This comprehensive volume brings together a diverse set of scholars to analyse candidate nomination, intra-party democracy, and election violence in Africa. Through a combination of comparative studies and country-specific case studies spanning much of Sub-Saharan Africa, including Kenya, Zambia, and South Africa, the authors shed light on violence during candidate nomination processes within political parties. The book covers several cases that vary significantly in terms of democracy, party dominance and competitiveness, and the institutionalization and inclusiveness of candidate selection processes. The authors investigate how common violence is during candidate nomination processes; whether the drivers of nomination violence are identical to those of general election violence; whether nomination violence can be avoided in high risk cases such as dominant party regimes with fierce intra-party competition for power; and which subnational locations are most likely to experience nomination violence. Through its focus on violence in nomination processes, this book firmly places the role of political parties at the centre of the analysis of African election violence. While adding to our theoretical and empirical understanding of nomination violence, the book contributes to the literature on conflict, the literature on democratization and democratic consolidation, and the literature on African political parties. This book was originally published as a special issue of the journal Democratization.
Although the phenomenon of authoritarian elections has been a focal point for the literature on authoritarian institutions for more than a decade, our understanding of the effect of authoritarian elections is still limited. Combining evidence from cross-national studies with studies on selected cases relying on recent field work, this book suggests a solution to the "paradox of authoritarian elections". Rather than focusing on authoritarian elections as a uniform phenomenon, it focuses on the differing conditions under which authoritarian elections occur. It demonstrates that the capacities available to authoritarian rulers shape the effect of elections and high levels of state capacity and control over the economy increase the probability that authoritarian multi-party elections will stabilize the regime. Where these capacities are limited, the regime is more likely to succumb in the face of elections. The findings imply that although multi-party competition and state strength may be important prerequisites for democracy, they can under some circumstances obstruct democratization by preventing the demise of dictatorships. This text will be of key interest to scholars, students and practitioners of democratization, and to those who study autocracy and electoral authoritarianism, as well as comparative politics more broadly.
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