situates Hungary in the context of its incorporation in the modern capitalist world-system after the fall of communism; and anarchist social thought which provides a unique way of seeing the actions of states and political elites. In so doing the book argues that the events unfolding in Hungary cannot be explained on the basis of Hungarian exceptionalism but must be situated in the broader political and economic context that has shaped the development of Hungary since 1990. The form of capitalism introduced in Hungary and across the region of East and Central Europe has systematically undermined the strong state and social security that had existed under communism, and when added to the failure of the left and liberals in the region it has paved the way for far-right and neo-fascist political movements to emerge claiming the mantle of defenders of society from the market. This represents a fundamental threat to the enlightenment traditions that have shaped dominant modern political ideologies and raises profound problems for both the EU and NATO.
Nearly 90 percent of the earth's land surface is directly affected by human infrastructure and activities, yet less than 5 percent is legally "protected" for biodiversity conservation--and even most large protected areas have people living inside their boundaries. In all but a small fraction of the earth's land area, then, conservation and people must coexist. Conservation is a resource for all those who aim to reconcile biodiversity with human livelihoods. It traces the historical roots of modern conservation thought and practice, and explores current perspectives from evolutionary and community ecology, conservation biology, anthropology, political ecology, economics, and policy. The authors examine a suite of conservation strategies and perspectives from around the world, highlighting the most innovative and promising avenues for future efforts. Exploring, highlighting, and bridging gaps between the social and natural sciences as applied in the practice of conservation, this book provides a broad, practically oriented view. It is essential reading for anyone involved in the conservation process--from academic conservation biology to the management of protected areas, rural livelihood development to poverty alleviation, and from community-based natural resource management to national and global policymaking.
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