This book provides a critical, selective review of concepts from game theory and their applications in public policy, and further suggests some modifications for some of the models (chiefly in cooperative game theory) to improve their applicability to economics and public policy.
Although it was an important specialization in economics in the mid-twentieth century, welfare economics has received less attention in the twenty-first century. This book explores the history of welfare economics, with a view to explaining its rise and subsequent decline. Drawing on both philosophy and economics, this book offers a new and original perspective on the history of welfare economics, starting with Pigou and charting the trajectory of applied and theoretical welfare economics throughout the twentieth century. This book will be of interest to students and researchers of philosophy, economics and history of economic thought.
This book provides a critical, selective review of concepts from game theory and their applications in public policy, and further suggests some modifications for some of the models (chiefly in cooperative game theory) to improve their applicability to economics and public policy.
Economic theory and philosophy have discussed concepts of fairness, but the criteria of fairness are in each case absolute: a situation is either fair or it is not. This book draws on these literatures to propose two criteria of relative fairness, and a hierarchical rule for the priority of application of these criteria, with a view to comparison of practicable alternatives in public policy.
The objectives of this book are twofold. Firstly, it proposes that economics should be defined as a study of imperfect cooperation. Secondly, it elucidates the continuities that extend from classical political economy through the neoclassical, Keynesia
Drawing on some recent research (especially that of Piketty and his associates) and on older ideas (particularly from Sir Arthur Lewis), Roger McCain proposes policies that, together, would aim to reverse the observed tendency towards the concentration of wealth in market economies, thus ‘approach equality.’ The shortcomings and dangers of rising wealth inequality are discussed, both from the point of view of increasing instability and of equalitarian values.
Agent-Based Computer Simulation of Dichotomous Economic Growth reports a project in agent-based computer stimulation of processes of economic growth in a population of boundedly rational learning agents. The study is an exercise in comparative simulation. That is, the same family of growth models will be simulated under different assumptions about the nature of the learning process and details of the production and growth processes. The purpose of this procedure is to establish a relationship between the assumptions and the simulation results. The study brings together a number of theoretical and technical developments, only some of which may be familiar to any particular reader. In this first chapter, some issues in economic growth are reviewed and the objectives of the study are outlined. In the second chapter, the simulation techniques are introduced and illustrated with baseline simulations of boundedly rational learning processes that do not involve the complications of dealing with long-run economic growth. The third chapter sketches the consensus modern theory of economic growth which is the starting point for further study. In the fourth chapter, a family of steady growth models are simulated, bringing the simulation, growth and learning aspects of the study together. In subsequent chapters, variants on the growth model are explored in a similar way. The ninth chapter introduces trade, with a spacial trading model that is combined with the growth model in the tenth chapter. The book returns again and again to the key question: to what extent can the simulations `explain' the puzzles of economic growth, and particularly the key puzzle of dichotomization, by constructing growth and learning processes that produce the puzzling results? And just what assumptions of the simulations are most predictable associated with the puzzling results?
This book introduces new concepts for cooperative game theory, and particularly solutions that determine the distribution of a coalitional surplus among the members of the coalition. It also addresses several generalizations of cooperative game theory. Drawing on methods of welfare economics, new value solutions are derived for Non-Transferable Utility games with and without differences of bargaining power among the members of the coalition. Cooperation in intertemporal games is examined, and conditions that permit the reduction of these games to games in coalition function form are outlined. Biform games and games that combine non-cooperative search and matching of coalition members with cooperative solutions (i.e., efficient contracts) within the coalition are considered.
As with the previous editions, this fourth edition relies on teaching by example and the Karplus Learning Cycle to convey the ideas of game theory in a way that is approachable, intuitive, and interdisciplinary. Noncooperative equilibrium concepts such as Nash equilibrium, mixed strategy equilibria, and subgame perfect equilibrium are systematically introduced in the first half of the book. Bayesian Nash equilibrium is briefly introduced. The subsequent chapters discuss cooperative solutions with and without side payments, rationalizable strategies and correlated equilibria, and applications to elections, social mechanism design, and larger-scale games. New examples include panic buying, supply-chain shifts in the pandemic, and global warming.
The country is more polarized than it has been for decades, but John McCain is the rare public figure who has earned the respect of colleagues and constituents on both sides of the aisle. A model for bipartisanship and political integrity, in his forty years in politics McCain has never been afraid to buck trends or ruffle a few feathers. His words are more important today than ever.
Fundamentals; Two-Person Games; Larger Numbers and Uncertainty; Games in Extensive Form and Repeated Play; Cooperation; Behavioral Game Theory; Selected Applications.
Drawing on some recent research (especially that of Piketty and his associates) and on older ideas (particularly from Sir Arthur Lewis), Roger McCain proposes policies that, together, would aim to reverse the observed tendency towards the concentration of wealth in market economies, thus ‘approach equality.’ The shortcomings and dangers of rising wealth inequality are discussed, both from the point of view of increasing instability and of equalitarian values.
