The dramatic insider account of why we invaded Iraq, the motivations that drove it, and the frustrations of those who tried and failed to stop it, leading to the most costly misadventure in US history. A single disastrous choice in the wake of 9/11-the decision to use force to remove Saddam Hussein from power-did enormous damage to the wealth, well-being, and reputation of the United States. Few errors in U.S. foreign policy have had longer-lasting or more harmful consequences. Yet how the decision came to be made remains shrouded in mystery and mythology. To this day, even the principal architects of the war cannot agree on it. Michael Mazarr has interviewed dozens of players involved in the deliberations about the invasion of Iraq and has reviewed all the documents so far declassified. He paints a devastating of portrait of an administration fueled by righteous conviction yet undercut by chaotic processes, rivalrous agencies, and competing egos. But more than the product of one bungling administration, the invasion of Iraq emerges here as a tragically typical example of modern U.S. foreign policy fiascos. Leap of Faith asks profound questions about the limits of US power and the accountability for its use. It offers lessons urgently relevant to stave off similar disasters-today and in the future.
This unique collection of essays explores the intricacies of how the Internet has changed the way we currently approach international security, civil society, and economic development. The contributors move past the conventional wisdom, tapping new and original sources to investigate new and unexpected developments. One essay explores how wiring Russia's nuclear scientists into the Internet increases the threat of weapons proliferation. Another looks at Internet-enabled development projects and, despite early success stories in Bangalore, India, explains why they will fail. Together the essays in this collection try to bring a dose of reality to the rose-colored futures many have predicted for world politics in the Information Age.
This book examines the role of risk management in the recent financial crisis and applies lessons from there to the national security realm. It rethinks the way risk contributes to strategy, with insights relevant to practitioners and scholars in national security as well as business. Over the past few years, the concept of risk has become one of the most commonly discussed issues in national security planning. And yet the experiences of the 2007-2008 financial crisis demonstrated critical limitations in institutional efforts to control risk. The most elaborate and complex risk procedures could not cure skewed incentives, cognitive biases, groupthink, and a dozen other human factors that led companies to take excessive risk. By embracing risk management, the national security enterprise may be turning to a discipline just as it has been discredited.
In the first report of a series on the emerging international order, RAND researchers examine the liberal order in effect since World War II, including the mechanisms by which the order affects state behavior, the engines that drive states to participate, and the U.S. approach to the order since 1945.
Discussions of an emerging practice of 'gray zone' conflict have become increasingly common throughout the U.S. Army and the wider national security community, but the concept remains ill-defined and poorly understood. This monograph aims to contribute to the emerging dialogue about competition and rivalry in the gray zone by defining the term, comparing and contrasting it with related theories, and offering tentative hypotheses about this increasingly important form of state competition. The idea of operating gradually and somewhat covertly to remain below key thresholds of response is hardly new. Many approaches being used today -- such as support for proxy forces and insurgent militias -- have been employed for millennia. The monograph argues that the emergence of this more coherent and intentional form of gray zone conflict is best understood as the confluence of three factors. Understood in this context, gray zone strategies can be defined as a form of conflict that pursues political objectives through integrated campaigns; employs mostly nonmilitary or nonkinetic tools; strives to remain under key escalatory or red line thresholds to avoid outright conventional conflict; and moves gradually toward its objectives rather than seeking conclusive results in a relatively limited period of time. Having examined the scope and character of gray zone conflict, the monograph offers seven hypotheses about this emerging form of rivalry. Finally, the monograph offers recommendations for the United States and its friends and allies to deal with this challenge"--Publisher's web site.
