The dramatic insider account of why we invaded Iraq, the motivations that drove it, and the frustrations of those who tried and failed to stop it, leading to the most costly misadventure in US history. A single disastrous choice in the wake of 9/11-the decision to use force to remove Saddam Hussein from power-did enormous damage to the wealth, well-being, and reputation of the United States. Few errors in U.S. foreign policy have had longer-lasting or more harmful consequences. Yet how the decision came to be made remains shrouded in mystery and mythology. To this day, even the principal architects of the war cannot agree on it. Michael Mazarr has interviewed dozens of players involved in the deliberations about the invasion of Iraq and has reviewed all the documents so far declassified. He paints a devastating of portrait of an administration fueled by righteous conviction yet undercut by chaotic processes, rivalrous agencies, and competing egos. But more than the product of one bungling administration, the invasion of Iraq emerges here as a tragically typical example of modern U.S. foreign policy fiascos. Leap of Faith asks profound questions about the limits of US power and the accountability for its use. It offers lessons urgently relevant to stave off similar disasters-today and in the future.
Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright -- Preface -- Contents -- Figures -- Tables -- Summary -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- Chapter One: Introduction -- The Order and Its Health -- Challenges with Measurement -- Methodology -- Structure of the Report -- Chapter Two: Participation in Formal Regional and International Institutions -- Steady Institutional Participation -- Integrating International Order into Domestic Institutions -- Increasingly Diverse and Informal Institutions -- Building New Institutions -- Regional Institutions -- Chapter Three: Economic Liberalization and Interdependence -- Trade and Financial Integration -- Capital Markets and Foreign Direct Investment -- Response to Crises -- Development Assistance -- Chapter Four: International Conflict and Peace -- Treaties of Pacific Settlement -- Territorial Changes Resulting from Conflict -- Status of Controls on Weapons of Mass Destruction -- Levels of Conflict -- Ability to Constrain Major War -- Chapter Five: Adherence to Liberal Norms and Values -- Democracy and Liberal Systems -- Human Rights -- Corruption and the Rule of Law -- Economic Growth and Democratic Stability -- Chapter Six: Major-Power Signaling and Policies Toward Order -- Russia -- China -- India -- Brazil -- Conclusion -- Chapter Seven: Public Attitudes Toward Elements of the Order -- Support for the Order's Rules and Institutions -- Support for Trade -- Support for Liberal Norms and Values -- Support for Internationalism -- The Rise of Nationalism -- Chapter Eight: Foundations of Order: Geopolitics and Ideology -- Geopolitical Trends -- Ideological Trends -- Conclusion: Causes for Worry -- Chapter Nine: Summing Up: The State of the Order -- The Importance of Ideas and Beliefs -- Recognizing Danger Signs -- Implications for Policy -- References
On July 22, 2011, Anders Behring Breivik detonated a car bomb in downtown Oslo, Norway. He didn't stop there, traveling several hours from the city to ambush a youth camp while the rest of Norway was distracted by his earlier attack. That's where the facts end. But what motivated him? Did he have help staging the attacks? The evidence suggests a startling truth: that this was the work of one man, pursuing a mission he was convinced was just. If Breivik did indeed act alone, he wouldn't be the first. Timothy McVeigh bombed a federal building in Oklahoma City based essentially on his own motivations. Eric Robert Rudolph embarked on a campaign of terror over several years, including the Centennial Park bombing at the 1996 Olympics. Ted Kaczynski was revealed to be the Unabomber that same year. And these are only the most notable examples. As George Michael demonstrates in Lone Wolf Terror and the Rise of Leaderless Resistance, they are not isolated cases. Rather, they represent the new way warfare will be conducted in the twenty-first century. Lone Wolf Terror investigates the motivations of numerous political and ideological elements, such as right-wing individuals, ecoextremists, foreign jihadists, and even quasi-governmental entities. In all these cases, those carrying out destructive acts operate as "lone wolves" and small cells, with little or no connection to formal organizations. Ultimately, Michael suggests that leaderless resistance has become the most common tactical approach of political terrorists in the West and elsewhere.
