This volume comprises a selection of papers that were contributed to the 7th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, which was held in Salzburg from the 11th - 16th July, 1983. There were 14 sections in this congress: 1. proof theory and foundations of mathematics 2. model theory and its applica ti on 3. recursion theory and theory of computation 4. axiomatic set theory 5. philosophical logic 6. general methodology of science 7. foundations of probability and induction 8. foundations and philosophy of the physical sciences 9. foundati ons and phi 1 osophy of biology 10. foundations and philosophy of psychology foundations and philosophy 11. of the social sciences 12. foundati ons and philosophy of linguistics 13. history of logic, methodology and philosophy of science 14. fundamental principles of the ethics of science In each section, three or four invited addresses were given, which will be published in the Congress Proceedings (Ruth Barcan Marcus, Georg J. W. Dorn and Paul Weingartner, eds. : Logic, Metho dology and Philosophy of Science VII. Proceedings of the Seventh International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of v PREFACE Science, Salzburg, 1983. - Amsterdam, New York, Oxford: North-Holland Publishing 'Company, 1985. ) Every section with the exception of section 14 also contained contributed papers.
To mark the English translation of Etre et l'événement as Being and event, ... a special issue on the work of the philosopher Alain Badiou ... [encouraging] contributors to take up the challenge Badiou raises in Being and event ... and deploy his categories in thinking a particular situation - be it political, artistic, scientific or amorous."--Ch. 1.
Philosophy and the Vision of Language explores the history and enduring significance of the twentieth-century turn to language as a specific object of investigation and resource for philosophical reflection. It traces the implications of the access to language in some of the most prominent projects and results of the historical and contemporary tradition of analytic philosophy, including the projects of Frege, Wittgenstein, Sellars, Quine, Brandom, and Cavell. Additionally, it demonstrates the deep and enduring connections between the analytic tradition’s inquiry into language and the parallel inquiries of phenomenology, critical theory, and deconstruction over the course of the twentieth century. Finally, it documents some of the enduring consequences of philosophy’s inquiry into language for contemporary questions of social and political life. The book provides a clear, accessible and widely inclusive introduction to the relevance of language for analytic and continental philosophy in the twentieth century and is readable by non-specialist audiences. It should contribute to a growing historical sense of the location of the analytic tradition in a broader geography of social, political and critical thought. Furthermore, it contributes to building bridges between this tradition and the neighboring continental ones from which it has all too often been estranged.
Although many agree that all teaching rests on a theory of knowledge, there has been no in-depth exploration of the implications of the philosophy of mathematics for education. This is Paul Ernest's aim. Building on the work of Lakatos and Wittgenstein it challenges the prevalent notion that mathematical knowledge is certain, absolute and neutral, and offers instead an account of mathematics as a social construction. This has profound educational implications for social issues, including gender, race and multiculturalism; for pedagogy, including investigations and problem solving; and challenges hierarchical views of mathematics, learning and ability. Beyond this, the book offers a well-grounded model of five educational ideologies, each with its own epistemology, values, aims and social group of adherents. An analysis of the impact of these groups on the National Curriculum results in a powerful critique, revealing the questionable assumptions, values and interests upon which it rests. The book finishes on an optimistic note, arguing that pedagogy, left unspecified by the National Curriculum, is the way to achieve the radical aims of educating confident problem posers and solvers who are able to critically evaluate the social uses of mathematics.
Time is generally thought to be one of the more mysterious ingredients of the universe. In this intriguing book, Paul Horwich makes precise and explicit the interrelationships between time and a large number of philosophically important notions. Ideas of temporal order and priority interact in subtle and convoluted ways with the deepest elements in our network of basic concepts. Confronting this conceptual jigsaw puzzle, Horwich notes that there are glaring differences in how we regard the past and future directions of time. For example, we can influence the future but not the past, and can easily gain knowledge of the past but not of the future. Moreover we see a profusion of decay processes but little spontaneous generation of order; time appears to "flow" in one privileged direction, not the other; and we tend to explain phenomena in terms of antecedent circumstances, rather than subsequent ones. Horwich explains such time asymmetries and examines their bearing on the nature of time itself. Asymmetries in Time covers many notoriously difficult problems in the philosophy of science: causation, knowledge, entropy, explanation, time travel, rational choice (including Newcomb's problem), laws of nature, and counterfactual implication—and gives a unified treatment of these matters. The book covers an unusually broad range of topics in a lucid and nontechnical way and includes alternative points of view in the philosophical literature.
