The Department of Defense is in the process of transforming the nation's armed forces to meet the military challenges of the 21st century. Currently, the opportunity exists to carry out experiments at individual and joint service levels to facilitate this transformation. Experimentation, which involves a spectrum of activities including analyses, war games, modeling and simulation, small focused experiments, and large field events among other things, provides the means to enhance naval and joint force development. To assist the Navy in this effort, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) asked the National Research Council (NRC) to conduct a study to examine the role of experimentation in building future naval forces to operate in the joint environment. The NRC formed the Committee for the Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces to perform the study.
Accurate and timely environmental information can provide a tactical advantage to U.S. naval forces during warfare. This report analyzes the current environmental information system used by the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps and recommends ways to address uncertainty and leverage network-centric operating principles to enhance the value of environmental information.
The widespread availability of quiet, diesel electric submarines and inexpensive mines is posing a growing threat to global access by the U.S. Navy. In response, the Navy has expanded its undersea warfare efforts and put particular emphasis on the potential for new distributed remote sensing (DRS) approaches. To assist with this effort, the former Chief of Naval Operations requested the NRC to conduct an assessment of DRS for naval undersea warfare. This report provides a clear, near-term path by which useful DRS systems can be applied rapidly to pressing naval USW problems, and by which ongoing science and technology efforts can be directed toward the most useful options. The report contains information as described in 5 U.S.C. 552(b) and therefore could not be released to the public in its entirety. The public version consists of the front matter and executive summary.
The growth of the terrorism threat to the nation's security has created significant strategic challenges for U.S. armed forces in fighting this global war on terrorism (GWOT). For the Navy, the challenges have centered on developing maritime capabilities to prosecute the GWOT as far forward as possible. To assist the Navy's planning in this area, the former Chief of Naval Operations requested the NRC to conduct an assessment of the adequacy of and prospects for improving the role of Naval Forces in the GWOT. The study developed a defense-in-depth framework as the organizing principle for the report. The report contains information as described in 5 U.S.C. 552(b) and therefore could not be released to the public in its entirety. The public version consists of an executive summary that presents an assessment of the transformation of naval forces for addressing the GWOT; a brief description of the defense-in-depth framework; and a list of findings and major recommendations.
Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities is a study to advise the Department of the Navy regarding its transition strategy to achieve a network-centric naval force through technology application. This report discusses the technical underpinnings needed for a transition to networkcentric forces and capabilities.
U.S. naval forces must be prepared to respond to a broad array of threats. Of increasing importance are those from chemical and biological warfare (CW and BW). To help review its current state of preparedness, the Chief of Naval Operations asked the National Research Council (NRC) to assess the U.S. Navy's defense capabilities against CW and BW threats. In particular to what extent are they being developed to enable naval forces to sense and analyze quickly the presence of chemical and biological agents, withstand or avoid exposure to such agents, deal with contamination under a broad spectrum of operational conditions, and over what period will these capabilities be realized. This report presents the results of that assessment. It provides an overview of the potential threats, and an evaluation of the Navy's operations, non-medical programs, and medical countermeasures designed to confront those threats. The report also presents a series of general and specific findings and recommendations based on these assessments.
FORCEnet is currently defined as the operational construct and architectural framework for naval warfare in the information age that integrates warriors, sensors, networks, command and control, platforms, and weapons into a networked, distributed, combat force that is scalable across all levels of conflict from seabed to space and sea to land. Although this definition views FORCEnet as the operational construct and the architectural framework for the entire transformed Navy, some have viewed FORCEnet merely as an information network and the associated FORCEnet architecture merely as an information systems architecture. FORCEnet Implementation Strategy provides advice regarding both the adequacy of this definition and the actions required to implement FORCEnet.
The Department of the Navy strives to maintain, through its Office of Naval Research (ONR), a vigorous science and technology (S&T) program in those areas considered critically important to U.S. naval superiority in the maritime environment, including littoral waters and shore regions. In pursuing its S&T investments in such areas, ONR must ensure that (1) a robust U.S. research capability to work on long-term S&T problems in areas of interest to the Department of the Navy and the Department of Defense is sustained, (2) an adequate supply of new scientists and engineers in these areas is maintained, and (3) S&T products and processes necessary to ensure future superiority in naval warfare are provided. One of the critical areas for the Department of the Navy is undersea weapons. An Assessment of Undersea Weapons Science and Technology assesses the health of the existing Navy program in undersea weapons, evaluates the Navy's research effort to develop the capabilities needed for future undersea weapons, identifies non-Navy-sponsored research and development efforts that might facilitate the development of such advanced weapons capabilities, and makes recommendations to focus the Navy's research program so that it can meet future needs.