In light of the spectacular performance of American high-technology weapons in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, as well as the phenomenal pace of innovation in the modern computer industry, many defense analysts have posited that we are on the threshold of a revolution in military affairs (RMA). The issue has more than semantic importance. Many RMA proponents have begun to argue for major changes in Pentagon budgetary priorities and even in American foreign policy more generally to free up resources to pursue a transformed U.S. military—and to make sure that other countries do not take advantage of the purported RMA before we do. This book takes a more measured perspective. Beginning with a survey of various types of defense technologies, it argues that while important developments are indeed under way, most impressively in electronics and computer systems, the overall thrust of contemporary military innovation is probably not of a revolutionary magnitude. Some reorientation of U.S. defense dollars is appropriate, largely to improve homeland defense and to take advantage of the promise of modern electronics systems and precision-guided munitions. But radical shifts in U.S. security policy and Pentagon budget priorities appear unwarranted—especially if those shifts would come at the expense of American military engagement in overseas defense missions from Korea to Iraq to Bosnia.
This book examines how presidents from Nixon to Obama have faced the challenges of global leadership in a dramatically changing world—one with more limited resources and an increasing number of threatening challengers. The immediate post-World War II era was undeniably a period of American power and influence. Even during the Cold War, the United States was the leader of the West, exerting wide-ranging power internationally. But beginning with the Vietnam War, America began experiencing a series of setbacks and challenges to its power. The Post-Heroic Presidency: Leveraged Leadership in an Age of Limits examines how U.S. presidents have attempted to reverse or contend with this new era of limited power in which presidential leadership is hamstrung due to an increasingly globalized and interdependent world—one where power is more diffuse and the system of checks and balances bind a president in an age of hyper-partisanship. The book examines presidents of the 20th and 21st centuries, explaining how the first U.S. president to confront this new age was Richard Nixon, who—along with Henry Kissinger—developed a sophisticated approach to deal with the recalibration of American power. It documents how other recent presidents have either tried to make peace with limited power (Jimmy Carter), reverse the decline (Ronald Reagan), ignore the implications of limits (George W. Bush), or find ways to lead that were less ambitious, more prudent, and less unilateral (George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and Barack Obama). In the cases of Clinton and Obama, this shift to using "soft power," persuasion, and multilateralism earned them criticism that they are "weak," thereby undermining their efforts to lead—both at home and abroad.
Intellectuals occupy a paradoxical position in contemporary American culture as they struggle both to maintain their critical independence and to connect to the larger society. In Anxious Intellects John Michael discusses how critics from the right and the left have conceived of the intellectual’s role in a pluralized society, weighing intellectual authority against public democracy, universal against particularistic standards, and criticism against the respect of popular movements. Michael asserts that these Enlightenment-born issues, although not “resolvable,” are the very grounds from which real intellectual work must proceed. As part of his investigation of intellectuals’ self-conceptions and their roles in society, Michael concentrates on several well-known contemporary African American intellectuals, including Henry Louis Gates Jr. and Cornel West. To illuminate public debates over pedagogy and the role of university, he turns to the work of Todd Gitlin, Michael Bérubé, and Allan Bloom. Stanley Fish’s pragmatic tome, Doing What Comes Naturally, along with a juxtaposition of Fredric Jameson and Samuel Huntington’s work, proves fertile ground for Michael’s argument that democratic politics without intellectuals is not possible. In the second half of Anxious Intellects, Michael relies on three popular conceptions of the intellectual—as critic, scientist, and professional—to discuss the work of scholars Constance Penley, Henry Jenkins, the celebrated physicist Stephen Hawking, and others, insisting that ambivalence, anxiety, projection, identification, hybridity, and various forms of psychosocial complexity constitute the real meaning of Enlightenment intellectuality. As a new and refreshing contribution to the recently emergent culture and science wars, Michael’s take on contemporary intellectuals and their place in society will enliven and redirect these ongoing debates.
