In Classes: A Marxist Critique, Paul Kamolnick has produced what may prove to be the most fundamental critique of Erik Olin Wright's class structure analysis to date. The recent publication of Wright's Classes has raised a number of central questions regarding his continuing project on the class structures of advanced capitalist societies. Has Wright now totally abandoned Marxism in favor of orthodox neo-classical economics, social psychology, and Weberian stratification theory? How does Wright's latest argument relate to his earlier work, especially his critique of Paulantzas? What is the meaning of Wright's dependence on Jon Elster, John Roemer, and the 'rational actor' subject grounded in the doctrine self-proclaimed methodological individualism? Following an extended critical Preface, Kamolnick first situates Wright within the social formation of a sociological and Althusserian Marxism while arguing the basic continuity between Wright's earlier and later work on class. Though Marxism must itself always remain a social formation, Kamolnick argues that Wright rejects Marxism in favor of bourgeois academic sociology. In chapters two and three kamolnick reveals how Wright's new theory of class consciousness is incapable of producing a knowledge of class structure and how Wright is led to rely ultimately on non-Marxist, bourgeois practices of science and knowledge production in order to overcome this. Classes: A Marxist Critique ends by considering the implications for Wright's new transnational data set of his failure to ground a knowledge of class structure, and finally, by arguing for the new directions Marxist class analysis should take in the 1980s and beyond. The thrust of Kamolnick's argument is the challenge for Marxists to revolutionize present sociologized practices of the labor process, objectivity, knowledge production, and Marxism itself. Class analysis must completely break with abstract sociologism and ground itself thoroughly within the concrete process of self-object
Sunni Islamic Orthodoxy, Salafism, Wahhabism, Muslim Brotherhood, Base of the Jihad, Bin Laden, From the Islamic State to the Caliphate, Recommendations for U.S. Government
Sunni Islamic Orthodoxy, Salafism, Wahhabism, Muslim Brotherhood, Base of the Jihad, Bin Laden, From the Islamic State to the Caliphate, Recommendations for U.S. Government
Dr. Kamolnick's book is a meticulously documented investigation and comparison of the al-Qaeda and the Islamic State across three key strategically relevant dimensions: essential doctrine, beliefs, and worldview; strategic concept, including terrorist modus operandi; and in the final chapter, specific implications, and recommendations for current U.S. Government policy and strategy. Contents: Belief-System, Creed, Worldview, Doctrine The Al-Qaeda Organization Sunni Islamic Orthodoxy Sunni-Salafism/"Fundamentalism" The Muwahhidun/Wahhabism/Salafi-Wahhabism Muslim Brotherhood-Salafi-Wahhabi The "Base of the Jihad"; Al-Qaeda From Qa'idat Al-Jihad to Bin Ladenism From Bin Ladenism Back to Qa'idat Al-Jihad Post-Arab Spring Qa'idat Al-Jihad "What is Qa'idat Al-Jihad?" In a Nutshell: Fazul Abdullah and Adam Gadahn III. Islamic State Organization "Zarqawism" vs. AQO: Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi's Worldview and Doctrine: 1989-June 7, 2006 From Non-Religious Violent Street Tough to Ultra-Sectarian Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadist Prison Tough: 1980-1999 Al-Zarqawi's Private Jihasist Armies of the Levant: 1999-2004 The History, Doctrines, and Worldview of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi's "Caliphate": From ISI to the Caliphate: Brief Organizational History Self-Proclaimed Emir Al-Muminin Abu Bakr Al-Hussaini Al-Qurayshi Al-Baghdadi: The Caliphate Now! The "Final Solution" to the "Shia Problem" Terrorist Modus Operandi Terrorist Quadrangle Analysis The Al-Qaeda Organization The "Classical" Base First Bin Ladenist Lone Mujahid" "Far Enemy" Strategy Islamic State Conclusions, Implications, and Recommendations for U.S. Government Key Findings Belief-Systems, Worldviews, Doctrines, Creeds Strategies and Terrorist Modus Operandi Implications for U.S. Government Policy and Strategies Implications for Existing USG Policy and Strategy to Permanently Defeat AQ and its Affiliates Implications for Existing USG Policy and Strategy to Permanently Defeat the IS