From thunderous broadsides traded between wooden sailing ships on Lake Erie, to the carrier battles of World War II, to the devastating high-tech action in the Persian Gulf, here is a gripping history of five key battles that defined the evolution of naval warfare--and the course of the American nation. Acclaimed military historian Craig Symonds offers spellbinding narratives of crucial engagements, showing how each battle reveals the transformation of technology and weaponry from one war to the next; how these in turn transformed naval combat; and how each event marked a milestone in American history. - Oliver Hazard Perry's heroic victory at Lake Erie, one of the last great battles of the Age of Sail, which secured the Northwestern frontier for the United States - The brutal Civil War duel between the ironclads Monitor and Virginia, which sounded the death knell for wooden-hulled warships and doomed the Confederacy's hope of besting the Union navy - Commodore Dewey's stunning triumph at Manila Bay in 1898, where the U.S. displayed its "new navy" of steel-hulled ships firing explosive shells and wrested an empire from a fading European power - The hairsbreadth American victory at Midway, where aircraft carriers launched planes against enemies 200 miles away--and where the tide of World War II turned in the space of a few furious minutes - Operation Praying Mantis in the Persian Gulf, where computers, ship-fired missiles, and "smart bombs" not only changed the nature of warfare at sea, but also marked a new era, and a new responsibility, for the United States. Symonds records these encounters in detail so vivid that readers can hear the wind in the rigging and feel the pounding of the guns. Yet he places every battle in a wide perspective, revealing their significance to America's development as it grew from a new Republic on the edge of a threatening frontier to a global superpower. Decision at Sea is a powerful and illuminating look at pivotal moments in the history of the Navy and of the United States. It is also a compelling study of the unchanging demands of leadership at sea, where commanders must make rapid decisions in the heat of battle with lives--and the fate of nations--hanging in the balance.
Military intervention always has been and always will be an important part of foreign policy, a tool to further national interests and influence world events. Many scholars have tried to explain the intervention behavior of states in crises, conflicts, and wars. When and why do states intervene, and what are reasons for nonintervention? What conflicts and crises are more likely to call for intervention, and why? When is intervention successful? The explanations are manifold and include political, military, economic, social, environmental, domestic, and humanitarian factors. The theoretical literature covers a gamut of realist intentions, ranging from security, power, and national interests, as guides to state action; to emphasis on international trade and economics; and to domestic politics. Some argue for explanations based on idealistic aspirations, such as democracy and human rights. Many studies focus on a mix of different reasons. From this vast field, the author has selected international crises involving any form of U.S. activity in the years 1946-2006. Within these U.S. activities, the author distinguishes between crisis response with and without naval forces, as this study intends to advance the knowledge of the use of U.S. naval forces as a response to international crises and to contribute to a better understanding of when and how the U.S. Navy is deployed.
From a military operational standpoint, surprise is an event or capability that could affect the outcome of a mission or campaign for which preparations are not in place. By definition, it is not possible to truly anticipate surprise. It is only possible to prevent it (in the sense of minimizing the number of possible surprises by appropriate planning), to create systems that are resilient to an adversary's unexpected actions, or to rapidly and effectively respond when surprised. Responding to Capability Surprise examines the issues surrounding capability surprise, both operational and technical, facing the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. This report selects a few surprises from across a continuum of surprises, from disruptive technologies, to intelligence-inferred capability developments, to operational deployments, and assesses what the Naval Forces are doing (and could do) about them while being mindful of future budgetary declines. The report then examines which processes are in place or could be in place in the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard to address such surprises. Today's U.S. naval forces continue to face a wide range of potential threats in the indefinite future and for this reason must continue to balance and meet their force structure needs. The recommendations of Responding to Capability Surprise will help to ensure more responsive, more resilient, and more adaptive behavior across the organization from the most senior leadership to the individual sailors, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen.