The accelerating interpenetration of nature and culture is the hallmark of the new "light-green" social order that has emerged in postwar France, argues Michael Bess in this penetrating new history. On one hand, a preoccupation with natural qualities and equilibrium has increasingly infused France's economic and cultural life. On the other, human activities have laid an ever more potent and pervasive touch on the environment, whether through the intrusion of agriculture, industry, and urban growth, or through the much subtler and more well-intentioned efforts of ecological management. The Light-Green Society limns sharply these trends over the last fifty years. The rise of environmentalism in the 1960s stemmed from a fervent desire to "save" wild nature-nature conceived as a qualitatively distinct domain, wholly separate from human designs and endeavors. And yet, Bess shows, after forty years of environmentalist agitation, much of it remarkably successful in achieving its aims, the old conception of nature as a "separate sphere" has become largely untenable. In the light-green society, where ecology and technological modernity continually flow together, a new hybrid vision of intermingled nature-culture has increasingly taken its place.
An informed modern plan for post-2020 American foreign policy that avoids the opposing dangers of retrenchment and overextension Russia and China are both believed to have “grand strategies”—detailed sets of national security goals backed by means, and plans, to pursue them. In the United States, policy makers have tried to articulate similar concepts but have failed to reach a widespread consensus since the Cold War ended. While the United States has been the world’s prominent superpower for over a generation, much American thinking has oscillated between the extremes of isolationist agendas versus interventionist and overly assertive ones. Drawing on historical precedents and weighing issues such as Russia’s resurgence, China’s great rise, North Korea’s nuclear machinations, and Middle East turmoil, Michael O’Hanlon presents a well-researched, ethically sound, and politically viable vision for American national security policy. He also proposes complementing the Pentagon’s set of “4+1” pre-existing threats with a new “4+1”: biological, nuclear, digital, climatic, and internal dangers.
Michael Turner argues that the root causes of failures in American intelligence can be found in the way it is organized and in the intelligence process itself. Intelligence that has gone awry affects national decision making and, ultimately, American national security. Intelligence officials are reluctant to talk about intelligence successes, claiming "the secret of our success is the secret of our success." But these officials also shy away from talking about failures, largely because doing so would expose the failings of American intelligence and have an impact on policy consumers who may become more reluctant to accept and act on the intelligence they receive. Rather than focusing on case studies, the book takes a holistic approach, beginning with structural issues and all dysfunctions that emanate from them. Turner explores each step of the intelligence cycle--priority setting, intelligence collection, analysis, production, and dissemination--to identify the "inflection points" within each stage that contribute to intelligence failures. Finally, he examines a variety of plans that, if implemented, would reduce the likelihood of intelligence failures. While examining the causes of intelligence failures, Turner also explores intelligence as a critical governmental activity, making the book an excellent primer on secret intelligence. Turner writes in jargon-free prose for the informed reader interested in foreign policy and national security policy matters and brings enough depth to his subject that even experts will find this a must-read.
This book provides a comprehensive assessment of the global diffusion of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and its impact on military innovation trajectories in small states. Although the 'Revolution in Military Affairs' (RMA) concept has enjoyed significant academic attention, the varying paths and patterns of military innovation in divergent strategic settings have been overlooked. This book seeks to rectify this gap by addressing the broad puzzle of how the global diffusion of RMA-oriented military innovation – the process of international transmission, communication, and interaction of RMA-related military concepts, organizations, and technologies - has shaped the paths, patterns, and scope of military innovation of selected small states. In a reverse mode, how have selected small states influenced the conceptualization and transmission of the RMA theory, processes, and debate? Using Israel, Singapore and South Korea as case studies, this book argues that RMA-oriented military innovation paths in small states indicate predominantly evolutionary trajectory, albeit with a varying patterns resulting from the confluence of three sets of variables: (1) the level of strategic, organizational, and operational adaptability in responding to shifts in the geostrategic and regional security environment; (2) the ability to identify, anticipate, exploit, and sustain niche military innovation – select conceptual, organizational, and technological innovation intended to enhance the military’s ability to prepare for, fight, and win wars, and (3) strategic culture. While the book represents relevant empirical cases for testing the validity of the RMA diffusion hypotheses, from a policy-oriented perspective, this book argues that these case studies offer lessons learned in coping with the security and defence management challenges posed by military innovation in general. This book will be of much interest for students of military innovation, strategic studies, defence studies, Asian politics, Middle Eastern politics and security studies in general.
