This article traces China’s foreign policy transformation from 2013 to the present. It also examines Deng Xiaoping’s doctrinal response to the political crises of 1989–91 and compares it to current Chinese foreign policy doctrines. From the early 1980s until the 2010s, China’s foreign policy has generally focused on keeping a low profile. Deng’s Tao Guang Yang Hui foreign policy doctrine is characterized by its “No’s”, while Xi Jinping’s Xin Xing is marked by its “New’s”. The move from Tao Guang Yang Hui to Xin Xing is a major doctrinal shift in China’s foreign policy. Since the 19th Party Congress in 2017, Xi’s “new” narratives have seemingly dominated Chinese foreign policy. However, old principles, particularly that of “non-interference” or “no hegemony”, are still alive, albeit in a different form. This transformation is driven by three forces, which this paper describes in the 3As framework: China’s Ambition to be a “great country” and a “non-hegemon” in a changing world; its provision of Alternatives to fill the gaps in regional and global governance structures; and its Adaptation to what it deems as “unprecedented major changes in a century” (Da Bian Ju). As China undergoes this foreign policy transformation, contradictions and dilemmas inevitably emerge. While China’s foreign policy transformation is currently being disrupted by the coronavirus crisis, there have been adjustments which were already apparent before the crisis. The ambitious “One Belt and One Road” strategy, for instance, was replaced by the “Belt and Road Initiative”; “constructive intervention” was replaced by “constructive role”; and “common destiny” was replaced by “shared future”. Looking ahead, China’s foreign policy transformation could include more strategic or, at least, tactical adjustments.
The two Taiwan Strait crises took place during a particularly tense period of the Cold War. Although each incident was relatively brief, their consequences loom large. Based on analyses of newly available documents from Beijing, Taipei, and Washington, Pang Yang Huei challenges conventional wisdom that claims Sino-US misperceptions of each other’s strategic concerns were critical in the 1950s. He underscores the fact that Washington, Taipei, and Beijing were actually aware of one another’s strategic intentions during the crises. He also demonstrates conclusively that both “crises” can be understood as a transformation from tacit communication to tacit accommodation. An important contribution of this study is a better understanding of the role of ritual, symbols, and gestures in international relations. While it is true that these two crises resulted in a stalemate, the fact that all parties were able to cultivate talks and negotiations brought relations, especially between the US and China, to a new and more stable level. Simply averting the threat of war was a major achievement. Strait Rituals is an important micro-history of a significant moment during the Cold War and a rich interpretation of the theoretical use of multiple points of view in writing history. It sets a new standard for understanding China’s place in the world. “Strait Rituals is a solidly detailed and thoroughly footnoted excursion into a critical stage of Cold War history. Dr. Pang’s exhaustive archival work sets a real standard in the amalgamation of different sources to reevaluate the Taiwan Strait crises in the 1950s, the repercussions of which can still be felt today.” —Hsiao-ting Lin, Hoover Institution, Stanford University “An excellent book for those interested in the Taiwan Strait crises in the context of the overall history of international affairs in the Asia-Pacific region. The book will prove to be of great value to those interested in the history of the region that is bound to increase in importance in the years to come.” —Akira Iriye, Harvard University “Dispassionate, balanced, rigorous in the presentation of facts, much drawn from Chinese archival sources, Pang Yang Huei’s work will be indispensable for anyone seeking to understand the issues surrounding this Cold War hangover that continues to trouble contemporary politics across the Taiwan Strait.” —Geoffrey C. Gunn, Journal of Contemporary Asia
Heralded as a literary masterpiece and a best-seller in the Chinese-speaking world, The Great Flowing River is a personal account of the history of modern China and Taiwan unlike any other. In this eloquent autobiography, the noted scholar, writer, and teacher Chi Pang-yuan recounts her youth in mainland China and adulthood in Taiwan. Chi’s remarkable life, told in rich and striking detail, humanizes the eventful and turbulent times in which she lived. The Great Flowing River begins as a coming-of-age story set against the backdrop of China’s war with Japan. Chi depicts her childhood in pre-occupation Manchuria and gives an eyewitness account of life in China during the war with Japan. She tells the tale of her youthful romance with a dashing pilot that ends tragically when he is shot down in the last days of the war. The book describes the deepening political divide in China and her choice to take a job in Taiwan, where she would remain after the Communist victory. Chi details her growth as an educator, scholar, and promoter of Chinese literature in translation and her realization that despite her roots in China, she has found a home in Taiwan, giving an immersive account of the postwar history of Taiwan from a mainlander’s perspective. A novelistic, epoch-defining narrative, The Great Flowing River unites the personal and intimate with the grand sweep of history.