The new security environment has a number of distinguishing characteristics. The formerly dominant bipolar power structure now exists only artificially, in the nuclear balance. By every measure of usable power, economic and political as well as military, the world is at a thoroughly multilateral stage, albeit with a single and unquestioned lead actor: the United States. But more and more states in the developing world have the ability to challenge U.S. and allied military forces, a fact demonstrated repeated by Saddam Hussein's Iraq. From an intense focus on a single global threat, Western defense planning has moved to the more complex and varied task of analyzing and preparing for regional crises and wars involving a kaleidoscopic variety of potential aggressors and victims. In part it has done so because such operations may be more likely today than during the cold war, when the risk of escalation to superpower war lurked in all regional conflicts. This shift demands, among other things, forces that are more flexible and agile than those deployed during the cold war. It also requires better intelligence on the developing world, where most immediate military missions lie.
Examining the future of nuclear deterrence in the 1990s and beyond, this book outlines aspects of the evolving strategic environment. It also projects the likely future of deterrence strategies and strategic force postures. Other topics, such as the Soviet nuclear doctrine are also covered.
An in-depth study of the military, economic, and political implications of the strategic and tactical missile defences for the Asian-Pacific region. It offers recent research on the status of SDI and Asian-Pacific countries and offers an introduction to the SDI debate and Europe.
Nations rise and fall, succeed or fail in rivalries, and enjoy stability or descend into chaos because of a complex web of factors that affect competitive advantage. One critical component is the package of essential social characteristics of a nation. The ultimate story of the Cold War is that the United States was simply a more competitive society than the Soviet Union: more energetic, more vibrant, more innovative, more productive, more legitimate. Through analysis of comparative studies of historical eras and trends, historical case studies, and the findings of issue-specific empirical research, the report explores how seven characteristics of a society determine its competitive standing and distinguish dynamic and competitively successful nations. If the history surveyed in this report provides an accurate guide to the future, the fate of the United States in today's rivalries will not be determined solely, or even in significant degree, by the numbers of its weapons or amounts of defense spending or how many proxy wars it wins but by the basic characteristics of its society. The author applies the seven leading characteristics that affect national standing to the United States to create a snapshot of where the country stands. That application provides some reason for optimism. The United States continues to reflect many of these characteristics, and the overall synergistic engine, more than any other large country in the world. However, multiple trends are working to weaken traditional U.S. advantages. Several, such as the corruption of the national information space, pose acute risks to the long-term dynamism and competitiveness of the nation, raising the worrying prospect that the United States has begun to display classic patterns of a major power on the far side of its dynamic and vital curve.
From Saddam Hussein's first bold threats in 1990 to the stunning ground phase of Desert Storm in early 1991, the crisis in the Gulf captured the world's attention. This high-tech, low-cost war was televised nightly from beginning to end, accompanied by on-the-spot interpretations of strategy and its implications. But what did we learn from this crisis? Did the United States bungle its attempts at discouraging Saddam's aggressive actions, or is deterrence simply not a reliable foreign policy tool? Are chemical weapons truly the "poor man's atom bomb"? Does the war represent a good model for future crises, or did circumstances make this war more of an anomaly than a precedent? How did the ail-volunteer U.S. force perform? By combining exciting, detailed vignettes of the crisis with insightful discussions of its consequences, this book opens up an informed debate concerning the true military and geopolitical lessons of the conflict. Representing a distillation of the best thinking on defense and foreign policy in Washington, Desert Storm also incorporates the testimony of the inside players during the crisis—the people who actually planned and fought the war. Combining academic rigor and in-depth military expertise, the authors challenge the complacency of the emerging conventional wisdom regarding the conflict, taking us beyond mere chronicling and instant analysis to a riveting reenactment of the war and the serious consideration of its long-term implications.
The challenge of deterring territorial aggression is taking on renewed importance, yet discussion of it has lagged in U.S. military and strategy circles. The authors aim to provide a fresh look, with two primary purposes: to review established concepts about deterrence, and to provide a framework for evaluating the strength of deterrent relationships. They focus on a specific type of deterrence: extended deterrence of interstate aggression.