While the United States has had some kind of intelligence capability throughout its history, its intelligence apparatus is young, dating only to the period immediately after World War II. Yet, in that short a time, it has undergone enormous changes—from the labor-intensive espionage and covert action establishment of the 1950s to a modern enterprise that relies heavily on electronic data, technology, satellites, airborne collection platforms, and unmanned aerial vehicles, to name a few. This second edition covers the history of United States intelligence, and includes several key features: Chronology Introductory essay Appendixes Bibliography Over 600 cross-referenced entries on key events, issues, people, operations, laws, regulations This book is an excellent access point for members of the intelligence community; students, scholars, and historians; legal experts; and general readers wanting to know more about the history of U.S. intelligence.
How the United States and China can avoid future conflict and establish stable cooperative relations After forty years of largely cooperative Sino-U.S. relations, policymakers, politicians, and pundits on both sides of the Pacific see growing tensions between the United States and China. Some go so far as to predict a future of conflict, driven by the inevitable rivalry between an established and a rising power, and urge their leaders to prepare now for a future showdown. Others argue that the deep economic interdependence between the two countries and the many areas of shared interests will lead to more collaborative relations in the coming decades. In this book, James Steinberg and Michael O'Hanlon stake out a third, less deterministic position. They argue that there are powerful domestic and international factors, especially in the military and security realms, that could well push the bilateral relationship toward an arms race and confrontation, even though both sides will be far worse off if such a future comes to pass. They contend that this pessimistic scenario can be confidently avoided only if China and the United States adopt deliberate policies designed to address the security dilemma that besets the relationship between a rising and an established power. The authors propose a set of policy proposals to achieve a sustainable, relatively cooperative relationship between the two nations, based on the concept of providing mutual strategic reassurance in such key areas as nuclear weapons and missile defense, space and cyber operations, and military basing and deployments, while also demonstrating strategic resolve to protect vital national interests, including, in the case of the United States, its commitments to regional allies.
Bestselling author Michael Shermer's exploration of science and morality that demonstrates how the scientific way of thinking has made people, and society as a whole, more moral From Galileo and Newton to Thomas Hobbes and Martin Luther King, Jr., thinkers throughout history have consciously employed scientific techniques to better understand the non-physical world. The Age of Reason and the Enlightenment led theorists to apply scientific reasoning to the non-scientific disciplines of politics, economics, and moral philosophy. Instead of relying on the woodcuts of dissected bodies in old medical texts, physicians opened bodies themselves to see what was there; instead of divining truth through the authority of an ancient holy book or philosophical treatise, people began to explore the book of nature for themselves through travel and exploration; instead of the supernatural belief in the divine right of kings, people employed a natural belief in the right of democracy. In The Moral Arc, Shermer will explain how abstract reasoning, rationality, empiricism, skepticism--scientific ways of thinking--have profoundly changed the way we perceive morality and, indeed, move us ever closer to a more just world.
This volume contains a detailed study of the applicable international law relevant to peace operations in the context of collapsed states, in the establishment of safe havens or in a general enforcement role. It discusses the interaction and the often complex legal relationships between non-government humanitarian actors, relevant UN agencies, the warring parties and international peace forces under international law and practice. In particular, the book deals with issues concerning the implications of contemporary peace operations for military forces in terms of force structure, operating procedures and training. The book focuses on the often overlooked but critical issues of the interim administration of law and order in complex operations and on the reconstruction of a local capability in this regard. Many contemporary operational challenges are analysed, including the Balkans and the Middle East. In particular, the book includes a detailed case study of Somalia based on the author's personal knowledge, experience and access to information on the ground in his capacity as military legal adviser to the Australian Defence Force Contingent in Somalia.
Presidents George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush both led the United States through watershed events in foreign relations: the end of the Cold War and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Many high-level cabinet members and advisers played important foreign policy roles in both administrations, most notably Dick Cheney, Colin Powell, and Condoleeza Rice. Both presidents perceived Saddam Hussein as a significant threat and took action against Iraq. But was the George W. Bush administration really just "Act II" of George H. W. Bush's administration? In The Gulf, Michael F. Cairo reveals how, despite many similarities, father and son pursued very different international strategies. He explores how the personality, beliefs, and leadership style of each man influenced contemporary U.S. foreign policy. Contrasting the presidents' management of American wars in Iraq, approach to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and relationships with their Israeli counterparts, Cairo offers valuable insights into two leaders who left indelible marks on U.S. international relations. The result is a fresh analysis of the singular role the executive office plays in shaping foreign policy.
