This book offers an analytical explanation for the origins of and change in property institutions on the American frontier during the nineteenth century. Its scope is interdisciplinary, integrating insights from political science, economics, law and history. This book shows how claim clubs - informal governments established by squatters in each of the major frontier sectors of agriculture, mining, logging and ranching - substituted for the state as a source of private property institutions and how they changed the course of who received a legal title, and for what price, throughout the nineteenth century. Unlike existing analytical studies of the frontier that emphasize one or two sectors, this book considers all major sectors, as well as the relationship between informal and formal property institutions, while also proposing a novel theory of emergence and change in property institutions that provides a framework to interpret the complicated history of land laws in the United States.
The gap between the U.S. military and society has widened in recent years, posing problems for the constitutional order. The gap is especially acute in major universities. Arms and the University probes various dimensions of the tense relationship between the military and the university. Developing and applying a theory of civic and liberal education, this book shows how some military presence on campus can contribute to the diversity of ideas and the education of all students.
Property rights are the rules governing ownership in society. This Element offers an analytical framework to understand the origins and consequences of property rights. It conceptualizes of the political economy of property rights as a concern with the follow questions: What explains the origins of economic and legal property rights? What are the consequences of different property rights institutions for wealth creation, conservation, and political order? Why do property institutions change? Why do legal reforms relating to property rights such as land redistribution and legal titling improve livelihoods in some contexts but not others? In analyzing property rights, the authors emphasize the complementarity of insights from a diversity of disciplinary perspectives, including Austrian economics, public choice, and institutional economics, including the Bloomington School of institutional analysis and political economy.
Over the past two decades, "fracking" has led to a revolution in shale gas production. For some, shale gas promised economic opportunities, cheaper energy bills, and an alternative to coal. For others, shale gas was fool’s gold. Critics contend that the shale boom has occurred in a regulatory Wild West, that the response has been fractured and ineffective, or that the harmful environmental and health consequences exceed the benefits from shale gas production. The Political Economy of Fracking argues that the criticism of the shale revolution has been misplaced. The authors use insights from a diversity of perspectives in political economy to understand why the shale boom occurred, who won in the race for shale, and who was left behind. The book explains how private property rights and entrepreneurs led to the shale boom. It contends that polycentric governance, which encourages a diversity of regulatory responses, is a virtue because it generates knowledge about the most appropriate ways to regulate shale development. Private property rights and political institutions that provide for local self-governance also helped to ensure that the benefits of shale gas production exceeded its costs. The authors make the case for fracking shale gas using evidence from shale-producing countries from around the world, comparing them to those that have fallen behind in the shale race. They show that private property rights and markets have been a source of innovation and dynamism and that a diversity of regulatory responses is appropriate to govern shale gas development. This book is insightful reading for academics and professionals interested in the shale boom, the fracking industry in general, and regulatory policy.
Since Garrett Hardin published The Tragedy of the Commons in 1968, critics have argued that population growth and capitalism contribute to overuse of natural resources and degradation of the global environment. They propose coercive, state-centric solutions. This book offers an alternative view. Employing insights from new institutional economics, the authors argue that property rights, competitive markets, polycentric political institutions, and social institutions such as trust, patience and individualism enable society to conserve natural resources and mitigate harms to the global environment.
Since Garrett Hardin published The Tragedy of the Commons in 1968, critics have argued that population growth and capitalism contribute to overuse of natural resources and degradation of the global environment. They propose coercive, state-centric solutions. This book offers an alternative view. Employing insights from new institutional economics, the authors argue that property rights, competitive markets, polycentric political institutions, and social institutions such as trust, patience and individualism enable society to conserve natural resources and mitigate harms to the global environment.
Although today's richest countries tend to have long histories of secure private property rights, legal-titling projects do little to improve the economic and political well-being of those in the developing world. This book employs a historical narrative based on secondary literature, fieldwork across thirty villages, and a nationally representative survey to explore how private property institutions develop, how they are maintained, and their relationship to the state and state-building within the context of Afghanistan. In this predominantly rural society, citizens cannot rely on the state to enforce their claims to ownership. Instead, they rely on community-based land registration, which has a long and stable history and is often more effective at protecting private property rights than state registration. In addition to contributing significantly to the literature on Afghanistan, this book makes a valuable contribution to the literature on property rights and state governance from the new institutional economics perspective.
The gap between the U.S. military and society has widened in recent years, posing problems for the constitutional order. The gap is especially acute in major universities. Arms and the University probes various dimensions of the tense relationship between the military and the university. Developing and applying a theory of civic and liberal education, this book shows how some military presence on campus can contribute to the diversity of ideas and the education of all students.
Demonstrates why claim clubs are perhaps the most important explanation for the origins of and change in property institutions during an important period in American history.
Over the past two decades, "fracking" has led to a revolution in shale gas production. For some, shale gas promised economic opportunities, cheaper energy bills, and an alternative to coal. For others, shale gas was fool’s gold. Critics contend that the shale boom has occurred in a regulatory Wild West, that the response has been fractured and ineffective, or that the harmful environmental and health consequences exceed the benefits from shale gas production. The Political Economy of Fracking argues that the criticism of the shale revolution has been misplaced. The authors use insights from a diversity of perspectives in political economy to understand why the shale boom occurred, who won in the race for shale, and who was left behind. The book explains how private property rights and entrepreneurs led to the shale boom. It contends that polycentric governance, which encourages a diversity of regulatory responses, is a virtue because it generates knowledge about the most appropriate ways to regulate shale development. Private property rights and political institutions that provide for local self-governance also helped to ensure that the benefits of shale gas production exceeded its costs. The authors make the case for fracking shale gas using evidence from shale-producing countries from around the world, comparing them to those that have fallen behind in the shale race. They show that private property rights and markets have been a source of innovation and dynamism and that a diversity of regulatory responses is appropriate to govern shale gas development. This book is insightful reading for academics and professionals interested in the shale boom, the fracking industry in general, and regulatory policy.
Property rights are the rules governing ownership in society. This Element offers an analytical framework to understand the origins and consequences of property rights. It conceptualizes of the political economy of property rights as a concern with the follow questions: What explains the origins of economic and legal property rights? What are the consequences of different property rights institutions for wealth creation, conservation, and political order? Why do property institutions change? Why do legal reforms relating to property rights such as land redistribution and legal titling improve livelihoods in some contexts but not others? In analyzing property rights, the authors emphasize the complementarity of insights from a diversity of disciplinary perspectives, including Austrian economics, public choice, and institutional economics, including the Bloomington School of institutional analysis and political economy.
Despite vast efforts to build the state, profound political order in rural Afghanistan is maintained by self-governing, customary organizations. Informal Order and the State in Afghanistan explores the rules governing these organizations to explain why they can provide public goods. Instead of withering during decades of conflict, customary authority adapted to become more responsive and deliberative. Drawing on hundreds of interviews and observations from dozens of villages across Afghanistan, and statistical analysis of nationally representative surveys, Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili demonstrates that such authority enhances citizen support for democracy, enabling the rule of law by providing citizens with a bulwark of defence against predatory state officials. Contrary to conventional wisdom, it shows that 'traditional' order does not impede the development of the state because even the most independent-minded communities see a need for a central government - but question its effectiveness when it attempts to rule them directly and without substantive consultation.
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