Examines the feasibility and necessity of a central reporting system and computerized telecommunications data center capable of receiving, storing, and retrieving data concerning daily shipments of hazardous materials, and also capable of providing information to facilitate responses to accidents and incidents.
Examines the feasibility and necessity of a central reporting system and computerized telecommunications data center capable of receiving, storing, and retrieving data concerning daily shipments of hazardous materials, and also capable of providing information to facilitate responses to accidents and incidents.
A large number of chemicals are used on land at shore facilities, in the air in combat and reconnaissance aircraft, on seas around the world in surface vessels, and in submarine vessels by the navy and marine corps. Although the chemicals used are for the large part harmless, there is a significant amount of chemicals in use that can be health hazards during specific exposure circumstances. The Navy Environmental Health Center (NEHC) is primarily tasked with assessing these hazards. The NEHC completes its tasks by reviewing toxicological and related data and preparing health-hazard assessments (HHAs) for the different chemicals. Since the NEHC is continually asked to develop these HHAs, the National Research Council (NRC) was asked to assess independently the validity and effectiveness of NEHC's HHA process, in order to determine whether the process as implemented provides the Navy with the best, comprehensive, and defensible evaluations of health hazards and to identify any elements that might require improvement. The task was assigned to the Board on Environmental Studies and Toxicology's Committee on Toxicology's (COT's) Subcommittee on Toxicological hazard and Risk Assessment. Review of the U.S. Navy Environmental Health Center's Health-Hazard Assessment Process presents the subcommittee's report. The report is the work of expertise in general toxicology, inhalation toxicology, epidemiology, neurotoxicology, immunotoxicology, reproductive and developmental toxicology, pharmacology, medicine, risk assessment, and biostatistics. It is based on its review of documents provided by NEHC, presentations by NEHC personnel, and site visits to NEHC in Norfolk, Virginia and an aircraft carrier in San Diego, California.
This study is a review and evaluation of the U.S. Army's Report to Congress on Alternative Approaches for the Treatment and Disposal of Chemical Agent Identification Sets (CAIS). CAIS are test kits that were used to train soldiers from 1928 to 1969 in defensive responses to a chemical attack. They contain samples of chemicals that had been or might have been used by opponents as chemical warfare agents. The Army's baseline approach for treating and disposing of CAIS has been to develop a mobile treatment system, called the Rapid Response System (RRS), which can be carried by several large over-the-road trailers.
A major goal of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and now the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), is the development of technologies for detecting explosives and illegal drugs in freight cargo and passenger luggage. One such technology is pulsed fast neutron analysis (PFNA). This technology is based on detection of signature radiation (gamma rays) induced in material scanned by a beam of neutrons. While PFNA may have the potential to meet TSA goals, it has many limitations. Because of these issues, the government asked the National Research Council to evaluate the potential of PFNA for airport use and compare it with current and future x-ray technology. The results of this survey are presented in "Assessment of the Practicality of Pulsed Fast Neutron Analysis for Aviation Security." A broad range of detection methods and test results are covered in this report. Tests conducted as of October 2000 showed that the PFNA system was unable to meet the stringent federal aviation requirements for explosive detection in air cargo containers. PFNA systems did, however, demonstrate some superior characteristics compared to existing x-ray systems in detecting explosives in cargo containers, though neither system performed entirely satisfactorily. Substantial improvements are needed in the PFNA detection algorithms to allow it to meet aviation detection standards for explosives in cargo and passenger baggage. The PFNA system currently requires a long scan time (an average of 90 minutes per container in the prototype testing in October 2000), needs considerable radiation shielding, is significantly larger than current x-ray systems, and has high implementation costs. These factors are likely to limit installation at airports, even if the detection capability is improved. Nevertheless, because PFNA has the best potential of any known technology for detecting explosives in cargo and luggage, this book discusses how continued research to improve detection capabilities and system design can best be applied for the airport environment.
Prompt and effective response to time-critical ship casualties and emergencies, for example, by refloating stranded ships, can prevent marine pollution and economic disruption of ports and waterways. The marine salvage industry, which conducts this work, has undergone significant changes in the past two decades. This book evaluates these changes and assesses the adequacy of marine salvage in the United States. Among the issues addressed are conditions in the salvage industry; emergency response-time; national salvage policy; workforce needs; salvage techniques; and the contribution of the Navy to the national salvage capability.
Extremely hazardous substances (EHSs) can be released accidentally as a result of result of chemical spills, industrial explosions, fires, or accidents involving railroad cars and trucks transporting EHSs. Workers and residents in communities surrounding industrial facilities where EHSs are manufactured, used, or stored and in communities along the nation's railways and highways are potentially at risk of being exposed to airborne EHSs during accidental releases or intentional releases by terrorists. Pursuant to the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has identified approximately 400 EHSs on the basis of acute lethality data in rodents. As part of its efforts to develop acute exposure guideline levels for EHSs, EPA and the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) in 1991 requested that the National Research Council (NRC) develop guidelines for establishing such levels. In response to that request, the NRC published Guidelines for Developing Community Emergency Exposure Levels for Hazardous Substances in 1993. Subsequently, Standard Operating Procedures for Developing Acute Exposure Guideline Levels for Hazardous Substances was published in 2001, providing updated procedures, methodologies, and other guidelines used by the National Advisory Committee (NAC) on Acute Exposure Guideline Levels for Hazardous Substances and the Committee on Acute Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGLs) in developing the AEGL values. Using the 1993 and 2001 NRC guidelines reports, the NAC-consisting of members from EPA, the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of Transportation (DOT), other federal and state governments, the chemical industry, academia, and other organizations from the private sector-has developed AEGLs for more than 270 EHSs. In 1998, EPA and DOD requested that the NRC independently review the AEGLs developed by NAC. In response to that request, the NRC organized within its Committee on Toxicology (COT) the Committee on Acute Exposure Guideline Levels, which prepared this report. This report is the fourteenth volume in that series. Acute Exposure Guideline Levels for Selected Airborne Chemicals: Volume 14 summarizes the committee's conclusions and recommendations.