Recommended for Chief of Naval Operations Navy Reading Program How We Fight is a concise, single volume that explains the basic, unique, and enduring attributes associated with being a Sailor, going to sea, and conducting war at sea. It highlights the fundamentals of the environment in which the Navy operates, our uniquely maritime characteristics, our history in this domain, and the way of Navy warfighting. This book should serve as a companion piece to other sources of literature enabling Sailors to understand the essence of being “a Sailor” as they develop their skills as sea going professionals. Navy Officer Candidate School students, Navy prep school students, U.S. Naval Academy students, and others interested in the US Navy and their Sailor preparation may enjoy this resource. Military collections at public, academic, and Naval training schools should have a copy of this volume available for their patrons.
The future national security environment will present the naval forces with operational challenges that can best be met through the development of military capabilities that effectively leverage rapidly advancing technologies in many areas. The panel envisions a world where the naval forces will perform missions in the future similar to those they have historically undertaken. These missions will continue to include sea control, deterrence, power projection, sea lift, and so on. The missions will be accomplished through the use of platforms (ships, submarines, aircraft, and spacecraft), weapons (guns, missiles, bombs, torpedoes, and information), manpower, materiel, tactics, and processes (acquisition, logistics, and so on.). Accordingly, the Panel on Technology attempted to identify those technologies that will be of greatest importance to the future operations of the naval forces and to project trends in their development out to the year 2035. The primary objective of the panel was to determine which are the most critical technologies for the Department of the Navy to pursue to ensure U.S. dominance in future naval operations and to determine the future trends in these technologies and their impact on Navy and Marine Corps superiority. A vision of future naval operations ensued from this effort. These technologies form the base from which products, platforms, weapons, and capabilities are built. By combining multiple technologies with their future attributes, new systems and subsystems can be envisioned. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035 Becoming a 21st-Century Force: Volume 2: Technology indentifies those technologies that are unique to the naval forces and whose development the Department of the Navy clearly must fund, as well as commercially dominated technologies that the panel believes the Navy and Marine Corps must learn to adapt as quickly as possible to naval applications. Since the development of many of the critical technologies is becoming global in nature, some consideration is given to foreign capabilities and trends as a way to assess potential adversaries' capabilities. Finally, the panel assessed the current state of the science and technology (S&T) establishment and processes within the Department of the Navy and makes recommendations that would improve the efficiency and effectiveness of this vital area. The panel's findings and recommendations are presented in this report.
This illustrated history covers the history of the U.S. Navy in the Middle East. America's interests in the Middle East, southwest Asia, and eastern Africa date almost to the founding of the nation. Since World War II, the Navy has been the first line of defense for these interests. From the establishment of the Middle East Force (MEF) in 1949 through the beginning of the 21st century, the U.S. Navy served as a force for stability and peace in the region.
A letter dated December 21, 2011, to National Academy of Sciences President Dr. Ralph Cicerone from the Chief of Naval Operations, ADM Jonathan W. Greenert, U.S. Navy, requested that the National Research Council's (NRC's) Naval Studies Board (NSB) conduct a study to examine the issues surrounding capability surpriseboth operationally and technically relatedfacing the U.S. naval services. Accordingly, in February 2012, the NRC, under the auspices of its NSB, established the Committee on Capability Surprise for U.S. Naval Forces. The study's terms of reference, provided in Enclosure A of this interim report, were formulated by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) in consultation with the NSB chair and director. The terms of reference charge the committee to produce two reports over a 15-month period. The present report is the first of these, an interim report issued, as requested, following the third full committee meeting. The terms of reference direct that the committee in its two reports do the following: (1) Select a few potential capability surprises across the continuum from disruptive technologies, to intelligence inferred capability developments, through operational deployments and assess what U.S. Naval Forces are doing (and could do) about these surprises while mindful of future budgetary declines; (2) Review and assess the adequacy of current U.S. Naval Forces' policies, strategies, and operational and technical approaches for addressing these and other surprises; and (3) Recommend any changes, including budgetary and organizational changes, as well as identify any barriers and/or leadership issues that must be addressed for responding to or anticipating such surprises including developing some of our own surprises to mitigate against unanticipated surprises. Capability Surprise for U.S. Naval Forces: Initial Observations and Insights: Interim Report highlights issues brought to the committee's attention during its first three meetings and provides initial observations and insights in response to each of the three tasks above. It is very much an interim report that neither addresses in its entirety any one element of the terms of reference nor reaches final conclusions on any aspect of capability surprise for naval forces. The committee will continue its study during the coming months and expects to complete by early summer 2013 its final report, which will address all of the elements in the study's terms of reference and explore many potential issues of capability surprise for U.S. naval forces not covered in this interim report.
