This book offers the first set of quantitative analyses of the results of deregulation of the gas wellhead process coupled with partial deregulation of pipeline transportation and product storage. This complex process OCo which involves taking pipelines out of the field markets as product purchasers, and creating spot gas and pipeline space markets OCo has changed the nature and extent of services for gas at the burner tip, and the level as well as volatility of prices for these services. Using econometric tools of analysis, the authors concentrating on these changes uncover surprising findings in contrast to what regulatory reform was supposed to accomplish. Sample Chapter(s). Chapter 1: Introduction (62 KB). Contents: Quantitative Study Number One: Regional Markets for Gas Transmission Services (V Marmer & D Shapiro); Quantitative Study Number Two: Competition Among the Few in the Natural Gas Pipelines Industry After Partial Deregulation (N Moshkin); Quantitative Study Number Three: The Basis Differentials as a Measure of Performance in Partially Deregulated Pipeline Transportation Markets (P W MacAvoy); Quantitative Study Number Four: Profitability of Natural Gas Storage Resulting from Federal Deregulation (N Moshkin); Quantitative Study Number Five: Revising the Model of Gas Wellhead Prices and Quantities for Deregulation (P W MacAvoy & V Marmer). Readership: Advanced undergraduate and graduate studies in energy pricing, supply and policy. Professionals will find the book useful for methodology and findings of fact.
Northeast Utilities Company adopted an ambitious new competitive strategy in the mid-1980s, seeking to become the low-cost supplier in New England electric power markets bracing for deregulation. Given its high-cost nuclear facilities, doing so required a corporate turnaround. For a decade Northeast faced increasing public and employee resistance to cost cutting at its nuclear plants. Though management achieved many of its goals, curtailing outlays on nuclear operations meant high risk that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission would close the plants because of frequent, prolonged outages. This is just what happened in 1996. Did management's deliberate cost-containment strategy take nuclear operations to an inevitable regulatory shutdown, and if so, why? Was it the pursuit of executive compensation tied to cost containment that caused undue risk of regulatory shutdown? Paul MacAvoy and Jean Rosenthal describe ten years of corporate performance preceding the shutdown, detailing aggressive executive decisions, mounting regulatory actions in response to increasingly severe operational failures, and--at the same time--overall improvement in corporate earnings, stock prices, and executive pay packages. They relate the complexities of managing declining nuclear plant operations under ever more pressing budgetary targets. Their discussion of the increasing risk of outages raises the issue of the tradeoff of profit and conservative management of hazard operations. All the more timely in light of the massive 2003 East Coast blackout, Corporate Profit and Nuclear Safety represents a powerful and cautionary commentary on industrial practices that goes to the heart of effective corporate governance.
MacAvoy shows how antitrust and regulation have failed to make long-distance markets competitive, to the detriment of consumers seeking prices in line with the costs of providing long-distance services.
Taking a close look at American corporate governance, the authors show what is missing in today's corporate governance, and support a case for activating the board of directors to put new controls on management and take responsibility for the result.
This vivid portrait of Bart Giamatti encompasses his entire eventful life but focuses especially on his years at Yale University (1966-1986) and his brief career as a major league baseball executive (1986-1989). As scholar, teacher, and then university president, Giamatti was an admired and respected figure on campus. He forged his academic career during turbulent decades, and his tenure in baseball was no less contentious, for as commissioner of baseball he oversaw the banishment of Cincinnati's Pete Rose from the game for gambling. The book draws on Giamatti's numerous writings and speeches to illuminate the character and complexities of the man and to understand the values that motivated his leadership. Bart Giamatti was a cultural conservative and institutional moderate at a time when such values were out of favour and under attack. At Yale, as a baseball executive, and indeed in all things, Giamatti championed the related values of freedom and order. Robert P. Moncreiff places Giamatti in the context of major events at Yale, recounts in detail the legal context in which the Pete Rose affair unfolded, and arrives at a nuanced understanding of this memorable man's life.
divOver the past six decades federal regulatory agencies have attempted different strategies to regulate the natural gas industry in the United States. All have been unsuccessful, resulting in nationwide gas shortages or massive gas surpluses and costing the nation scores of billions of dollars. In addition, partial deregulation has led the regulatory agency to become more involved in controlling individual transactions among gas producers, distributors, and consumers. In this important book, Paul MacAvoy demonstrates that no affected group has gained from these experiments in public control and that all participants would gain from complete deregulation. Although losses have declined with partial deregulation in recent years, current regulatory practices still limit the growth of supply through the transmission system. MacAvoy’s history of the regulation of natural gas is a cautionary tale for other natural resource or network industries that are regulated or are about to be regulated. /DIV
Work on this book began in the Spring of 1983, not long after an Amax Corporation annual budget meeting. As a member of the Amax board of directors since 1979, I had been present at such meetings in which the molybdenum price had been forecast to move higher than $7.00 per pound. The actual annual average prices were $9.70 in 1980, $8.50 in 1981, and $4.00 in 1982. The forecast for 1983 called for prices to return to higher levels, but as both dealer and producer prices declined further, my research began in earnest. Initially, the research was to address the question of why the molybdenum price had declined by more than half in a short period. More fundamental, as other metals prices also declined, was an impelling need to know the causes of the abrupt and sustained reduction in metals price levels that year. As prices stayed at low levels, while those of other materials recovered over the 1983-1986 period, the question became that of why metals prices had remained at startlingly low levels for over five years.
The standard wisdom among political scientists has been that "iron triangles" operated among regulatory agencies, the regulated industries, and members of Congress, all presumably with a stake in preserving regulation that protected the industries from competition. Despite almost unanimous agreement among economists that such regulation was inefficient, it seemed highly unlikely that deregulation could occur. Yet between 1975 and 1980 major deregulatory changes that strongly favored competition did take place in a wide range of industries. The results are familiar to airline passengers, users of telephone service, and trucking freight shippers, among others. Martha Derthick and Paul J. Quirk ask why this deregulation happened. How did a diffuse public interest prevail over the powerful industry and union interests that sought to preserve regulation? Why did the regulatory commissions, which were expected to be a major obstacle to deregulation, instead take the initiative on behalf of it? And why did influential members of Congress push for even greater deregulation? The authors concentrate on three cases: airlines, trucking, and telecommunications. They find important similarities among the cases and discuss the implications of these findings for two broader topics: the role that economic analysis has played in policy change, and the capacity of the American political system for transcending narrow interests.
This book focuses on the role of government in organizing the nation's transportation industries. As the authors show, over the course of the twentieth century transportation in the United States was as much a product of hard-fought politics, lobbying, and litigation as it was a naturally evolving system of engineering and available technology.
This vivid portrait of Bart Giamatti encompasses his entire eventful life but focuses especially on his years at Yale University (1966-1986) and his brief career as a major league baseball executive (1986-1989). As scholar, teacher, and then university president, Giamatti was an admired and respected figure on campus. He forged his academic career during turbulent decades, and his tenure in baseball was no less contentious, for as commissioner of baseball he oversaw the banishment of Cincinnati's Pete Rose from the game for gambling. The book draws on Giamatti's numerous writings and speeches to illuminate the character and complexities of the man and to understand the values that motivated his leadership. Bart Giamatti was a cultural conservative and institutional moderate at a time when such values were out of favour and under attack. At Yale, as a baseball executive, and indeed in all things, Giamatti championed the related values of freedom and order. Robert P. Moncreiff places Giamatti in the context of major events at Yale, recounts in detail the legal context in which the Pete Rose affair unfolded, and arrives at a nuanced understanding of this memorable man's life.
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