Although it was an important specialization in economics in the mid-twentieth century, welfare economics has received less attention in the twenty-first century. This book explores the history of welfare economics, with a view to explaining its rise and subsequent decline. Drawing on both philosophy and economics, this book offers a new and original perspective on the history of welfare economics, starting with Pigou and charting the trajectory of applied and theoretical welfare economics throughout the twentieth century. This book will be of interest to students and researchers of philosophy, economics and history of economic thought.
The objectives of this book are twofold. Firstly, it proposes that economics should be defined as a study of imperfect cooperation. Secondly, it elucidates the continuities that extend from classical political economy through the neoclassical, Keynesia
This book provides a critical, selective review of concepts from game theory and their applications in public policy, and further suggests some modifications for some of the models (chiefly in cooperative game theory) to improve their applicability to economics and public policy.
As with the previous editions, this fourth edition relies on teaching by example and the Karplus Learning Cycle to convey the ideas of game theory in a way that is approachable, intuitive, and interdisciplinary. Noncooperative equilibrium concepts such as Nash equilibrium, mixed strategy equilibria, and subgame perfect equilibrium are systematically introduced in the first half of the book. Bayesian Nash equilibrium is briefly introduced. The subsequent chapters discuss cooperative solutions with and without side payments, rationalizable strategies and correlated equilibria, and applications to elections, social mechanism design, and larger-scale games. New examples include panic buying, supply-chain shifts in the pandemic, and global warming.
The objective of the third edition of Game Theory: A Nontechnical Introduction to the Analysis of Strategy is to introduce the ideas of game theory in a way that is approachable, intuitive, and interdisciplinary. Relying on the Karplus Learning Cycle, the book is intended to teach by example. Noncooperative equilibrium concepts such as Nash equilibrium play the central role. In this third edition, increased stress is placed on the concept of rationalizable strategies, which has proven in teaching practice to assist students in making the bridge from intuitive to more formal concepts of noncooperative equilibrium.The Instructor Manual and PowerPoint Slides for the book are available upon request for all instructors who adopt this book as a course text. Please send your request to sales@wspc.com.
Economic theory and philosophy have discussed concepts of fairness, but the criteria of fairness are in each case absolute: a situation is either fair or it is not. This book draws on these literatures to propose two criteria of relative fairness, and a hierarchical rule for the priority of application of these criteria, with a view to comparison of practicable alternatives in public policy.
This survey reviews research on the economics of small business, introducing key concepts for the understanding of the research, including some basic microeconomics, distribution functions, and concepts of entrepreneurship. Accessible to readers with elementary knowledge of economics and probability, the book is suitable as a text for an undergraduate course in the economics of small business. It also covers the economics of organization, the role of the family in small business, human capital and nonpecuniary motivation, together with the relationship of small business to entrepreneurship and growth. Public policy toward small business is discussed with an emphasis on the United States, together with comparisons and contrasts of many other countries.
Agent-Based Computer Simulation of Dichotomous Economic Growth reports a project in agent-based computer stimulation of processes of economic growth in a population of boundedly rational learning agents. The study is an exercise in comparative simulation. That is, the same family of growth models will be simulated under different assumptions about the nature of the learning process and details of the production and growth processes. The purpose of this procedure is to establish a relationship between the assumptions and the simulation results. The study brings together a number of theoretical and technical developments, only some of which may be familiar to any particular reader. In this first chapter, some issues in economic growth are reviewed and the objectives of the study are outlined. In the second chapter, the simulation techniques are introduced and illustrated with baseline simulations of boundedly rational learning processes that do not involve the complications of dealing with long-run economic growth. The third chapter sketches the consensus modern theory of economic growth which is the starting point for further study. In the fourth chapter, a family of steady growth models are simulated, bringing the simulation, growth and learning aspects of the study together. In subsequent chapters, variants on the growth model are explored in a similar way. The ninth chapter introduces trade, with a spacial trading model that is combined with the growth model in the tenth chapter. The book returns again and again to the key question: to what extent can the simulations `explain' the puzzles of economic growth, and particularly the key puzzle of dichotomization, by constructing growth and learning processes that produce the puzzling results? And just what assumptions of the simulations are most predictable associated with the puzzling results?
This book introduces new concepts for cooperative game theory, and particularly solutions that determine the distribution of a coalitional surplus among the members of the coalition. It also addresses several generalizations of cooperative game theory. Drawing on methods of welfare economics, new value solutions are derived for Non-Transferable Utility games with and without differences of bargaining power among the members of the coalition. Cooperation in intertemporal games is examined, and conditions that permit the reduction of these games to games in coalition function form are outlined. Biform games and games that combine non-cooperative search and matching of coalition members with cooperative solutions (i.e., efficient contracts) within the coalition are considered.
Mysteries and Legends of New England explores unusual phenomena, strange events, and mysteries in the region’s history—evenly divided between the New England States (Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island).
New EnglandMyths and Legends explores unusual phenomena, strange events, and mysteries in Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island. From vampires to an angel, a ghost rapper to a phantom ship, New EnglandMyths and Legends pulls back the curtain on some of the region’s most fascinating and compelling stories.
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