This book analyzes Ayatollah Khomeinis ideology, Irans official and unofficial armed forces, and its allies throughout the world and provides photographs of the regimes predominant actors. Since 1892, the Shia clergy has played a major role in Iran, such as the tobacco boycott, which led to the withdrawal of the concession given by the Shah to British citizens, Irans Constitutional Revolution of 1906, as well as organizing opposition to the Shahs policies in the 1979 revolution. Ayatollah Khomeini was a lecturer at Hawza Ilmiyya (Shia seminary of traditional Islamic school of higher learning) of Najaf and Qom for decades before he came on to the Iranian political scene. In 1977, Khomeini assumed the mantle of leadership within the Islamist opposition after the death of Ali Shariati, a leftist intellectual and one of the most influential Iranian Muslim thinkers of his generation. In 1930, Shariati contributed a new line of thinking in Iran, through his reinterpretation of jihad and shahadat (martyrdom), which was presented in his view of an authentic Islam. Shariatis new authentic Islam centered on a reinterpretation of the story of Karbala, where Imam Hussein was martyred in a battle, refusing to pledge allegiance to Yazid, the Umayyad caliph. Shariati borrowed the Christian concept of martyrdom from the Crucifixion and Resurrection of Jesus as the basis of his new Islamic philosophy. Shariati wrote that when faced with the possibility of ones own death, one must adopt an attitude of freedom-toward-death and thereby experience authentic living. In 1978, Ayatollah Khomeinis reinterpretation of Shia rituals removed the borders between the audience and the actors, turning the entire country into a stage for his casting. He imbued the old passion of the story of Karbala with a new passionate hatred for the Shahs unjust rule in Iran, as well as Israels and the United Statess influences within the world. Khomeinis memory of Dr. Mohammed Mosaddegh, whose government was toppled by the CIA in 1953, returning the Shah to Iran, resulted in the rise of various political groups such as nationalists, liberals, secularists, and Marxists. These groups were essential in assisting Khomeinis overthrow of the Shah, though they were soon stomped out by the creation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in May 1979 in order to protect Khomeinis unique brand of a Shia Islamic Revolution. The Iran-Iraq War initiated the rapid expansion of the IRGCs size and capabilities. In September 1980, the IRGC had only 30,000 men in lightly armed units. Prior to the war, the IRGC personnel were very young in age and had little to no military experience. By the summer of 1981, the IRGC had organized basic training centers with experienced commanders and a select group of regular officers. They also had 50,000 members, and its strength would jump to 100,000 in 1983 and 250,000 in 1985. In order to meet all its manpower needs on the Iraq war front, the IRGC then turned to its volunteer militia, the Basij. The Basij members provided more troops than the IRGC could arm. The average Basij member came from Irans rural areas and can be described as poor, uneducated, and ranged in age from twelve to thirty years old. Like the IRGC, the Basij members are motivated by both religion and ideology. After the Iran-Iraq War, the IRGC focused on external threats as the Basij increased its involvement in domestic affairs. In past years, the Basij militia has been active in controlling public gatherings and disrupting demonstrations by civil or student activists.
In September 2007, the former Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Mohammad Aziz Ali Jafari (2007-2019), said, “We must be flexible in confronting any threat. The IRGC’s goal is to increase its resilience against enemies of Iran and the Islamic Revolution and strengthen the country’s power and ability to deal with threats to prevent the enemy from acting against the country and the regime.” Jafari stated that he would try to strengthen the IRGC’s power in three ways: first, prepare the IRGC forces for asymmetric warfare; second, improve the country’s intelligence collection power to have better information on enemy’s activities in the region; third, improve country’s missiles capabilities. Aziz Jafari did not mention strengthening and enhancing the use of drones or unmanned aircraft systems. It seems that the IRGC has been working and improving its drone technology covertly since the Iran/Iraq War. The IRGC has around 90 drones for commercial, surveillance, tactical, and suicide missions. The IRGC not only shipped its suicide drones to Russia to be used against Ukraine but also equipped its proxies such as Lebanese Hezbollah, Yemeni Houthis, the Syrian army, and Iraqi Shia Militia groups with all kinds of armed drones. The IRGC also has sold armed drones to Venezuela, Ethiopia, and soon Armenia to use in case of war again with the Republic of Azerbaijan. The Iranian drones look primitive and unsophisticated but are still very lethal. A small and innovative drone, made of wood and foam with a small engine carrying about 5 kg of explosives, may seem unimportant and impractical at first glance. But effectively using such a simple and primitive drone can impose a high cost on the enemy. Iran has decided to enter a drone market focusing on more accurate, longer-range drones. The use of technologically capable Iranian drones as Iranians advance their drone technology, with a more extended range and improved precision, can be devastating to ground forces.