What kind of knowledge can we get just by thinking? Two of the world's leading philosophers develop radically different positions, in alternating chapters, on the status and nature of a priori knowledge. The reader is able to follow up-close how a philosophical debate evolves.
This accessible new book provides a clear and wide-ranging introduction to the defining problems of contemporary philosophy. Its unique feature is to focus on problems that cut across the established divide between analytic and continental philosophical traditions. Instead of segregating the two traditions, as is usually done, the authors offer a critical orientation and guide for readers who are not exclusively affiliated with either approach and who want to understand the increasingly shared questions philosophers are asking and addressing today. Each chapter starts with a fundamental overarching question: (1) What and how can we know? (2) What is the structure of the world? (3) What goes beyond the physical world? (4) What is to be done? (5) What does it mean to orient oneself philosophically? Under these headings, the authors critically examine the disciplines most fundamental problems. Their approach reveals deep and unexpected connections across the analytic/continental divide, and opens up new ways of thinking about critique itself. No other book about contemporary philosophy is as comprehensive and cosmopolitan. The Problems of Contemporary Philosophy provides newcomers and seasoned philosophers alike with an entertaining, engaging, and far-reaching portrait of todays philosophical landscape. It is an exemplary instance of thinking across and beyond the analytic/continental divide.
In The Philosophical Structure of Historical Explanation, Paul A. Roth resolves disputes persisting since the nineteenth century about the scientific status of history. He does this by showing why historical explanations must take the form of a narrative, making their logic explicit, and revealing how the rational evaluation of narrative explanation becomes possible. Roth situates narrative explanations within a naturalistic framework and develops a nonrealist (irrealist) metaphysics and epistemology of history—arguing that there exists no one fixed past, but many pasts. The book includes a novel reading of Thomas S. Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, showing how it offers a narrative explanation of theory change in science. This book will be of interest to researchers in historiography, philosophy of history, philosophy of science, philosophy of social science, and epistemology.
The majority of histories of nineteenth-century philosophy overlook Bernard Bolzano of Prague (1781-1848), a systematic philosopher-mathematician whose contributions extend across the entire range of philosophy. This book, the first of its kind to be published in English, gives a detailed and comprehensive introduction to Bolzano's life and work.
What is meaning? Paul Horwich presents an original philosophical theory, demonstrates its richness, and defends it against all comers. At the core of his theory is the idea, made famous by Wittgenstein, that the meaning of a word derives from its use; Horwich articulates this idea in a new way that will restore it to the prominence that it deserves. He surveys the diversity of valuable insights into meaning that have been gained in the twentieth century, and seeks to accommodate them within his theory. His aim is not to correct a common-sense view of meaning, but to vindicate it: he seeks to take the mystery out of meaning. Horwich's 1990 book Truth established itself both as the definitive exposition and defence of a notable philosophical theory, `minimalism', and as a stimulating, straightforward introduction to philosophical debate about truth. Meaning now gives the broader context in which the theory of truth operates, and is published simultaneously with a revised edition of Truth, in which Horwich refines and develops his treatment of the subject in the light of subsequent discussions, while preserving the distinctive format which made the book so successful. The two books together present a compelling view of the relations between language, thought, and reality. They will be essential reading for all philosophers of language.
What is philosophy? How should we do it? Why should we bother to? These are the kinds of questions addressed by metaphilosophy - the philosophical study of the nature of philosophy itself. Students of philosophy today are faced with a confusing and daunting array of philosophical methods, approaches and styles and also deep divisions such as the notorious rift between analytic and Continental philosophy. This book takes readers through a full range of approaches - analytic versus Continental, scientistic versus humanistic, 'pure' versus applied - enabling them to locate and understand these different ways of doing philosophy. Clearly and accessibly written, it will stimulate reflection on philosophical practice and will be invaluable for students of philosophy and other philosophically inclined readers.