Calls upon the Department of Transportation and its Bureau of Transportation Statistics to take the lead in coordinating freight data collection in the US. This work focuses on increasing the linkages between sources of data and filling data gaps to develop a source of timely and reliable data on freight flows. A national framework is needed.
The Bhopal Disaster of 1984 resulted in the death of around 2,000 residents living near chemical plants and irreversible injuries to more than 20,000 other residents. These numbers can be attributed to the community's lack of awareness concerning the chemicals' existence, dangers and effects, and/or how to react in case of emergency. The disaster emphasized the need for governments to identify hazardous substances and to aid local communities in developing plans for emergency exposures. As a result, the United States government issued the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) of 1986; requiring the identification of extremely hazardous substances (EHSs) by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). EPA was also tasked with assisting Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs) in conducting health-hazard assessments to develop emergency-response plans for sites where EHSs are produced, stored, transported, or used. The EPA identified nearly 400 EHSs in terms of their immediate danger to life and health (IDLH) as their first step in assisting these LEPCs. In 1991 the EPA went on to request that the National Research Council (NRC) Committee on Toxicology (COT) develop criteria and methods for developing emergency exposure levels for EHSs for the general population. The COT, who had published many reports on emergency exposure guidance levels at the time, designated the task to a subcommittee. The subcommittee focused on Guidelines for Developing Community Emergency Exposure Levels for Hazardous Substances. Four years later the National Advisory Committee for Acute Exposure Guideline Levels for Hazardous Substances (NAC) was created with a focus on identifying, reviewing, and interpreting relevant toxicologic and other scientific data and developing acute exposure guideline levels (AEGLs) for high-priority, acutely toxic chemicals. In Acute Exposure Guideline Levels for Selected Airborne Chemicals:Volume 4, the NAC outlines acute exposure guideline levels for chlorine, hydrogen chloride, toluene 2,4, hydrogen fluoride, 2,6-diisocyanate, and uranium hexafluoride.
This report assesses the operational performance of explosives-detection equipment and hardened unit-loading devices (HULDs) in airports and compares their operational performance to their laboratory performance, with a focus on improving aviation security.
In 1991, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) asked the National Research Council (NRC) to provide technical guidance for establishing community emergency exposure levels for extremely hazardous substances (EHSs) pursuant to the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986. In response to that request, the NRC published Guidelines for Developing Community Emergency Exposure Levels for Hazardous Substances in 1993. Subsequently, Standing Operating Procedures for Developing Acute Exposure Guideline Levels for Hazardous Substances was published in 2001; it provided updated procedures, methods, and other guidelines used by the National Advisory Committee (NAC) on Acute Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGLs) for hazardous substances for assessing acute adverse health effects. Using both these reports, the NAC-consisting of members from the EPA, the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of Transportation (DOT), other federal and state governments, the chemical industry, academia, and other organizations from the private sector-developed AEGLs for approximately 270 EHSs. In 1998, EPA and DOD requested that the NRC independently review the AEGLs developed by NAC. In response to that request, the NRC organized within its Committee on Toxicology the Committee on Acute Exposure Guideline Levels, which prepared this report. This report, Twenty-First Interim Report of the Committee on Acute Exposure Guideline Levels: Part B, summarizes the committee's conclusions and recommendations for improving AEGL documents for several chemicals and chemical classes not mentioned in Twenty-First Interim Report of the Committee on Acute Exposure Guideline Levels: Part A.
Standing Operating Procedures for Developing Acute Exposure Guideline Levels for Hazardous Chemicals contains a detailed and comprehensive methodology for developing acute exposure guideline levels (AEGLs) for toxic substances from inhalation exposures. The book provides guidance on what documents and databases to use, toxicity endpoints that need to be evaluated, dosimetry corrections from animal to human exposures, selection of appropriate uncertainty factors to address the variability between animals and humans and within the human population, selection of modifying factors to address data deficiencies, time scaling, and quantitative cancer risk assessment. It also contains an example of a summary of a technical support document and an example of AEGL derivation. This book will be useful to persons in the derivation of levels from other exposure routesâ€"both oral and dermalâ€"as well as risk assessors in the government, academe, and private industry.
Risk assessments are often used by the federal government to estimate the risk the public may face from such things as exposure to a chemical or the potential failure of an engineered structure, and they underlie many regulatory decisions. Last January, the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued a draft bulletin for all federal agencies, which included a new definition of risk assessment and proposed standards aimed at improving federal risk assessments. This National Research Council report, written at the request of OMB, evaluates the draft bulletin and supports its overall goals of improving the quality of risk assessments. However, the report concludes that the draft bulletin is "fundamentally flawed" from a scientific and technical standpoint and should be withdrawn. Problems include an overly broad definition of risk assessment in conflict with long-established concepts and practices, and an overly narrow definition of adverse health effects-one that considers only clinically apparent effects to be adverse, ignoring other biological changes that could lead to health effects. The report also criticizes the draft bulletin for focusing mainly on human health risk assessments while neglecting assessments of technology and engineered structures.
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