In Classes: A Marxist Critique, Paul Kamolnick has produced what may prove to be the most fundamental critique of Erik Olin Wright's class structure analysis to date. The recent publication of Wright's Classes has raised a number of central questions regarding his continuing project on the class structures of advanced capitalist societies. Has Wright now totally abandoned Marxism in favor of orthodox neo-classical economics, social psychology, and Weberian stratification theory? How does Wright's latest argument relate to his earlier work, especially his critique of Paulantzas? What is the meaning of Wright's dependence on Jon Elster, John Roemer, and the 'rational actor' subject grounded in the doctrine self-proclaimed methodological individualism? Following an extended critical Preface, Kamolnick first situates Wright within the social formation of a sociological and Althusserian Marxism while arguing the basic continuity between Wright's earlier and later work on class. Though Marxism must itself always remain a social formation, Kamolnick argues that Wright rejects Marxism in favor of bourgeois academic sociology. In chapters two and three kamolnick reveals how Wright's new theory of class consciousness is incapable of producing a knowledge of class structure and how Wright is led to rely ultimately on non-Marxist, bourgeois practices of science and knowledge production in order to overcome this. Classes: A Marxist Critique ends by considering the implications for Wright's new transnational data set of his failure to ground a knowledge of class structure, and finally, by arguing for the new directions Marxist class analysis should take in the 1980s and beyond. The thrust of Kamolnick's argument is the challenge for Marxists to revolutionize present sociologized practices of the labor process, objectivity, knowledge production, and Marxism itself. Class analysis must completely break with abstract sociologism and ground itself thoroughly within the concrete process of self-object
Disrupting, dismantling, and ultimately defeating al-Qaeda based and inspired terrorism is a declared policy of the U.S. Government. Three key strategic objectives have been identified for accomplishing this: attacking al-Qaeda's terror network, undermining radicalization and recruitment, and hardening homeland defense. The present monograph proposes a distinct "jihad-realist" approach for undermining radicalization and recruitment to al-Qaeda. First, a brief discussion of six means for ending terrorist organizations is provided. Second, the premises of a jihad-realist approach are described. Third, a jihad-realist Shari'a case against al-Qaeda's terrorism is presented. In conclusion, key assertions are summarized, and several specific policy recommendations offered for national security personnel charged with formulating and executing counterterrorist messaging strategy.
The al-Qaeda Organization (AQO) and the Islamic State Organization (ISO) are transnational adversaries that conduct terrorism in the name of Sunni Islam. It is declared U.S. Government (USG) policy to degrade, defeat, and destroy them. The present book has been written to assist policymakers, military planners, strategists, and professional military educators whose mission demands a deep understanding of strategically-relevant differences between these two transnational terrorist entities. In it, one shall find a careful comparative analysis across three key strategically relevant dimensions: essential doctrine, beliefs, and worldview; strategic concept, including terrorist modus operandi; and specific implications and recommendations for current USG policy and strategy. Key questions that are addressed include: How is each terrorist entity related historically and doctrinally to the broader phenomenon of transnational Sunni "jihadism"? What is the exact nature of the ISO? How, if at all, does ISO differ in strategically relevant ways from AQO? What doctrinal differences essentially define these entities? How does each understand and operationalize strategy? What critical requirements and vulnerabilities characterize each entity? Finally, what implications, recommendations, and proposals are advanced that are of particular interest to USG strategists and professional military educators? This book may appeal to military planners, policymakers and analysts, strategists, political scientists, broadcast reporters, homeland security and intelligence community analysts, and professional military educators whose mission demands on a deep understanding of the strategically relevant differences between two transnational terrorist entities, the Al-Qaeda Organization and the Islamic State Organization (IS).Broadcast news media and students pursuing coursework and research assignments relating to the Islamic State and/or the Al-Qaeda organizations and their doctrines for terrorism may be interested in this text for military science, defense policy, political science, and homeland security classes. Related products; The Resurgence of Al-Qaeda in Syria and Iraq can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-000-01116-8 Al-Qaeda: The Many Faces of an Islamist Extremist Threat, Report, June 2006 can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-000-01116-8 Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War is available here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-029-00619-7 Armed Groups: Studies in National Security, Counterterrorism, and Counterinsurgency can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-020-01573-3 Terrorism and 9/11 History resources collection can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/us-military-history/terrorism-911-history
