Some countries support smaller firms through tax incentives in an effort to stimulate job creation and startups, or alleviate specific distortions, such as financial constraints or high regulatory or tax compliance costs. In addition to fiscal costs, tax incentives that discriminate by firm size without specifically targeting R&D investment can create disincentives for firms to invest and grow, negatively affecting firm productivity and growth. This paper analyzes the relationship between size-related corporate income tax incentives and firm productivity and growth, controlling for other policy and firm-level factors, including product market regulation, financial constraints and innovation. Using firm level data from four European economies over 2001–13, we find evidence that size-related tax incentives that do not specifically target R&D investment can weigh on firm productivity and growth. These results suggest that when designing size-based tax incentives, it is important to address their potential disincentive effects, including by making them temporary and targeting young and innovative firms, and R&D investment explicitly.
Strengthening fiscal frameworks, in particular fiscal rules, has emerged as a key response to the fiscal legacy of the crisis. This paper takes stock of fiscal rules in use around the world, compiles a dataset - covering national and supranational fiscal rules, in 81 countries from 1985 to end-March 2012 - and presents details about the rules’ key design elements, particularly in support of enforcement. This information is summarized in a set of fiscal rules indices. Three key findings emerge: (i) many new fiscal rules have been adopted and existing ones strengthened in response to the crisis; (ii) the number of fiscal rules and the comprehensiveness of the design features in emerging economies has caught up to those in advanced economies; and (iii) the "next-generation" fiscal rules are increasingly complex as they combine the objectives of sustainability and with the need for flexibility in response to shocks, thereby creating new challenges for implementation, communication, and monitoring.
This paper provides country-specific information on fiscal rules in use in 81 countries from 1985 to end-September 2012. It serves as background material and update of the July 2012 Working Paper “Fiscal Rules in Response to the Crisis—Toward the ‘Next Generation’ Rules: A New Dataset” and is also available in an easy accessible electronic data visualization tool (http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/FiscalRules/map/map.htm.).The dataset covers four types of rules: budget balance rules, debt rules, expenditure rules, and revenue rules, applying to the central or general government or the public sector. It also presents details on various characteristics of rules, such as their legal basis, coverage, escape clauses, as well as key supporting features such as independent monitoring bodies.
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are popular around the world, in part because they allow governments to secure much-needed investment in public services without immediately having to raise taxes or borrow. Yet, PPPs pose a fiscal danger because a government's desire to avoid reporting immediate liabilities may blind it to future fiscal costs and risks. Although PPPs may not blemish governments' reported fiscal statements in the short term, they do create fiscal obligations. This increases fiscal vulnerability and can result in poorly-designed PPPs. The extent of the danger depends on the fiscal institutions that shape and constrain government decisions toward PPPs. Such fiscal institutions affect decisionmaking incentives. Better fiscal institutions therefore can increase the chance that PPPs will be well designed and appropriately used.
This paper argues that asset price cycles have significant effects on fiscal outcomes. In particular, there is evidence of debt bias—the tendency of debt to increase over the cycle— that is significantly larger for house price cycles than stand-alone business cycles. Automatic stabilizers and discretionary fiscal policy generally respond to output fluctuations, whereas revenue increases due to house price booms are largely treated as permanent. Thus, neglecting the direct and indirect impact of asset prices on fiscal accounts encourages procyclical fiscal policies.
When and how do natural disasters worsen within-country income inequality? We highlight the channels through which natural disasters may have distributional effects and empirically analyze when and which type of disasters affect inequality in advanced economies (AEs) and in emerging and developing economies (EMDEs). We find that in AEs inequality increases after severe disasters. We also find that inequality increases if severe disasters are associated with growth slowdowns or there are multiple disasters in a year in AEs and in EMDEs. Descriptive evidence for the US also suggests that adverse labor market effects of disasters are likely to fall on vulnerable groups.