Deflationism' has emerged as one of the most significant developments in contemporary philosophy. It is best known as a story about truth - roughly, that the traditional search for its underlying nature is misconceived, since there can be no such thing. However, the scope of deflationism extends well beyond that particular topic. For, in the first place, such a view of truth substantially affects what we should say about neighboring concepts such as 'reality', 'meaning', and 'rationality'. And in the second place, the anti-theoretical meta-philosophy that lies behind that view - the idea that philosophical problems are characteristically based on confusion and should therefore be dissolved rather than solved - may fruitfully be applied throughout the subject, in epistemology, ethics, the philosophy of science, metaphysics, and so on. The essays reprinted here were written over the last twenty five years. They represent Paul Horwich's development of the deflationary perspective and demonstrate its considerable power and fertility. They concern a broad array of philosophical problems: the nature of truth, realism vs. anti-realism, the creation of meaning, epistemic rationality, the conceptual role of "ought", probabilistic models of scientific reasoning, the autonomy of art, the passage of time, and the trajectory of Wittgenstein's philosophy. They appear as originally published except for the correction of obvious mistakes, the interpolation of clarifying material, and the inclusion of new footnotes to indicate Horwich's subsequent directions of thought.
A profusely illustrated history of the occult nature of the tarot from its origins in ancient Persia. The origins of the tarot have been lost in the mists of time. Most scholars have guessed that its origins were in China, Egypt, or India. Huson has expertly tracked each symbol of the Minor Arcana to roots in ancient Persia and the Major Arcana Trump card images to the medieval world of mystery, miracle, and morality plays. A number of tarot historians have questioned the use of the tarot as a divination tool prior to the 18th century. But the author demonstrates that the symbolic meanings of the Major Arcana were evident from the time they were first employed in the mid-15th century in the popular divination practice of sortilege. He also reveals how the identities of the court cards in the Minor Arcana were derived from a blend of pagan and medieval sources that strongly influenced their interpretation in tarot divination."--Publisher marketing.
This book explores the idea of time travel from the first account in English literature to the latest theories of physicists such as Kip Thorne and Igor Novikov. This very readable work covers a variety of topics including: the history of time travel in fiction; the fundamental scientific concepts of time, spacetime, and the fourth dimension; the speculations of Einstein, Richard Feynman, Kurt Goedel, and others; time travel paradoxes, and much more.
What is truth? Paul Horwich gives the definitive exposition of a notable philosophical theory, `minimalism'. This is the controversial theory that the nature of truth is entirely captured in the trivial fact that each proposition specifies its own condition for being true, and that truth is therefore, despite the philosophical struggles to which it has given rise, an entirely mundane and unpuzzling concept. Horwich makes a powerful case for the minimalist view, and gives a careful systematic explanation of its implications for a cluster of important philosophical issues on which questions about truth have impinged. The first edition of Truth, published in 1990, established itself both as the best account of minimalism and as an excellent introduction to the debate for students. For this new edition Paul Horwich has refined and developed his treatment of the subject in the light of subsequent discussions, while preserving the distinctive format which made the book so successful. It appears simultaneously with his new book Meaning, a companion work which sets out the broader philosophical context for the theory of truth: an account of meaning which seeks to accommodate the diversity of valuable insights that have been gained in the twentieth century within a common-sense view of meaning as deriving from use. The two books together present a compelling view of the relations between language, thought, and reality. Horwich's demystification of meaning and truth will be essential reading for all philosophers of language. Praise for the first edition: 'subtle, penetrating and ingenious . . . everyone interested in philosophy is in his debt' Michael Dummett, University of Oxford 'lucid and compact . . . a forthright presentation of an interesting thesis' Donald Davidson, University of California, Berkeley 'This is an excellent book and deserves to be widely read and used as a text. It states its thesis clearly and argues for it briskly: a style that seems well calculated to start discussions . . . It seems like an admirable starting-point for several weeks' worth of discussions in a philosophy of language course at upper-division undergraduate level.' Australasian Journal of Philosophy 'clearly written and well-structured' British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 'clear, informed and provocative ... I thoroughly recommend the book to everyone in the philosophy of language, philosophy of science, and metaphysics' Michael Devitt, Mind and Language
Extends the ideas of social constructivism to the philosophy of mathematics, developing a powerful critique of traditional absolutist conceptions of mathematics, and proposing a reconceptualization of the philosophy of mathematics.