Since the Second World War, Arab armed forces have consistently punched below their weight. They have lost many wars that by all rights they should have won, and in their best performances only ever achieved quite modest accomplishments. Over time, soldiers, scholars, and military experts have offered various explanations for this pattern. Reliance on Soviet military methods, the poor civil-military relations of the Arab world, the underdevelopment of the Arab states, and patterns of behavior derived from the wider Arab culture, have all been suggested as the ultimate source of Arab military difficulties. Armies of Sand, Kenneth M. Pollack's powerful and riveting history of Arab armies from the end of World War Two to the present, assesses these differing explanations and isolates the most important causes. Over the course of the book, he examines the combat performance of fifteen Arab armies and air forces in virtually every Middle Eastern war, from the Jordanians and Syrians in 1948 to Hizballah in 2006 and the Iraqis and ISIS in 2014-2017. He then compares these experiences to the performance of the Argentine, Chadian, Chinese, Cuban, North Korean, and South Vietnamese armed forces in their own combat operations during the twentieth century. The book ultimately concludes that reliance on Soviet doctrine was more of a help than a hindrance to the Arabs. In contrast, politicization and underdevelopment were both important factors limiting Arab military effectiveness, but patterns of behavior derived from the dominant Arab culture was the most important factor of all. Pollack closes with a discussion of the rapid changes occurring across the Arab world-political, economic, and cultural-as well as the rapid evolution in war making as a result of the information revolution. He suggests that because both Arab society and warfare are changing, the problems that have bedeviled Arab armed forces in the past could dissipate or even vanish in the future, with potentially dramatic consequences for the Middle East military balance. Sweeping in its historical coverage and highly accessible, this will be the go-to reference for anyone interested in the history of warfare in the Middle East since 1945.
Long before the United States became a major force in global affairs, Americans believed in their superiority over others due to their inventiveness, productivity, and economic and social well-being. U.S. expansionists assumed a mandate to civilize non-Western peoples by demanding submission to American technological prowess and design. As an integral part of America's national identity and sense of itself in the world, this civilizing mission provided the rationale to displace the Indians from much of our continent, to build an island empire in the Pacific and Caribbean, and to promote unilateral--at times military--interventionism throughout Asia. In our age of smart bombs and mobile warfare, technological aptitude remains preeminent in validating America's global mission. Michael Adas brilliantly pursues the history of this mission through America's foreign relations over nearly four centuries from North America to the Philippines, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf. The belief that it is our right and destiny to remake foreign societies in our image has endured from the early decades of colonization to our current crusade to implant American-style democracy in the Muslim Middle East. Dominance by Design explores the critical ways in which technological superiority has undergirded the U.S.'s policies of unilateralism, preemption, and interventionism in foreign affairs and raised us from an impoverished frontier nation to a global power. Challenging the long-held assumptions and imperatives that sustain the civilizing mission, Adas gives us an essential guide to America's past and present role in the world as well as cautionary lessons for the future.
Assesses the military performances of Iraq, Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, from the first military engagements between Egypt and Israel to the 1991 Gulf War.
A provocative and urgent analysis of the U.S.–China rivalry. It has become conventional wisdom that America and China are running a “superpower marathon” that may last a century. Yet Hal Brands and Michael Beckley pose a counterintuitive question: What if the sharpest phase of that competition is more like a decade-long sprint? The Sino-American contest is driven by clashing geopolitical interests and a stark ideological dispute over whether authoritarianism or democracy will dominate the 21st century. But both history and China’s current trajectory suggest that this rivalry will reach its moment of maximum danger in the 2020s. China is at a perilous moment: strong enough to violently challenge the existing order, yet losing confidence that time is on its side. Numerous examples from antiquity to the present show that rising powers become most aggressive when their fortunes fade, their difficulties multiply, and they realize they must achieve their ambitions now or miss the chance to do so forever. China has already started down this path. Witness its aggression toward Taiwan, its record-breaking military buildup, and its efforts to dominate the critical technologies that will shape the world’s future. Over the long run, the Chinese challenge will most likely prove more manageable than many pessimists currently believe—but during the 2020s, the pace of Sino-American conflict will accelerate, and the prospect of war will be frighteningly real. America, Brands and Beckley argue, will still need a sustainable approach to winning a protracted global competition. But first, it needs a near-term strategy for navigating the danger zone ahead.
