This book explores the mind-body issue from both the perspectives of philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. Starting from the problem of mental causation, it provides an overview of the contemporary metaphysical discussion and argues in favour of the token-identity thesis, as the only position that can account for the causal efficacy of the mental. Showing furthermore that this ontological reductionism is not dissociable from epistemological reductionism, the author applies a new strategy of inter-theoretic reduction, which is compatible with the multiple realizability of mental properties. Using functionally defined sub-types, this account establishes a conservative reduction of psychology to neuroscience, which vindicates both the scientific legitimacy and the theoretical indispensability of psychology. This account is illustrated by several empirical examples borrowed from contemporary neuroscience.
In 1969 after 20 years living in New York City, Engineer, Photographer & Educator William Henry Mackey, Jr. returned to the rural Georgia backwoods where he had been raised. During the 20 years since he had left, the South had undergone drastic changes, from the Civil Rights Era to the technological advances in farming techniques, yet at the same time it remained the same simple place where he had grown up. Mackey proceeded to photograph and interview friends, family and other residents of the area in an effort to document their history and recollections of an era that was fast fading under the onslaught of 'progress'. The result is a fascinating look into the legacy of rural Blacks in coastal Georgia and the political, technological and social changes they underwent during the century since the Emancipation Proclamation.
This book explores the mind-body issue from both the perspectives of philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. Starting from the problem of mental causation, it provides an overview of the contemporary metaphysical discussion and argues in favor of the token-identity thesis, as the only position that can account for the causal efficacy of the mental. Showing furthermore that this ontological reductionism is not dissociable from epistemological reductionism, the author applies a new strategy of inter-theoretic reduction, which is compatible with the multiple realizability of mental properties. Using functionally defined sub-types, this account establishes a conservative reduction of psychology to neuroscience, which vindicates both the scientific legitimacy and the theoretical indispensability of psychology. This account is illustrated by several empirical examples borrowed from contemporary neuroscience.
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