Practical Foundations collects the methods of construction of the objects of twentieth-century mathematics. Although it is mainly concerned with a framework essentially equivalent to intuitionistic Zermelo-Fraenkel logic, the book looks forward to more subtle bases in categorical type theory and the machine representation of mathematics. Each idea is illustrated by wide-ranging examples, and followed critically along its natural path, transcending disciplinary boundaries between universal algebra, type theory, category theory, set theory, sheaf theory, topology and programming. Students and teachers of computing, mathematics and philosophy will find this book both readable and of lasting value as a reference work.
Some experiences of the natural world bring a sense of unity, knowledge, self-transcendence, eternity, light, and love. This is the first detailed study of these intriguing phenomena. Paul Marshall explores the circumstances, characteristics, and after-effects of this important but relatively neglected type of mystical experience, and critiques explanations that range from the spiritual and metaphysical to the psychoanalytic, contextual, and neuropsychological. The theorists discussed include R. M. Bucke, Edward Carpenter, W. R. Inge, Evelyn Underhill, Rudolf Otto, Sigmund Freud, Aldous Huxley, R. C. Zaehner, W. T. Stace, Steven Katz, and Robert Forman, as well as contemporary neuroscientists. The book makes a significant contribution to current debates about the nature of mystical experience.
Kathleen Paul challenges the usual explanation for the racism of post-war British policy. According to standard historiography, British public opinion forced the Conservative government to introduce legislation stemming the flow of dark-skinned immigrants and thereby altering an expansive nationality policy that had previously allowed all British subjects free entry into the United Kingdom. Paul's extensive archival research shows, however, that the racism of ministers and senior functionaries led rather than followed public opinion. In the late 1940s, the Labour government faced a birthrate perceived to be in decline, massive economic dislocations caused by the war, a huge national debt, severe labor shortages, and the prospective loss of international preeminence. Simultaneously, it subsidized the emigration of Britons to Australia, Canada, and other parts of the Empire, recruited Irish citizens and European refugees to work in Britain, and used regulatory changes to dissuade British subjects of color from coming to the United Kingdom. Paul contends post-war concepts of citizenship were based on a contradiction between the formal definition of who had the right to enter Britain and the informal notion of who was, or could become, really British. Whitewashing Britain extends this analysis to contemporary issues, such as the fierce engagement in the Falklands War and the curtailment of citizenship options for residents of Hong Kong. Paul finds the politics of citizenship in contemporary Britain still haunted by a mixture of imperial, economic, and demographic imperatives.
Since the beginning of philosophy, philosophers have sought objective knowledge: knowledge of things whose existence does not depend on one's conceiving of them. This book uses lessons from debates over objective knowledge to characterize the kinds of reasons pertinent to philosophical and other theoretical views. It argues that we cannot meet skeptics' typical demands for nonquestion-begging support for claims to objective truth, and that therefore we should not regard our supporting reasons as resistant to skeptical challenges. One key lesson is that a constructive, explanatory approach to philosophy must change the subject from skeptic-resistant reasons to perspectival reasons arising from variable semantic commitments and instrumental, purpose-relative considerations. The book lays foundations for such a reorientation of philosophy, treating fundamental methodological issues in ontology, epistemology, the theory of meaning, the philosophy of mind, and the theory of practical rationality. It explains how certain perennial debates in philosophy rest not on genuine disagreement, but on conceptual diversity: talk about different matters. The book shows how acknowledgment of conceptual diversity can resolve a range of traditional disputes in philosophy. It also explains why philosophers need not anchor their discipline in the physicalism of the natural sciences.
