As Washington elites drifted toward ideological poles over the past few decades, did ordinary Americans follow their lead? In The Partisan Sort, Matthew Levendusky reveals that we have responded to this trend—but not, for the most part, by becoming more extreme ourselves. While polarization has filtered down to a small minority of voters, it also has had the more significant effect of reconfiguring the way we sort ourselves into political parties. In a marked realignment since the 1970s—when partisan affiliation did not depend on ideology and both major parties had strong liberal and conservative factions—liberals today overwhelmingly identify with Democrats, as conservatives do with Republicans. This “sorting,” Levendusky contends, results directly from the increasingly polarized terms in which political leaders define their parties. Exploring its far-reaching implications for the American political landscape, he demonstrates that sorting makes voters more loyally partisan, allowing campaigns to focus more attention on mobilizing committed supporters. Ultimately, Levendusky concludes, this new link between party and ideology represents a sea change in American politics.
A compelling exploration of concrete strategies to reduce partisan animosity by building on what Democrats and Republicans have in common. One of the defining features of twenty-first-century American politics is the rise of affective polarization: Americans increasingly not only disagree with those from the other party but distrust and dislike them as well. This has toxic downstream consequences for both politics and social relationships. Is there any solution? Our Common Bonds shows that—although there is no silver bullet that will eradicate partisan animosity—there are concrete interventions that can reduce it. Matthew Levendusky argues that partisan animosity stems in part from partisans’ misperceptions of one another. Democrats and Republicans think they have nothing in common, but this is not true. Drawing on survey and experimental evidence, the book shows that it is possible to help partisans reframe the lens through which they evaluate the out-party by priming commonalities—specifically, shared identities outside of politics, cross-party friendships, and common issue positions and values identified through civil cross-party dialogue. Doing so lessons partisan animosity, and it can even reduce ideological polarization. The book discusses what these findings mean for real-world efforts to bridge the partisan divide.
Forty years ago, viewers who wanted to watch the news could only choose from among the major broadcast networks, all of which presented the same news without any particular point of view. Today we have a much broader array of choices, including cable channels offering a partisan take. With partisan programs gaining in popularity, some argue that they are polarizing American politics, while others counter that only a tiny portion of the population watches such programs and that their viewers tend to already hold similar beliefs. In How Partisan Media Polarize America, Matthew Levendusky confirms—but also qualifies—both of these claims. Drawing on experiments and survey data, he shows that Americans who watch partisan programming do become more certain of their beliefs and less willing to weigh the merits of opposing views or to compromise. And while only a small segment of the American population watches partisan media programs, those who do tend to be more politically engaged, and their effects on national politics are therefore far-reaching. In a time when politics seem doomed to partisan discord, How Partisan Media Polarize America offers a much-needed clarification of the role partisan media might play.
Generations of political scientists argue that American politics needs strong, cohesive parties to function effectively. Yet more recently, many worry that such vigorous partisan sentiments--most notably, the rising hostility between the parties--can damage democracy, as partisans willingly undermine the system if it means stopping their disliked opponents. Is this the case? This book offers a nuanced evaluation of when and how partisan animosity matters in today's highly charged--but fluid--political environment, using data from two of the most tumultuous years in recent American history, 2019 to 2021. The authors show that partisan animus powerfully shapes political behaviors, but its effects are conditional, not constant. They develop a theory of the conditions that make partisan animosity most salient, and show that, in the absence of these, other thought processes take over. While partisan animosity makes democratic functioning more difficult (e.g., by politicizing seemingly non-political issues, undermining compromise), it does not inevitably lead to democratic erosion (e.g., the rejection of foundational democratic norms or the endorsement of violence). Partisan hostility has degraded American democracy, but it does not in itself represent an existential threat. The future of democracy depends on how politicians respond to the rise of animosity"--
This popular brief text for the one-semester or one-quarter American Government course maintains the framework of the Wilson, DiIulio, Bose, and Levendusky comprehensive text, emphasizing the historical development of the American political system, who governs, and to what ends. The 13th edition of AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: INSTITUTIONS AND POLICIES, BRIEF VERSION, offers coverage of the 2014 and 2016 campaigns and elections; budget battles and the sequestration of funds; ongoing debates about immigration, gay marriage, and other key issues in American politics; and foreign-policy decisions on Afghanistan, the Middle East, and North Korea. We have also reworked each chapter to focus on a clear set of learning objectives to guide students through the material. Important Notice: Media content referenced within the product description or the product text may not be available in the ebook version.
Americans today are affectively polarized: they dislike and distrust those from the opposing political party more than they did in the past, with damaging consequences for their democracy. This Element tests one strategy for ameliorating such animus: having ordinary Democrats and Republicans come together for cross-party political discussions. Building on intergroup contact theory, the authors argue that such discussions will mitigate partisan animosity. Using an original experiment, they find strong support for this hypothesis – affective polarization falls substantially among subjects who participate in heterogeneous discussion (relative to those who participate in either homogeneous political discussion or an apolitical control). This Element also provides evidence for several of the mechanisms underlying these effects, and shows that they persist for at least one week after the initial experiment. These findings have considerable importance for efforts to ameliorate animus in the mass public, and for understanding American politics more broadly.