This book analyzes Ayatollah Khomeinis ideology, Irans official and unofficial armed forces, and its allies throughout the world and provides photographs of the regimes predominant actors. Since 1892, the Shia clergy has played a major role in Iran, such as the tobacco boycott, which led to the withdrawal of the concession given by the Shah to British citizens, Irans Constitutional Revolution of 1906, as well as organizing opposition to the Shahs policies in the 1979 revolution. Ayatollah Khomeini was a lecturer at Hawza Ilmiyya (Shia seminary of traditional Islamic school of higher learning) of Najaf and Qom for decades before he came on to the Iranian political scene. In 1977, Khomeini assumed the mantle of leadership within the Islamist opposition after the death of Ali Shariati, a leftist intellectual and one of the most influential Iranian Muslim thinkers of his generation. In 1930, Shariati contributed a new line of thinking in Iran, through his reinterpretation of jihad and shahadat (martyrdom), which was presented in his view of an authentic Islam. Shariatis new authentic Islam centered on a reinterpretation of the story of Karbala, where Imam Hussein was martyred in a battle, refusing to pledge allegiance to Yazid, the Umayyad caliph. Shariati borrowed the Christian concept of martyrdom from the Crucifixion and Resurrection of Jesus as the basis of his new Islamic philosophy. Shariati wrote that when faced with the possibility of ones own death, one must adopt an attitude of freedom-toward-death and thereby experience authentic living. In 1978, Ayatollah Khomeinis reinterpretation of Shia rituals removed the borders between the audience and the actors, turning the entire country into a stage for his casting. He imbued the old passion of the story of Karbala with a new passionate hatred for the Shahs unjust rule in Iran, as well as Israels and the United Statess influences within the world. Khomeinis memory of Dr. Mohammed Mosaddegh, whose government was toppled by the CIA in 1953, returning the Shah to Iran, resulted in the rise of various political groups such as nationalists, liberals, secularists, and Marxists. These groups were essential in assisting Khomeinis overthrow of the Shah, though they were soon stomped out by the creation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in May 1979 in order to protect Khomeinis unique brand of a Shia Islamic Revolution. The Iran-Iraq War initiated the rapid expansion of the IRGCs size and capabilities. In September 1980, the IRGC had only 30,000 men in lightly armed units. Prior to the war, the IRGC personnel were very young in age and had little to no military experience. By the summer of 1981, the IRGC had organized basic training centers with experienced commanders and a select group of regular officers. They also had 50,000 members, and its strength would jump to 100,000 in 1983 and 250,000 in 1985. In order to meet all its manpower needs on the Iraq war front, the IRGC then turned to its volunteer militia, the Basij. The Basij members provided more troops than the IRGC could arm. The average Basij member came from Irans rural areas and can be described as poor, uneducated, and ranged in age from twelve to thirty years old. Like the IRGC, the Basij members are motivated by both religion and ideology. After the Iran-Iraq War, the IRGC focused on external threats as the Basij increased its involvement in domestic affairs. In past years, the Basij militia has been active in controlling public gatherings and disrupting demonstrations by civil or student activists.
In 2006, Mehran Rafiei, a Persian Aussie, takes a solo holiday in New Zealand. His trip coincides with Nowruz, the Persian New Year, and evokes a flood of joyful memories of his childhood in Abadan in the 1950s. As he tours the famous tourist hotspots, he engages eagerly with fellow travellers and locals, sharing impressions and stories. Every event and conversation triggers a memory of his homeland and he is determined to capture his own story. His memoir is an insightful, deeply moving and sometimes humorous personal account of the Iran he knew and was forced to flee. Through his eyes, we see the Oil Nationalisation Uprising and consequent CIA-backed coup d'etat which changes the Middle East for ever. From his exile, Khomeini promises justice, freedom, and free public services. The authoritarian Shah flees abroad in January 1979, and weeks later, an alien creature is born: the Islamic Republic of Iran. Overnight, cruel mullahs extend their grip on power - and the crooks jump on the bandwagon. The nation suffers shortages, inflation, unemployment, unpredictable executions, and religious and racial discrimination. The crisis intensifies when Iraq invades in1980. The Cultural Revolution disqualifies Mehran and his wife from teaching positions. Their rented flat in Shiraz is confiscated; a new neighbour moves in: an anti-Saddam militia organisation. His home becomes an attractive target for enemy sabotage, so he finds refuge in their family farm in Kazeroon. The political and moral destruction of a nation is told warmly through human stories as families try to make the best of life - matchmaking, weddings, friendships, business deals - and courage shines through the worst moments. Mehran's unique story of finally getting a migration visa from the Australian Embassy in Tehran shows more ugly realities of war and the plight of asylum seekers - a story more relevant today than ever.
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