TRB Conference Proceedings 30: Marine Salvage Capabilities: Responding to Terrorist Attacks in U.S. Portsâ€"Actions to Improve Readiness is the report of the TRB Marine Board Workshop on Marine Salvage Response Capability held on August 5-6, 2003, in Washington, DC. The workshop addressed economic, legal, forensic, environmental, and human casualty issues related to salvage. The report contains a summary of workshop discussions and committee recommendations highlighting important topics and issues associated with marine salvage that warrant further, more detailed inquiry by the responsible federal agencies.
TRB Conference Proceedings 30: Marine Salvage Capabilities: Responding to Terrorist Attacks in U.S. Portsâ€"Actions to Improve Readiness is the report of the TRB Marine Board Workshop on Marine Salvage Response Capability held on August 5-6, 2003, in Washington, DC. The workshop addressed economic, legal, forensic, environmental, and human casualty issues related to salvage. The report contains a summary of workshop discussions and committee recommendations highlighting important topics and issues associated with marine salvage that warrant further, more detailed inquiry by the responsible federal agencies.
From a military operational standpoint, surprise is an event or capability that could affect the outcome of a mission or campaign for which preparations are not in place. By definition, it is not possible to truly anticipate surprise. It is only possible to prevent it (in the sense of minimizing the number of possible surprises by appropriate planning), to create systems that are resilient to an adversary's unexpected actions, or to rapidly and effectively respond when surprised. Responding to Capability Surprise examines the issues surrounding capability surprise, both operational and technical, facing the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. This report selects a few surprises from across a continuum of surprises, from disruptive technologies, to intelligence-inferred capability developments, to operational deployments, and assesses what the Naval Forces are doing (and could do) about them while being mindful of future budgetary declines. The report then examines which processes are in place or could be in place in the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard to address such surprises. Today's U.S. naval forces continue to face a wide range of potential threats in the indefinite future and for this reason must continue to balance and meet their force structure needs. The recommendations of Responding to Capability Surprise will help to ensure more responsive, more resilient, and more adaptive behavior across the organization from the most senior leadership to the individual sailors, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen.
A letter dated December 21, 2011, to National Academy of Sciences President Dr. Ralph Cicerone from the Chief of Naval Operations, ADM Jonathan W. Greenert, U.S. Navy, requested that the National Research Council's (NRC's) Naval Studies Board (NSB) conduct a study to examine the issues surrounding capability surpriseboth operationally and technically relatedfacing the U.S. naval services. Accordingly, in February 2012, the NRC, under the auspices of its NSB, established the Committee on Capability Surprise for U.S. Naval Forces. The study's terms of reference, provided in Enclosure A of this interim report, were formulated by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) in consultation with the NSB chair and director. The terms of reference charge the committee to produce two reports over a 15-month period. The present report is the first of these, an interim report issued, as requested, following the third full committee meeting. The terms of reference direct that the committee in its two reports do the following: (1) Select a few potential capability surprises across the continuum from disruptive technologies, to intelligence inferred capability developments, through operational deployments and assess what U.S. Naval Forces are doing (and could do) about these surprises while mindful of future budgetary declines; (2) Review and assess the adequacy of current U.S. Naval Forces' policies, strategies, and operational and technical approaches for addressing these and other surprises; and (3) Recommend any changes, including budgetary and organizational changes, as well as identify any barriers and/or leadership issues that must be addressed for responding to or anticipating such surprises including developing some of our own surprises to mitigate against unanticipated surprises. Capability Surprise for U.S. Naval Forces: Initial Observations and Insights: Interim Report highlights issues brought to the committee's attention during its first three meetings and provides initial observations and insights in response to each of the three tasks above. It is very much an interim report that neither addresses in its entirety any one element of the terms of reference nor reaches final conclusions on any aspect of capability surprise for naval forces. The committee will continue its study during the coming months and expects to complete by early summer 2013 its final report, which will address all of the elements in the study's terms of reference and explore many potential issues of capability surprise for U.S. naval forces not covered in this interim report.