Paul Horwich presents a bold new interpretation of Wittgenstein's later work. He argues that it is Wittgenstein's radically anti-theoretical metaphilosophy - and not his identification of the meaning of a word with its use - that underpins his discussions of specific issues concerning language, the mind, mathematics, knowledge, art, and religion.
There are few issues more contentious today than the nature and purpose of borders. Migration flows and the refugee crisis have propelled the issue of borders into the centre of political debate and revealed our moral unease more clearly than ever. Who are we to deny others access to our territory? Is not freedom of movement a basic human right, one that should be defended above all others? In this book Paul Scheffer takes a different view. Rather than thinking of borders as obstacles to freedom, he argues that borders make freedom possible. Democracy and redistributive justice are only possible with the regulation of access to territories and rights. When liberals ignore an open society’s need for borders, people with authoritarian inclinations will begin to erect them. In the context of Europe, the project of removing internal borders can therefore only be successful if Europe accepts responsibility for its external border. This timely and important book challenges conventional ways of thinking and will be of interest to everyone concerned with the great social and political issues of our time.
Content and Justification presents a series of essays by Paul Boghossian on the theory of content and on its relation to the phenomenon of a priori knowledge.Part one comprises essays on the nature of rule-following and its relation to the problem of mental content; on the intelligibility of eliminativist views of the mental; on the prospects for a naturalistic reduction of mental content; and on the currently influential view that meaning is a normative notion.Part two includes three widely discussed papers on the phenomenon of self-knowledge and its compatibility with externalist conceptions of mental content.Part three concerns the classical but ill-understood phenomenon of knowledge that is based upon knowledge of meaning or conceptual competence.Finally, part four turns its attention from general issues about mental content to an account of a specific class of mental contents. It contains two widely discussed papers on the nature of colour concepts, and colour properties.
This text provides everything you ever wanted to know about PhD supervision but were afraid to ask. It is a practical no-nonsense handbook for both the novice and the experienced higher degree supervisor. This 2nd edition includes details on supervising professional doctoral theses.
This captivating biography traces the life of Eliza Fenwick, an extraordinary woman who paved her own unique path throughout the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as she made her way from country to country as writer, teacher, and school owner. Lissa Paul brings to light Fenwick’s letters for the first time to reveal the relationships she developed with many key figures of her era, and to tell Fenwick’s story as depicted by the woman herself. Fenwick began as a writer in the radical London of the 1790s, a member of Mary Wollstonecraft’s circle, and when her marriage crumbled, she became a prolific author of children’s literature to support her family. Eventually Fenwick moved to Barbados, becoming the owner of a school while confronting the reality of slavery in the British colonies. She would go on to establish schools in numerous cities in the United States and Canada, all the while taking care of her daughter and grandchildren and maintaining her friendships through letters that, as presented here, tell the story of her life. Distributed for the University of Delaware Press
This is a detailed study of Niels Bohr's work on an epistemological foundation for 20th century physics. The connections he drew between physics, language, and philosophy, are traced historically and their validity is analyzed in the light of contemporary science. (Philosophy)
A central figure in Anglo-American philosophy for over four decades, Paul F. Snowdon made seminal contributions to the fields of metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and the history of twentieth-century philosophy. Snowdon's work on perception and perceptual experience--much of which is collected in this volume for the first time--was particularly influential and firmly established 'disjunctivism' as a view with which any theorist working in the field must reckon. In the essays collected in the first part of this volume, Snowdon traces the contours of the concept of perception, refining his formulation of the disjunctivist position, determining the degree of involvement of the concept of causation, and engaging critically with arguments which aim to support sense-data theories. The second part contains critical examinations of the views propounded by several influential philosophers, amounting to a partial sketch of the history of twentieth-century philosophy of perception. Among the figures whose work Snowdon engages are J. L. Austin, A. J. Ayer, Michael Ayers, Michael Hinton, John McDowell, G. E. Moore, H. H. Price, Wilfrid Sellars, P. F. Strawson, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. The volume opens with a robust and intellectually generous introduction in which Snowdon describes the theoretical challenges, approaches, and themes that animate the set of interrelated problems addressed across all sixteen essays. Sprinkled throughout are an array of candid reflections that serve to illuminate both the substantive connections between the essays as well as the historical and circumstantial contexts that occasioned their writing.