Sunni Islamic Orthodoxy, Salafism, Wahhabism, Muslim Brotherhood, Base of the Jihad, Bin Laden, From the Islamic State to the Caliphate, Recommendations for U.S. Government
Sunni Islamic Orthodoxy, Salafism, Wahhabism, Muslim Brotherhood, Base of the Jihad, Bin Laden, From the Islamic State to the Caliphate, Recommendations for U.S. Government
Dr. Kamolnick's book is a meticulously documented investigation and comparison of the al-Qaeda and the Islamic State across three key strategically relevant dimensions: essential doctrine, beliefs, and worldview; strategic concept, including terrorist modus operandi; and in the final chapter, specific implications, and recommendations for current U.S. Government policy and strategy. Contents: Belief-System, Creed, Worldview, Doctrine The Al-Qaeda Organization Sunni Islamic Orthodoxy Sunni-Salafism/"Fundamentalism" The Muwahhidun/Wahhabism/Salafi-Wahhabism Muslim Brotherhood-Salafi-Wahhabi The "Base of the Jihad"; Al-Qaeda From Qa'idat Al-Jihad to Bin Ladenism From Bin Ladenism Back to Qa'idat Al-Jihad Post-Arab Spring Qa'idat Al-Jihad "What is Qa'idat Al-Jihad?" In a Nutshell: Fazul Abdullah and Adam Gadahn III. Islamic State Organization "Zarqawism" vs. AQO: Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi's Worldview and Doctrine: 1989-June 7, 2006 From Non-Religious Violent Street Tough to Ultra-Sectarian Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadist Prison Tough: 1980-1999 Al-Zarqawi's Private Jihasist Armies of the Levant: 1999-2004 The History, Doctrines, and Worldview of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi's "Caliphate": From ISI to the Caliphate: Brief Organizational History Self-Proclaimed Emir Al-Muminin Abu Bakr Al-Hussaini Al-Qurayshi Al-Baghdadi: The Caliphate Now! The "Final Solution" to the "Shia Problem" Terrorist Modus Operandi Terrorist Quadrangle Analysis The Al-Qaeda Organization The "Classical" Base First Bin Ladenist Lone Mujahid" "Far Enemy" Strategy Islamic State Conclusions, Implications, and Recommendations for U.S. Government Key Findings Belief-Systems, Worldviews, Doctrines, Creeds Strategies and Terrorist Modus Operandi Implications for U.S. Government Policy and Strategies Implications for Existing USG Policy and Strategy to Permanently Defeat AQ and its Affiliates Implications for Existing USG Policy and Strategy to Permanently Defeat the IS
This book presents the U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) as an example of successful change by the Army in wartime. It argues that creating the AWG required senior leaders to create a vision differing from the Army’s self-conceptualization, change bureaucratic processes to turn the vision into an actual unit, and then place the new unit in the hands of uniquely qualified leaders to build and sustain it. In doing this, it considers the forces influencing change within the Army and argues the two most significant are its self-conceptualization and institutional bureaucracy. The work explores three major subject areas that provide historical context. The first is the Army’s institutional history from the early 1950s through 2001. This period begins with the Army seeking to validate its place in America’s national security strategy and ends with the Army trying to chart a path into the post-Cold War future. The Army’s history is largely one of asymmetric warfare. The work thus examines several campaigns that offered lessons for subsequent wars. Some lessons the Army took to heart, others it ignored. As the AWG was a direct outgrowth of the failures and frustrations the Army experienced in Afghanistan and Iraq, the book examines these campaigns and identifies the specific problems that led senior Army leaders to create the AWG. Finally, the work chronicles the AWG’s creation in 2006, growth, and re-assignment from the Army staff to a fully-fledged organization subordinate to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command in 2011 to its deactivation. This action resulted not from the unit’s failure to adapt to a post-insurgency Army focusing on modernization. Rather, it resulted from the Army failing to realize that while the AWG was a product of counterinsurgency, it provided the capability to support the Army during a period of great strategic and institutional uncertainty.
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