U.S. oceangoing vessels have half the crew size of 30 years ago, thanks to automation and mechanization in the shipping industry. But are reductions in crew size increasing the risk of vessel accidents? Crew Size and Maritime Safety explores how we can minimize risk without hindering technology, presenting the most thorough analysis available of key issues such as domestic versus foreign manning practices and safety performance; effect of crew size on crew fatigue, level of training, and ship maintenance; and modernizing the U.S. Coast Guard approach to crew size regulation. The volume features a trend analysis of 20 years of maritime safety data, analyzing U.S. and international laws and treaties concerning ship manning and making recommendations for improvements. In addition, it includes a model for setting optimum crew levels, based on systems engineering and tested with actual ships.
Accurate and timely environmental information can provide a tactical advantage to U.S. naval forces during warfare. This report analyzes the current environmental information system used by the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps and recommends ways to address uncertainty and leverage network-centric operating principles to enhance the value of environmental information.
U.S. naval forces must be prepared to respond to a broad array of threats. Of increasing importance are those from chemical and biological warfare (CW and BW). To help review its current state of preparedness, the Chief of Naval Operations asked the National Research Council (NRC) to assess the U.S. Navy's defense capabilities against CW and BW threats. In particular to what extent are they being developed to enable naval forces to sense and analyze quickly the presence of chemical and biological agents, withstand or avoid exposure to such agents, deal with contamination under a broad spectrum of operational conditions, and over what period will these capabilities be realized. This report presents the results of that assessment. It provides an overview of the potential threats, and an evaluation of the Navy's operations, non-medical programs, and medical countermeasures designed to confront those threats. The report also presents a series of general and specific findings and recommendations based on these assessments.
The chemical sector is a key part of the national economy and has been designated by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as one of 17 sectors comprising the nation's Critical Infrastructure. Although its products represent only 2 percent of the U.S. gross domestic product, those products underpin most other manufactured goods. To assist DHS in characterizing and mitigating the vulnerabilities faced by the nation from the chemical industry, this study examines classes of chemicals and chemical processes that are critical to the nation's security, economy, and health. It identifies vulnerabilities and points of weakness in the supply chain for these chemicals and chemical processes; assesses the likely impact of a significant disruption in the supply chain; identifies actions to help prevent disruption in the supply chain and mitigate loss and injury should such disruption occur; identifies incentives and disincentives to preventative and mitigating actions; and recommends areas of scientific, engineering, and economic research and development. The report concludes that the consequences of a deliberate attack on the chemical infrastructure would be expected to be similar in nature to the accidents we have already experienced. Under limited circumstances, such an attack could cause catastrophic casualties and loss of life, but it would take several simultaneous events to cause catastrophic economic consequences. Poor communication could amplify societal response. Overall, the recommendations in this report emphasize the benefit of investments to improve emergency preparedness for and response to chemical events. They also highlight the potential to minimize the physical hazards through development of cost-effective, safer processes that reduce the volume, toxicity, or hazardous conditions under which chemicals are processed.
The availability of land bases from which to launch and maintain military, diplomatic, and humanitarian relief operations is becoming increasingly uncertain because of physical or political constraints. The ability to operate from a sea base, therefore, is likely to become more and more important. The Defense Science Board recently concluded that Sea Basing will be a critical future joint military capability and that DOD should proceed to develop such capability. Following the DSB report, the Navy requested that the National Research Council (NRC) convene a workshop to assess the science and technology base, both inside and outside the Navy, for developing Sea Basing and to identify R&D for supporting future concepts. This report of the workshop includes an examination of Sea Basing operational concepts; ship and aircraft technology available to make Sea Basing work; and issues involved in creating the sea base as a joint system of systems.
This paper provides a proposed course of action to respond to the increasing shortage of Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) professionals that are necessary to ensure the national and economic security of the United States. It specifically responds to the recommendations and proposed actions developed in the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report entitled "Rising Above the Gathering Storm: Energizing and Employing America for a Brighter Economic Future." (NAS Storm Report) This paper consists of an executive summary, a purpose statement, the context, a view of the problem, a description of NAVSEA's 21st Century engagement, education, and technology initiative, and an implementation plan. Additionally, appendix A provides linkages between the NAS Recommendations/Actions and the proposed activities discussed in this paper. Appendix B provides a model for engagement with academic institutions"--Preface.
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