The question of how China's rise will affect the post-World War II international order carries considerable significance for the future of global politics. This report evaluates the character and possible future of China's engagement with the postwar order. The resulting portrait is anything but straightforward: China's engagement with the order remains a complex, often contradictory work in progress. This report offers four major findings about the relationship of China to the international order. First, China's behavior over the past two decades does not mark it as an opponent or saboteur of the order, but rather as a conditional supporter. Since China undertook a policy of international engagement in the 1980s, the level and quality of its participation in the order rivals that of most other states. Second, looking forward, the posture China takes toward the institutions, norms, and rules of a shared order is now in significant flux; various outcomes--from continued qualified support to more-aggressive challenges--are possible. Third, partly because of this uncertainty, a strengthened and increasingly multilateral international order can provide a critical tool for the United States and other countries to shape and constrain rising Chinese power. Finally, modifications to the order on the margins in response to Chinese preferences pose less of a threat to a stable international system than a future in which China is alienated from that system. However, these modifications must be governed by strictly articulated end-points.
As part of a larger study on the future of the post–World War II liberal international order, RAND researchers analyze the health of the existing order and offer implications for future U.S. policy. The study’s overall conclusion is that the postwar order continues to enjoy many elements of stability but is increasingly threatened by major geopolitical and domestic socioeconomic trends that call into question the order’s fundamental assumptions.
Drawing on years of research and dozens of interviews with officials from the major countries involved, Dr Mazarr explains why North Korea may believe it needs muclear weapons and how the United States has tried to thwart the North's plans
Significant gaps exist in the ability of the United States and its allies to deter or defeat aggression that could threaten national interests. For example, NATO members Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania remain vulnerable to Russian invasion. South Korea is vulnerable to North Korea's artillery. China's neighbors — especially Taiwan — are vulnerable to coercion and aggression. Violent extremists continue to pose a threat in the Middle East. Solutions to these problems will take both money and time. In this report, RAND researchers analyze the specific technological, doctrinal, and budgetary gaps between the stated strategic and defense policies of the United States and the resources and capabilities that would be required to implement those policies successfully. Absent a change in administration policy or a new political consensus in favor of a defense buildup, there will not be enough resources to close the gap between stated U.S. aims and the military capabilities needed to achieve them. This leaves the Trump administration and this Congress with some difficult choices. The United States could decide to focus primarily on its own security, devoting to allies and partners only those forces and capabilities that could be easily spared. At the other end of the spectrum, the Trump administration could take the central role in defending U.S. allies against aggression by Russia, China, and other potential adversaries. The hard-to-find middle ground would be to provide the military with sufficient capabilities to ensure that aggression that imperils U.S. interests in critical regions would fail while helping allies build the capacity to do more for their own and the collective defense.
This volume examines key issues in Republic of Korea-United States (ROK-U.S.) burden-sharing, with attention to the unique nature of the arrangement. It analyzes the security balance in Northeast Asia and future trends within the ROK-U.S. alliance.
In an era of rising global competition, U.S. challengers and rivals are increasingly looking to achieve competitive advantage through gray zone activities-that is, acts of aggression that remain below the threshold of outright warfare. In this report, RAND researchers identify eight common characteristics of such aggression (e.g., unfolds gradually, is not attributable) and develop a framework for assessing the health of U.S. and partner deterrence in the gray zone. They apply the framework to three cases: China's aggression against the Senkaku Islands, Russia's aggression against the Baltic states, and North Korea's aggression against South Korea. The authors conclude that U.S. and partner deterrence of gray zone activities is in a reasonably strong, though mixed, condition in each of these three contexts. Finally, the authors outline the implications of their findings for the U.S. Army. Among these implications are that maintaining a local presence and posture plays an important role in conveying likely responses to aggression, and clear statements of shared intent to respond to specific actions are critical.
