This volume makes available to the general public some of Paul H. Nitze's most important papers on foreign policy and national security and arms control. Divided into three chapters, 'Strategy and Security, ' 'The Military Component of National Security, ' and 'The Arms Control Component of National Security, ' this volume contains letters, reports, transcripts of speeches, and Nitze's comments on speeches made by other policy makers and officials involved with national securi
This book is the effort of experts brought together by the Atlantic Council to analyze the capabilities of the Western Alliance to defend sea lines of communication under various conditions of peace, tension, and war. It reviews the way in which Soviet naval forces have been used in the Alliance.
It is essential for the reader to remember that this is a memoir; in other words, a record of events based on the authors experiences and feelings. Because of the secrecy restrictions at the time these events occurred, and in some cases for many years thereafter, the author kept no diary, notes, or record and wrote no letters describing his work. Furthermore, almost without exception, all the people with whom and for whom he worked are now dead. Consequently, in writing this book, the author has been entirely dependent on his memory. At the age of ninety-one, this memory may have at times been defective or twisted. However, there can be no doubt the story is true. Careful research of the archives of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, the U.S. Navy, and the CIA should substantiate this. But even here, there will be difficulties due to secrecy and the deindexing of the FBIs Latin American files by its then-director rather than turn them over to the hated CIA. Moreover, the authors foolish refusal to accede to the request of his commanding officer to write the history of the naval operation Roads End immediately after its conclusion and for which he had received a commendation has erased forever the details of that historic event. Finally, the tragic suicide of the CIAs director of operations subsequent to the Kim Philby espionage scandal diminished the possibility of a proper analysis of events surrounding it in Washington . . .
George F. Kennan is well known as the preeminent American expert on the Soviet Union during the Cold War and the author of the doctrine of containment. In Mr. X and the Pacific, Paul J. Heer chronicles and assesses Kennan's work in affecting US policy toward East Asia. Heer traces the origins, development, and bearing of Kennan's strategic perspective on the Far East during his time as director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff from 1947 to 1950. The author follows Kennan's career and evolution of his thinking as he subsequently became a prominent critic of American participation in the Vietnam War. Mr. X and the Pacific offers readers a new view of Kennan, revealing his importance and the totality of his role in East Asia policy, his struggle with American foreign policy in the region, and the ways in which Kennan's legacy still has implications for how the United States approaches the region in the twenty-first century.
This deathbed memoir by Dr. Paul H. Johnstone, former senior analyst in the Strategic Weapons Evaluation Group (WSEG) in the Pentagon and a co-author of The Pentagon Papers, provides an authoritative analysis of the implications of nuclear war that remain insurmountable today. Indeed, such research has been kept largely secret, with the intention “not to alarm the public” about what was being cooked up. This is the story of how U.S. strategic planners in the 1950s and 1960s worked their way to the conclusion that nuclear war was unthinkable. It drives home these key understandings: • That whichever way you look at it -- and this book shows the many ways analysts tried to skirt the problem -- nuclear war means mutual destruction • That Pentagon planners could accept the possibility of totally destroying another nation, while taking massive destructive losses ourselves, and still conclude that “we would prevail”. • That the supposedly “scientific answers” provided to a wide range of unanswerable questions are of highly dubious standing. • That official spheres neglect anything near a comparable effort to understand the “enemy” point of view, rather than to annihilate him, or to use such understanding to make peace. Dr. Johnstone’s memoirs of twenty years in the Pentagon tell that story succinctly, coolly and objectively. He largely lets the facts speak for themselves, while commenting on the influence of the Cold War spirit of the times and its influence on decision-makers. Johnstone writes: “Theorizing about nuclear war was a sort of virtuoso exercise in creating an imaginary world wherein all statements must be consistent with each other, but nothing need be consistent with reality because there was no reality to be checked against.” While remaining highly secret – so much so that Dr. Johnstone himself was denied access to what he had written – these studies had a major impact on official policy. They contributed to a shift from the notion that the United States could inflict “massive retaliation” on its Soviet enemy to recognition that a nuclear exchange would bring about Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). "From MAD to Madness could not be more timely reading. In it, a former senior Pentagon analyst from the last Cold War comes back from the past to warn us of the disaster we are courting in the new Cold War. We should heed his warning." —Ron Paul
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