Generally, categories are understood to express the most general features of reality. Yet, since categories have this special status, obtaining a correct list of them is difficult. This question is addressed by examining how Thomas Aquinas establishes the list of categories through a technique of identifying diversity in how predicates are per se related to their subjects. A sophisticated critique by Duns Scotus of this position is also examined, a rejection which is fundamentally grounded in the idea that no real distinction can be made from a logical one. It is argued Aquinas's approach can be rehabilitated in that real distinctions are possible when specifically considering per se modes of predication. This discussion between Aquinas and Scotus bears fruit in a contemporary context insofar as it bears upon, strengthens, and seeks to correct E. J. Lowe's four-category ontology view regarding the identity and relation of the categories.
One of the most basic themes in the philosophy of language is referential uptake, viz., the question of what counts as properly `understanding' a referring act in communication. In this inquiry, the particular line pursued goes back to Strawson's work on re-identification, but the immediate influence is that of Gareth Evans. It is argued that traditional and recent proposals fail to account for success in referential communication. A novel account is developed, resembling Evans' account in combining an external success condition with a Fregean one. But, in contrast to Evans, greater emphasis is placed on the action-enabling side of communication. Further topics discussed include the role of mental states in accounting for communication, the impact of re-identification on the understanding of referring acts, and Donnellan's referential/attributive distinction. Readership: Philosophers, cognitive scientists and semanticists.
This book contains a broad overview of time travel in science fiction, along with a detailed examination of the philosophical implications of time travel. The emphasis of this book is now on the philosophical and on science fiction, rather than on physics, as in the author's earlier books on the subject. In that spirit there are, for example, no Tech Notes filled with algebra, integrals, and differential equations, as there are in the first and second editions of TIME MACHINES. Writing about time travel is, today, a respectable business. It hasn’t always been so. After all, time travel, prima facie, appears to violate a fundamental law of nature; every effect has a cause, with the cause occurring before the effect. Time travel to the past, however, seems to allow, indeed to demand, backwards causation, with an effect (the time traveler emerging into the past as he exits from his time machine) occurring before its cause (the time traveler pushing the start button on his machine’s control panel to start his trip backward through time). Time Machine Tales includes new discussions of the advances by physicists and philosophers that have appeared since the publication of TIME MACHINES in 1999, examples of which are the chapters on time travel paradoxes. Those chapters have been brought up-to-date with the latest philosophical thinking on the paradoxes.
Paul Horwich, one of the world's most distinguished philosophers, develops in this book his highly original deflationary conception of language. His main aim in Reflections on Meaning is to explain how mere noises, marks, gestures, and mental symbols are able to capture the world - that is, how words and sentences (in whatever medium) come to mean what they do, to stand for certain things, to be true or false of reality. His answer is an innovative development of Wittgenstein's idea that the meaning of a term is nothing more than its use.
Unique organization begins with an introduction to the basic information and topics pertinent to children of all ages, then divides up the rest of the text by age group to cover the specific changes the child experiences physically, cognitively, emotionally, and socially. In most cases, particular dental issues are discussed only once, at the point in a child s development at which they are most appropriate. Section on children from conception to age three covers conditions such as cleft palate, disturbances in calcification, unusual numbers of teeth, oral habits, caries, and the development of malocclusions that start during these years. Chapter on aesthetic restorative dentistry for the adolescent looks at material selection, tooth color and form, diastemas, discolored teeth, bleaching and more. Chapter on sport dentistry and mouth protection covers how to evaluate child/adolescent athletes, the different types of mouth protection available, and professional activities in sports dentistry. Chapter on the diagnosis of oral lesions and developmental anomalies uses tables and extensive illustrations to depict developmental anomalies, white soft tissue lesions and enlargements, dark soft tissue lesions, ulcerative lesions, radiolucent lesions of bone, mixed radiolucent and radiopaque lesions of bone. NEW! Full-color design creates an immediate visual impact and better illustrates concepts and dental conditions.
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