This fifth edition of American National Security is a timely update of a classic classroom text, providing contemporary perspectives on limited war, economic challenges to national security, and research and development. It reviews the changing security environment in key regions of the world: Russia, East Asia, the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and Europe. And it identifies the issues that the United States must face in the next century: peace operations, conflict and arms control, and the widening array of missions undertaken by U.S. armed forces. "We have chosen to emphasize 'power,' broadly defined, as the central dimension of international and national security. This is not to deny that various trends and forces are increasingly pressing states toward more cooperative, less confrontational behavior; rather it is to focus on the fact that on important issues many states -- including all the great powers -- apply a power calculus in dealing with other international actors." -- from the fifth edition of American National Security Praise for previous editions: "A classic text, widely used in universities... It does an exemplary job of explaining the process of defining and implementing national security objectives. Hardly any significant subject is omitted from this very rich and readable volume." -- Foreign Affairs Contents Foreword by Senator Sam Nunn Part I -- National Security Policy: What Is It, and How Have Americans Approached It? 1. National Security: The International Setting 2. Military Power and the Role of Force in the Post-Cold War Era 3. Traditional American Approaches to National Security 4. The Evolution of American National Security Policy Part II -- National Security Policy 5. Presidential Leadership and the Executive Branch in National Security 6. The Impact of Congress on National Security Policy 7. Intelligence and National Security 8. The Role of Military in the National Security Policy Process 9. Defense Planning, Budgeting, and Management 10. The National Security Decision-making Process: Putting the Pieces Together Part III -- Issues of National Strategy 11. Low-level Conflict 12. Limited War 13. Nuclear Strategy Economic Challenges to National Security 15. Research and Development Part IV -- International and Regional Security Issues 16. Russia 17. East Asia 18. The Middle East 19. Sun-Sarahan Africa 20. Latin America 21. Europe Part V: Approaches to National Security for the Early Twenty-first Century 22. Peace Operations 23. Conflict and Arms Control 24. National Security Perspectives for the Early Twenty-first Century
Foundations for the Analysis and OUtline of the Report -- The State of Deterrrence in Korea : North Korea's Motivation ; Clarity of the U.S. Deterrence Message ; Credibility of the U.S. Deterrence Message ; Conclusion -- The State of Deterrence in Taiwan : China's Motivation ; Clarity of the U.S. Deterrence Message ; Credibility of the U.S. deterrence Message ; Conclusion -- Conclusions and Implications for the U.S. Army : Deterrence in Korea ; Deterrence in Taiwan -- Appendix ; U.S. Deterrence of China in Three Taiwan elections.
The U.S. Air Force has embarked on a new round of strategic planning, under the auspices of its 2015 Strategic Master Plan (SMP), to help set the future direction of the service. Refining the Air Force's strategic planning process may help the service align itself to its environment and keep key initiatives on track. To offer the Air Force actionable findings on strategic planning, we surveyed a number of major topics and literatures for common themes and findings. The basic concept and approach of the SMP has promise. Our review of history and theory supports the idea that a consistent, ongoing planning structure would offer important advantages to any military service. Yet we also found that the actual design and execution of the SMP could potentially obstruct, rather than facilitate, these objectives. The SMP retains many elements of an old-style strategic planning process — forecasting an identifiable future, building an exhaustive, pre-set plan, and identifying hundreds of specific tasks — which creates a focus on execution over creative and flexible responses."--Publisher's description.
The United States is entering a period of intensifying strategic competition with several rivals, most notably Russia and China. U.S. officials expect this competition to be played out primarily below the threshold of armed conflict, in what is sometimes termed the gray zone between peace and war. In this report, the authors examine how the United States might respond to Russian and Chinese efforts to seek strategic advantage through coercive actions in the gray zone, including military, diplomatic, informational, and economic tactics. The United States is ill prepared and poorly organized to compete in this space, yet the authors' findings suggest that the United States can begin to treat the ongoing gray zone competition as an opportunity more than a risk. Moreover, leaders in Europe and Asia view Russian and Chinese gray zone aggression as a meaningful threat and are receptive to U.S. assistance in mitigating it. In this report, the authors use insights from their extensive field research in affected countries, as well as general research into the literature on the gray zone phenomenon, to sketch out the elements of a strategic response to the gray zone challenge and develop a menu of response options for U.S. officials to consider.
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