In this incisive examination of our national security policy, Michael Klare suggests that the Pentagon in effect established a new class of enemies when the Cold War came to an -unpredictable and hostile states in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Klare argues that the containment of these rising Third World powers-Iraq, Iran, Libya, and North Korea, especially-became the centerpiece of American military policy and the justification for near-Cold War levels of military sping.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, transformed the way in which Americans and their leaders viewed the world. The tragic events of that day helped give rise to a foreign policy strategy commonly referred to as the “Bush Doctrine.” At the heart of this doctrine lie a series of claims about the need to encourage liberal democracy as the antidote to jihadist terrorism. President George W. Bush proclaimed in a variety of addresses that democracy now represented the “single surviving model” of political life to which all people aspired. In the course of making this argument, President Bush linked his policies to an overarching “teleology” of progress. This discourse suggested that the United States might use force to hasten the emergence of liberal norms and institutions in rogue states. With a sense of irony, some commentators soon referred to the Bush administration’s position as “Leninist” because of its determination to bring about the so-called “end of history” today. Yet, surprisingly, these critics had little more to add. This book assesses in greater depth the Bush administration’s claim to comprehend the purpose of historical progress. Developing a concept termed “democratic vanguardism,” this study investigates the idea of liberal modernity, the role of the United States as a force for democracy, and the implications of using military intervention in the service of idealistic ends. It examines disputes among political theorists, public intellectuals, and elected statesmen that help to enrich our understanding of the United States’ efforts under President Bush to bend history to its will.
With the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq seemingly drawing down, and with new calls to focus on the threats of great power competition posed by states such as China and Russia on the rise, what will happen to U.S. capabilities for dealing with conflicts that occur in messy political-military environments? Irregular Soldiers and Rebellious States offers, for both expert and non-expert audiences, a useful typology and background for examining interventions where U.S. advisors and forces operating on a small-scale basis will either work with a foreign government to help defend it from threats of subversion or insurgency (known as Foreign Internal Defense) or to assist insurgents or guerrilla forces in countering a hostile regime (known as Unconventional Warfare). It uses nine examples to illustrate how the U.S.—and the British in one case—used such capabilities in either limited or assertive ways to defend (El Salvador, Philippines, Sahel, and Dhofar) or counter (Angola, Nicaragua, northern Iraq, and Afghanistan) foreign governments. Placing such interventions within the broader contexts of American military history and the cultures of the armed forces, it offers three key findings and six policy prescriptions for wisely and judiciously using these capabilities in the present and future.
In Defense 101, a concise primer for understanding the United States' $700+ billion defense budget and rapidly changing military technologies, Michael O'Hanlon provides a deeply informed yet accessible analysis of American military power. After an introduction in which O'Hanlon surveys today's international security environment, provides a brief sketch of the history of the US military, its command structure, the organization of its three million personnel, and a review of its domestic basing and global reach, Defense 101 provides in-depth coverage of four critical areas in military affairs: • Defense Budgeting and Resource Allocation: detailed budget and cost breakdowns, wartime spending allocations, economics of overseas basing, military readiness, and defense budgeting versus US grand strategy • Gaming and Modeling Combat: wargaming, micro modeling, nuclear exchange calculations, China scenarios, and assessments of counterinsurgency missions • Technological Change and Military Innovation: use of computers, communications, and robotics, cutting-edge developments in projectiles and propulsion systems • The Science of War, military uses of space, missile defense, and nuclear weapons, testing, and proliferation For policy makers and experts, military professionals, students, and citizens alike, Defense 101 helps make sense of the US Department of Defense, the basics of war and the future of armed conflict, and the most important characteristics of the American military.