Naval Analytical Capabilities assesses current Department of Defense initiatives and the Department of the Navy's progress in transitioning from a requirements-based to a capabilities-based organization. The report also provides recommendations aimed at improving the organizational structure of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations to best position the Chief of Naval Operations to fulfill his Title 10 (U.S. Code on Armed Forces) responsibilities. This report addresses key elements of capabilities-based planning, examines Navy analytical processes, and recommends an approach to making improvements.
Newport Paper No. 29, Shaping the Security Environment, edited by Derek S. Reveron, makes an important contribution to an unfolding debate on the global role of U.S. military forces in an era of transnational terrorism, failed or failing states, and globalization. Reveron, professor of national security decision making at the Naval War College, looks beyond the current conflicts in which the United States is involved to raise fundamental questions concerning the regional diplomatic roles of America's combatant commanders (COCOMs) and, more generally, the entire array of nonwarfighting functions that have become an increasingly important part of the day-to-day life of the American military as it engages a variety of partners or potential partners around the world. These functions are increasingly being given doctrinal definition and a larger role in U.S. military planning under the novel concept of “shaping.” This volume is intended to explore the notion of shaping in its various aspects, both generally and in several regional contexts. The changing role of the regional COCOMs (formerly CINCs) over the last dozen years or so is the focus of a paper by General Anthony Zinni, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.), who provides a characteristically frank and illuminating account of his own tenure as commander of the U.S. Central Command, with responsibilities for the Persian Gulf and the greater Middle East. Papers by Commander Alan Lee Boyer, USN (Ret.), and Stephen A. Emerson examine maritime and regional security cooperation from the perspective of the U.S. European Command on the one hand and, on the other, the Combined Task Force–Horn of Africa, a joint organization headquartered in Djibouti that has played a critical role in recent years in strengthening the capabilities of countries throughout the region to improve their own security and counter terrorism. Two further chapters examine aspects of shaping from a global perspective. Ronald E. Ratcliffe provides a searching analysis of the “thousand-ship navy” initiative proposed several years ago by outgoing Chief of Naval Operations Michael Mullen, including the difficulties the U.S. Navy has had in operationalizing this concept—and the difficulties some of our allies and partners continue to have in coming to terms with it. Ratcliffe makes a number of useful recommendations as to how the Navy can make headway in the area of maritime security cooperation in the coming years, which is likely to figure prominently in the new maritime strategy the Navy is currently developing. Finally, Dennis Lynn looks at “strategic communication,” also a relatively new concept that is intended to bring greater coherence to the way the U.S. military thinks about the overall impact of its words and actions abroad and how it can better craft messages to shape the environment—friendly as well as adversarial—in which it finds itself today.
At the request of the Chief of Naval Operations, the National Research Council (NRC) conducted a study to determine the technological requirements, operational changes, and combat service support structure necessary to land and support forces ashore under the newly evolving Navy and Marine Corps doctrine. The Committee on Naval Expeditionary Logistics, operating under the auspices of the NRC's Naval Studies Board, was appointed to (1) evaluate the packaging, sealift, and distribution network and identify critical nodes and operations that affect timely insertion of fuels, ammunition, water, medical supplies, food, vehicles, and maintenance parts and tool blocks; (2) determine specific changes required to relieve these critical nodes and support forces ashore, from assault through follow-on echelonment; and (3) present implementable changes to existing support systems, and suggest the development of innovative new systems and technologies to land and sustain dispersed units from the shoreline to 200 miles inland. In the course of its study, the committee soon learned that development of OMFTS is not yet at a stage to allow, directly, detailed answers to many of these questions. As a result, the committee addressed the questions in terms of the major logistics functions of force deployment, force sustainment, and force medical support, and the fundamental logistics issues related to each of these functions.
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