In the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, emerging market and developing economies are grappling with economic scarring, social tension, and reduced policy space. Policy actions are already urgently needed to boost growth in the near term and support the ongoing green transition. At the same time, high public debt and persistently high inflation have constrained policy space, posing difficult policy trade-offs. This Staff Discussion Note focuses on emerging market and developing economies and proposes a framework for prioritization, packaging, and sequencing of macrostructural reforms to accelerate growth, alleviate policy trade-offs, and support the green transition. The note shows that prioritizing the removal of the most binding constraints on economic activity, bundling reforms (governance, business deregulation, and external sector reforms), and appropriate sequencing of other reforms (such as labor market and credit sector reforms) can help front-load reform gains. In emerging market and developing economies with large initial structural gaps, the estimated output effects of such a major reform package are sizable—about 4 percent in two years and 8 percent in four years. Achieving higher growth and lower absolute carbon emissions over time requires a well-designed strategy that includes both macrostructural and green reforms.
We explore the differential effects of lender-based macroprudential policies on new mortgage borrowing for households of different income using a comprehensive dataset that links macroprudential policy actions with household survey data for European Union countries. The main results suggest that higher-income households on average experience a larger reduction in mortgage loan size than lower-income households when regulation targeting total lenders’ assets tightens. In contrast, lower-income households on average experience a larger reduction in mortgage loan size than higher-income households when regulation targeting lenders’ capital requirements tightens. We also provide evidence of the different channels through which the differential effects operate.
This paper provides country-specific information on fiscal rules in use in 81 countries from 1985 to end-September 2012. It serves as background material and update of the July 2012 Working Paper “Fiscal Rules in Response to the Crisis—Toward the ‘Next Generation’ Rules: A New Dataset” and is also available in an easy accessible electronic data visualization tool (http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/FiscalRules/map/map.htm.).The dataset covers four types of rules: budget balance rules, debt rules, expenditure rules, and revenue rules, applying to the central or general government or the public sector. It also presents details on various characteristics of rules, such as their legal basis, coverage, escape clauses, as well as key supporting features such as independent monitoring bodies.
Strengthening fiscal frameworks, in particular fiscal rules, has emerged as a key response to the fiscal legacy of the crisis. This paper takes stock of fiscal rules in use around the world, compiles a dataset - covering national and supranational fiscal rules, in 81 countries from 1985 to end-March 2012 - and presents details about the rules’ key design elements, particularly in support of enforcement. This information is summarized in a set of fiscal rules indices. Three key findings emerge: (i) many new fiscal rules have been adopted and existing ones strengthened in response to the crisis; (ii) the number of fiscal rules and the comprehensiveness of the design features in emerging economies has caught up to those in advanced economies; and (iii) the "next-generation" fiscal rules are increasingly complex as they combine the objectives of sustainability and with the need for flexibility in response to shocks, thereby creating new challenges for implementation, communication, and monitoring.
This paper argues that asset price cycles have significant effects on fiscal outcomes. In particular, there is evidence of debt bias—the tendency of debt to increase over the cycle— that is significantly larger for house price cycles than stand-alone business cycles. Automatic stabilizers and discretionary fiscal policy generally respond to output fluctuations, whereas revenue increases due to house price booms are largely treated as permanent. Thus, neglecting the direct and indirect impact of asset prices on fiscal accounts encourages procyclical fiscal policies.
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are popular around the world, in part because they allow governments to secure much-needed investment in public services without immediately having to raise taxes or borrow. Yet, PPPs pose a fiscal danger because a government's desire to avoid reporting immediate liabilities may blind it to future fiscal costs and risks. Although PPPs may not blemish governments' reported fiscal statements in the short term, they do create fiscal obligations. This increases fiscal vulnerability and can result in poorly-designed PPPs. The extent of the danger depends on the fiscal institutions that shape and constrain government decisions toward PPPs. Such fiscal institutions affect decisionmaking incentives. Better fiscal institutions therefore can increase the chance that PPPs will be well designed and appropriately used.
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