This article traces China’s foreign policy transformation from 2013 to the present. It also examines Deng Xiaoping’s doctrinal response to the political crises of 1989–91 and compares it to current Chinese foreign policy doctrines. From the early 1980s until the 2010s, China’s foreign policy has generally focused on keeping a low profile. Deng’s Tao Guang Yang Hui foreign policy doctrine is characterized by its “No’s”, while Xi Jinping’s Xin Xing is marked by its “New’s”. The move from Tao Guang Yang Hui to Xin Xing is a major doctrinal shift in China’s foreign policy. Since the 19th Party Congress in 2017, Xi’s “new” narratives have seemingly dominated Chinese foreign policy. However, old principles, particularly that of “non-interference” or “no hegemony”, are still alive, albeit in a different form. This transformation is driven by three forces, which this paper describes in the 3As framework: China’s Ambition to be a “great country” and a “non-hegemon” in a changing world; its provision of Alternatives to fill the gaps in regional and global governance structures; and its Adaptation to what it deems as “unprecedented major changes in a century” (Da Bian Ju). As China undergoes this foreign policy transformation, contradictions and dilemmas inevitably emerge. While China’s foreign policy transformation is currently being disrupted by the coronavirus crisis, there have been adjustments which were already apparent before the crisis. The ambitious “One Belt and One Road” strategy, for instance, was replaced by the “Belt and Road Initiative”; “constructive intervention” was replaced by “constructive role”; and “common destiny” was replaced by “shared future”. Looking ahead, China’s foreign policy transformation could include more strategic or, at least, tactical adjustments.
This article traces China's foreign policy transformation from 2013 to the present. It also examines Deng Xiaoping's doctrinal response to the political crises of 1989-91 and compares it to current Chinese foreign policy doctrines. From the early 1980s until the 2010s, China's foreign policy has generally focused on keeping a low profile. Deng's Tao Guang Yang Hui foreign policy doctrine is characterized by its 'No's', while Xi Jinping's Xin Xing is marked by its 'New's'. The move from Tao Guang Yang Hui to Xin Xing is a major doctrinal shift in China's foreign policy. Since the 19th Party Congress in 2017, Xi's 'new' narratives have seemingly dominated Chinese foreign policy. However, old principles, particularly that of 'non-interference' or 'no hegemony', are still alive, albeit in a different form. This transformation is driven by three forces, which this paper describes in the 3As framework: China's Ambition to be a 'great country' and a 'non-hegemon' in a changing world; its provision of Alternatives to fill the gaps in regional and global governance structures; and its Adaptation to what it deems as 'unprecedented major changes in a century' (Da Bian Ju). As China undergoes this foreign policy transformation, contradictions and dilemmas inevitably emerge. While China's foreign policy transformation is currently being disrupted by the coronavirus crisis, there have been adjustments which were already apparent before the crisis. The ambitious 'One Belt and One Road' strategy, for instance, was replaced by the 'Belt and Road Initiative'; 'constructive intervention' was replaced by 'constructive role'; and 'common destiny' was replaced by 'shared future'. Looking ahead, China's foreign policy transformation could include more strategic or, at least, tactical adjustments.
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