With the outbreak of the Palestinian Intifadat al-Aqsa in September 2000 that followed the failure of the Camp David II summit, the chain of belligerent events took Egypt by surprise, and it faced a dilemma in its search for an appropriate policy towards the Palestinian-Israeli escalation. This study argues that Egypt's policy towards the second Intifada may best be understood by scrutinizing several circles of reference that directly affected its policymaking process throughout the long years of the bloody Palestinian-Israeli conflict. These circles of reference comprise interests and calculations derived from: Egyptian internal issues, regional factors (Egypt's general role and position in the Arab world, and its relations with the Palestinians in particular), Egypt's relations with Israel, and its strategic ties with the United States. The growing strength and expansion of the global Islamic terrorist network that challenges the stability of the present Arab regimes constitutes a linchpin at every layer. Egypt's foreign policy is based on Realpolitik, that is, on pragmatic and material factors rather than on ideological or moral considerations. Safeguarding its national interests is Egypt's prime goal. In this regard, Egypt considers the peace with Israel as a strategic national asset. The abrogation of the peace treaty with Israel has never been an option, even during the worst days of the Intifada. Egypt has shown exemplary restraint throughout the conflict. Despite occasional harsh anti-Israeli statements aimed mainly at easing internal and external pressures, Egypt can, on the whole, be seen as a responsible and stabilizing factor vehemently striving to prevent regional escalation. This study is based primarily on Egyptian sources, as well as interviews and conversations with senior members of the Al-Ahram Center for Strategic Studies. It also draws on other primary and secondary sources in Arabic, Hebrew, and English. The book will be essential reading for all scholars involved and engaged with the Israel-Arab conflict.
With the outbreak of the Palestinian Intifadat al-Aqsa in September 2000 that followed the failure of the Camp David II summit, the chain of belligerent events took Egypt by surprise, and it faced a dilemma in its search for an appropriate policy towards the Palestinian-Israeli escalation. This study argues that Egypt's policy towards the second Intifada may best be understood by scrutinizing several circles of reference that directly affected its policymaking process throughout the long years of the bloody Palestinian-Israeli conflict. These circles of reference comprise interests and calculations derived from: Egyptian internal issues, regional factors (Egypt's general role and position in the Arab world, and its relations with the Palestinians in particular), Egypt's relations with Israel, and its strategic ties with the United States. The growing strength and expansion of the global Islamic terrorist network that challenges the stability of the present Arab regimes constitutes a linchpin at every layer. Egypt's foreign policy is based on Realpolitik, that is, on pragmatic and material factors rather than on ideological or moral considerations. Safeguarding its national interests is Egypt's prime goal. In this regard, Egypt considers the peace with Israel as a strategic national asset. The abrogation of the peace treaty with Israel has never been an option, even during the worst days of the Intifada. Egypt has shown exemplary restraint throughout the conflict. Despite occasional harsh anti-Israeli statements aimed mainly at easing internal and external pressures, Egypt can, on the whole, be seen as a responsible and stabilizing factor vehemently striving to prevent regional escalation. This study is based primarily on Egyptian sources, as well as interviews and conversations with senior members of the Al-Ahram Center for Strategic Studies. It also draws on other primary and secondary sources in Arabic, Hebrew, and English. The book will be essential reading for all scholars involved and engaged with the Israel-Arab conflict.
In discussion with Martin Buber, Franz Rosenzweig, Abraham Joshua Heschel, Franz Fischer and Emmanuel Levinas, Ephraim Meir outlines a novel conception of a selfhood that is grounded in dialogical thought. He focuses on the shaping of identity in present day societies and offers a new view on identity around the concepts of self-transcendence, self-difference, and trans-difference. Subjectivity is seen as the concrete possibility of relating to an open identity, which receives and hosts alterity. Self-difference is the crown upon the I; it is the result of a dialogical life, a life of passing to the other. The religious I is perceived as in dialogue with secularity, with its own past and with other persons. It is suggested that with a dialogical approach one may discover what unites people in pluralist societies.
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