These are extraordinary times in U.S. national security policy. America remains engaged in both Iraq and Afghanistan while facing a global economic downturn. Homeland security concerns still abound in the wake of the September 11 attacks. Even as the financial crisis places considerable pressure on the U.S. budget, President Obama will have to spend a great deal of time and money on national security, hard power, and war. How should these competing demands be prioritized? How much money will be needed? How much will be available, and how should it be spent? Budgeting for Hard Power continues the long and proud tradition of Brookings analysis on defense spending. As with previous volumes, this book examines the budgets of the Pentagon and the Department of Energy's nuclear weapons programs. But Michael O'Hanlon takes his analysis further, addressing the wide range of activities crucial for American security as a result of 9/11 and the ongoing wars. He considers homeland security resources and selected parts of the State Department and foreign operations budgets—offering a more complete overall look at the elements that make up America's "hard power" budget, a concept that he and Kurt Campbell wrote about in Hard Power: The New Politics of National Security (2006). With future federal deficits projected to top $1 trillion, O'Hanlon calls for Defense, State, and Homeland Security budgets to be as frugal as possible. At the same time, he recognizes that resources should be selectively increased in certain areas to compensate for years of systematic underfunding, especially in certain areas of homeland security, diplomacy, and foreign assistance. In his typically clear and concise manner, O'Hanlon shows policymakers how to wrestle with the resource allocation decisions affecting the national security of the United States.
Placing Alexander the Great’s leadership, command skills, and grand strategy within the context of twenty-first century military challenges, and thus showing continuities in leadership and warfare since his time, this volume demonstrates how and why Alexander is relevant to the modern world by emphasizing the need for human leadership in our digital era. Not only does this volume explore Alexander’s rich military history, but also it provides a robust exploration of the twenty-first century security environment. Theorists and policy-makers will gain insight into how Alexander’s story informs our thinking about peace, war, and strategy, while practitioners and educators will encounter ways to improve their approaches to leader development and building curricula. Ferguson and Worthington set forth these lessons in a thematic framework that organises Alexander’s reign into distinct parts, together with chapters discussing the lessons and warnings he brings to the modern world. Twenty-fifth National Security Advisor to the President of the United States, Lt. Gen. H. R. McMaster, provides a thoughtful conclusion to this fascinating volume. Alexander’s timeless campaigns remain as germane to this age as any other and demonstrate the critical importance of dynamic leadership and historical studies in an era increasingly dominated by the culture of technology. The Military Legacy of Alexander the Great is expertly written for students and scholars in a variety of disciplines, including Classics, Ancient History, Modern History, Peace Studies, and Military Studies. It is also of great interest to senior defence leaders, military academies, leadership- and management-focused academic programmes, intelligence organizations, and senior service colleges. The volume is also suitable for the general reader interested in warfare, military history, and history more broadly.
Communication becomes more complex as businesses compete in a global environment. The complexity brought on by an explosion in the number of tools for communication—computers, digital media, interactive corporate television, faxes, e-mail, the Internet—fuels the need for a corporation to consider its communications as central to its strategic plans. Corporate Communications for Executives looks closely at the professional practice of corporate communication. It offers numerous perspectives on ethics, science and society, employee motivation, corporate social responsibility, internal communication, global corporate communications, and communicating corporate cultures.
With the end of the Cold War, the euphoria of the Gulf War of the 1990s and the avowal of a New World Order, peace-operations were declared as the recipe for a better world through international intervention in conflict arenas. However, the debacles and failures in Cambodia, Somalia, or the Balkans led to disillusionment and a sense of strategic helplessness among leaders, experts and scholars in the industrial democracies. While these arguments have been the focus of intense criticism and discussion, they nevertheless underscore the fact that since the end of the Cold War the armed forces of the industrial democracies have undergone very significant transformations. This is the first work linking the changes in armed forces to Peace Support Operations (PSOs), those operations with major state-building components that demand broad and coherent cooperation between military forces and civilian entities. The Transformation of the World of War and Peace Support Operations is timely as the recent debates over PSOs continue to take center stage. This work embodies a new set of ideas and concepts that aid in grasping and interpreting the transformations taking place in the world of war and in PSOs. It seeks to understand how social, economic, political, and organizational transformations around the globe are related to the complex links between armed forces and PSOs. Additionally, this work addresses issues that continue to define the character and makeup of modern warfare and the missions of PSOs for coming decades.
