Nathan A Pelcovits's Books

The Long Armistice

Un Peacekeeping And The Arab-israeli Conflict, 1948-1960

By: Nathan A Pelcovits

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The Long Armistice

Un Peacekeeping And The Arab-israeli Conflict, 1948-1960

By: Nathan A Pelcovits

Drawing on previously untapped documents, interviews with key actors, and his own experiences in the Department of State, Nathan Pelcovits takes a fresh look at the impact of UN intervention, as peacekeeper and peacemaker, on the Arab-Israeli conflict during the formative years between 1948 and 1960. He examines the reasons behind the UN assumption of a quasi-custodial role in the dispute and how it is that Israel and the Arab states have come to hold diametrically opposed views of the value of engaging the UN as intermediary, with the UN-Israel relationship cooling into one of mutual suspicion and mistrust. Most relevant to the current peace process, Pelcovits explains why UN action shifted early in the game from an ambitious effort at peaceful settlement to "keeping" the peace of a long armistice. Pelcovits argues that the wounds of the formative years have affected the dynamic of the peace process to this day. The UN has been accorded a marginal role in the negotiations—ceremonial and passive—and UN peacekeepers are not likely to be enlisted as guarantors of the settlement.

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Page Count

247

Publisher

Routledge

Published Date

ISBN 10

1000303063

ISBN 13

9781000303063

Peacekeeping On Arab-Israeli Fronts

Lessons From The Sinai And Lebanon

By: Nathan A Pelcovits

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Peacekeeping On Arab-Israeli Fronts

Lessons From The Sinai And Lebanon

By: Nathan A Pelcovits

Since 1948, the United Nations has sponsored virtually every third party peacekeeping mission on Arab· Israeli fronts. Three recent events, however, have been responsible for significantly altering the pattern of peacekeeping in the region: the Camp David accords, which, because they were opposed in the U.N. by the Soviet Union and most Arab nations, prevented U.N. sponsorship of a Sinai peacekeeping force; the June 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, during which the U.N. Interim Force was made to look ineffectual; and the Sabra-Shatila massacres in South Beirut three months later, which prompted the deployment of a multinational peacekeeping force. Dr.Pelcovits analyzes these events to answer the questions they raise about peacekeeping in the Middle East: What advantages are afforded by U.N. peacekeepers compared with non-U.N. missions? What net benefits are derived from American participation in a non-U.N. multinational operation? And how do they compare to the classic U.N. peacekeeping rationale of insulating disputed areas from super power confrontation? Finally, what determines the success of such operations-geopolitical circumstance or institutional affiliation?

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