Becoming the Arsenal discusses one of the three signal events that transformed the relationship of government and the private sector in directing the American economy. The first was the Great Depression and the government's New Deal recovery program. The second was the gradual abandonment of the monetary Gold Standard, or the "floating" of the dollar between 1933 and the 1970s. Third, and least appreciated, was the mobilization of the American economy to confront the threat of the Axis ascendancy in World War II. Becoming the Arsenal places the events of this economic mobilization in its political-economic context and evaluates its performance in terms of prevailing military and political realities. The book is structured in three parts. The first deals with the decision to mobilize in May-June 1940. The second part relates the importance of the World War I experience and the economic diplomatic environment of the late 1930s. The final part examines the shift from a partial mobilization to the commitment to a "Victory Plan" in the fall of 1941, and achievement of complete mobilization and its consequences, in early 1943.
Revisiting the Roots of the Cold War is a history of the emergence of the Cold War from 1944–1948, emphasizing the recently available Soviet scholarship and information from other archives. Prior scholarship on the origins of the Cold War served as the basis for the final works of James Gaddis, George Kennan and Ernest May in the 1980s, and with no access to Soviet materials, these works ignored the effects of American demobilization and the major restructuring of the State and Defense Departments. This study represents a more realistic appraisal of the formulation of U.S. policy.
This study recounts the formulation of foreign and defense policies through an examination of the background of the policymakers, with specific emphasis on the World War I experience. The introduction provides an analysis of the literature of the history of this American World War II policy formulation. The events and factors that led to the reorientation of priorities in 1938-1939 are examined. From that base, Michael Carew reviews the unfolding events of the European and Japanese degeneration into war through the spring of 1940, and their perception for the American policy-makers. He also recounts the tectonic shifts of the subsequent eighteen months and the scramble for an American response. The immediate consequences of Pearl Harbor brought the policymaking to a crisis, and the Casablanca conference of January 1943 signified the completion of the formulation of American foreign policy and naval-military strategy. Carew emphasizes the leadership of President Roosevelt and his cadre of planners in the policy formulation realm, the assertion of leadership of the alliance, and Roosevelt's specific tasks in managing the American war effort. These presidential tasks included the industrial mobilization of the American economy, the domestic political leadership of the war, the persuasion of the alliance to the propriety of American policy, and the defeat of the Axis powers.
Becoming the Arsenal discusses one of the three signal events that transformed the relationship of government and the private sector in directing the American economy. The first was the Great Depression and the government's New Deal recovery program. The second was the gradual abandonment of the monetary Gold Standard, or the "floating" of the dollar between 1933 and the 1970s. Third, and least appreciated, was the mobilization of the American economy to confront the threat of the Axis ascendancy in World War II. Becoming the Arsenal places the events of this economic mobilization in its political-economic context and evaluates its performance in terms of prevailing military and political realities. The book is structured in three parts. The first deals with the decision to mobilize in May-June 1940. The second part relates the importance of the World War I experience and the economic diplomatic environment of the late 1930s. The final part examines the shift from a partial mobilization to the commitment to a "Victory Plan" in the fall of 1941, and achievement of complete mobilization and its consequences, in early 1943.
This work, part of a series, deals with the parliamentary papers of Nicholas Ferrer, from 1624. Other speeches of parliamentarians of the time are also mentioned, along with information on Sir Cheney Culpeper.
This will help us customize your experience to showcase the most relevant content to your age group
Please select from below
Login
Not registered?
Sign up
Already registered?
Success – Your message will goes here
We'd love to hear from you!
Thank you for visiting our website. Would you like to provide feedback on how we could improve your experience?
This site does not use any third party cookies with one exception — it uses cookies from Google to deliver its services and to analyze traffic.Learn More.