In the past decade, tensions in Asia have risen as Beijing has become more assertive in maritime disputes with its neighbors and the United States. Although taking place below the threshold of direct military confrontation, China’s assertiveness frequently involves coercive elements that put at risk existing rules and norms; physical control of disputed waters and territory; and the credibility of U.S. security commitments. Regional leaders have expressed increasing alarm that such “gray zone” coercion threatens to destabilize the region by increasing the risk of conflict and undermining the rules-based order. Yet, the United States and its allies and partners have struggled to develop effective counters to China’s maritime coercion. This study reviews deterrence literature and nine case studies of coercion to develop recommendations for how the United States and its allies and partners could counter gray zone activity.
In 2008, the iconic doomsday clock of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientistswas set at five minutes to midnight—two minutes closer to Armageddon than in 1962, when John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev went eyeball to eyeball over missiles in Cuba! We still live in an echo chamber of fear, after eight years in which the Bush administration and its harshest critics reinforced each other's worst fears about the Bomb. And yet, there have been no mushroom clouds or acts of nuclear terrorism since the Soviet Union dissolved, let alone since 9/11. Our worst fears still could be realized at any time, but Michael Krepon argues that the United States has never possessed more tools and capacity to reduce nuclear dangers than it does today - from containment and deterrence to diplomacy, military strength, and arms control. The bloated nuclear arsenals of the Cold War years have been greatly reduced, nuclear weapon testing has almost ended, and all but eight countries have pledged not to acquire the Bomb. Major powers have less use for the Bomb than at any time in the past. Thus, despite wars, crises, and Murphy's Law, the dark shadows cast by nuclear weapons can continue to recede. Krepon believes that positive trends can continue, even in the face of the twin threats of nuclear terrorism and proliferation that have been exacerbated by the Bush administration's pursuit of a war of choice in Iraq based on false assumptions. Krepon advocates a "back to basics" approach to reducing nuclear dangers, reversing the Bush administration's denigration of diplomacy, deterrence, containment, and arms control. As he sees it, "The United States has stumbled before, but America has also made it through hard times and rebounded. With wisdom, persistence, and luck, another dark passage can be successfully navigated.
A vivid insider's account of a life in intelligence, special operations, and strategy from the Cold War to the war with al-Qa’ida • "[An] illuminating and richly detailed memoir." —The New York Times Book Review "Deeply insightful...A sweeping and breathtaking journey that gives the reader unprecedented access to the courage, sacrifice, and bravado of our nation’s finest warriors, in their finest hours." —Admiral William H. McRaven, author of Wisdom of the Bullfrog and #1 New York Times bestseller, Make Your Bed In 1984, Michael Vickers took charge of the CIA’s secret war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. After inheriting a strategy aimed at imposing costs on the Soviets for their invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, Vickers transformed the covert campaign into an all-out effort to help the Afghan resistance win their war. More than any other American, he was responsible for the outcome in Afghanistan that led to the end of the Cold War. In By All Means Available, Vickers recounts his remarkable career, from his days as a Green Beret to his vision for victory in Afghanistan to his role in waging America’s war with al-Qa’ida at the highest levels of government. In captivating detail, he depicts his years in the Special Forces—including his training to parachute behind enemy lines with a backpack nuclear weapon in the event of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe—and reveals how those experiences directly influenced his approach to shaping policy. Vickers has played a significant role in most of the military and intelligence operations of the past four decades, and he offers a deeply informed analysis of the greatest challenges facing America today, and in the decades ahead. Riveting and illuminating, this is a rare and important insider’s account of the modern military and intelligence worlds at every level.
Examining the future of nuclear deterrence in the 1990s and beyond, this book outlines aspects of the evolving strategic environment. It also projects the likely future of deterrence strategies and strategic force postures. Other topics, such as the Soviet nuclear doctrine are also covered.
As economic power diffuses across more countries and China becomes more dependent on the world economy, Chinese leaders are being forced to abandon their largely passive approach to global governance. This report analyzes China’s interests and behavior to evaluate both the recent history of its interactions with the postwar international order and possible future trajectories. It also draws implications from that analysis for future U.S. policy.
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