The Essentials Edition of AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: INSTITUTIONS AND POLICIES is a clear and approachable text for students trying to successfully understand American government. It sets the standard for examining current issues in American politics, focusing on the importance of American governmental institutions, the historical development of governmental procedures and policies as well as on who governs in the United States and to what ends. The sixteenth edition includes concise learning objectives, highlighted key concepts and opportunities for practical application of contemporary debates on policy dynamics. These features allow students to identify important issues in American politics, maximize comprehension and engage with the material in a meaningful way. Important Notice: Media content referenced within the product description or the product text may not be available in the ebook version.
The twelfth book in this series, this text focuses on textual comments and believer edification of the gospel of Mark and Luke Although the text isn't focused on textual research of a theological exegesis, the commentary does try to bring the ideas and assertions made by the disciples Mark and Luke in the days of the Messiah Jesus Christ in the nation of Israel. This book is handy for anyone who wants to read into commentary history as well as to get a good solid look at how the texts of Mark and Luke apply to our lives.
An unflinching examination of the effects and boundaries of partisan animosity. For generations, experts argued that American politics needed cohesive parties to function effectively. Now many fear that strong partisan views, particularly hostility to the opposing party, are damaging democracy. Is partisanship as dangerous as we fear it is? To provide an answer, this book offers a nuanced evaluation of when and how partisan animosity matters in today’s highly charged, dynamic political environment, drawing on panel data from some of the most tumultuous years in recent American history, 2019 through 2021. The authors show that partisanship powerfully shapes political behaviors, but its effects are conditional, not constant. Instead, it is most powerful when politicians send clear signals and when an issue is unlikely to bring direct personal consequences. In the absence of these conditions, other factors often dominate decision-making. The authors argue that while partisan hostility has degraded US politics—for example, politicizing previously non-political issues and undermining compromise—it is not in itself an existential threat. As their research shows, the future of American democracy depends on how politicians, more than ordinary voters, behave.
As Washington elites drifted toward ideological poles over the past few decades, did ordinary Americans follow their lead? In The Partisan Sort, Matthew Levendusky reveals that we have responded to this trend—but not, for the most part, by becoming more extreme ourselves. While polarization has filtered down to a small minority of voters, it also has had the more significant effect of reconfiguring the way we sort ourselves into political parties. In a marked realignment since the 1970s—when partisan affiliation did not depend on ideology and both major parties had strong liberal and conservative factions—liberals today overwhelmingly identify with Democrats, as conservatives do with Republicans. This “sorting,” Levendusky contends, results directly from the increasingly polarized terms in which political leaders define their parties. Exploring its far-reaching implications for the American political landscape, he demonstrates that sorting makes voters more loyally partisan, allowing campaigns to focus more attention on mobilizing committed supporters. Ultimately, Levendusky concludes, this new link between party and ideology represents a sea change in American politics.
Forty years ago, viewers who wanted to watch the news could only choose from among the major broadcast networks, all of which presented the same news without any particular point of view. Today we have a much broader array of choices, including cable channels offering a partisan take. With partisan programs gaining in popularity, some argue that they are polarizing American politics, while others counter that only a tiny portion of the population watches such programs and that their viewers tend to already hold similar beliefs. In How Partisan Media Polarize America, Matthew Levendusky confirms—but also qualifies—both of these claims. Drawing on experiments and survey data, he shows that Americans who watch partisan programming do become more certain of their beliefs and less willing to weigh the merits of opposing views or to compromise. And while only a small segment of the American population watches partisan media programs, those who do tend to be more politically engaged, and their effects on national politics are therefore far-reaching. In a time when politics seem doomed to partisan discord, How Partisan Media Polarize America offers a much-needed clarification of the role partisan media might play.
A compelling exploration of concrete strategies to reduce partisan animosity by building on what Democrats and Republicans have in common. One of the defining features of twenty-first-century American politics is the rise of affective polarization: Americans increasingly not only disagree with those from the other party but distrust and dislike them as well. This has toxic downstream consequences for both politics and social relationships. Is there any solution? Our Common Bonds shows that—although there is no silver bullet that will eradicate partisan animosity—there are concrete interventions that can reduce it. Matthew Levendusky argues that partisan animosity stems in part from partisans’ misperceptions of one another. Democrats and Republicans think they have nothing in common, but this is not true. Drawing on survey and experimental evidence, the book shows that it is possible to help partisans reframe the lens through which they evaluate the out-party by priming commonalities—specifically, shared identities outside of politics, cross-party friendships, and common issue positions and values identified through civil cross-party dialogue. Doing so lessons partisan animosity, and it can even reduce ideological polarization. The book discusses what these findings mean for real-world efforts to bridge the partisan divide.
Local newspapers can hold back the rising tide of political division in America by turning away from the partisan battles in Washington and focusing their opinion page on local issues. When a local newspaper in California dropped national politics from its opinion page, the resulting space filled with local writers and issues. We use a pre-registered analysis plan to show that after this quasi-experiment, politically engaged people did not feel as far apart from members of the opposing party, compared to those in a similar community whose newspaper did not change. While it may not cure all of the imbalances and inequities in opinion journalism, an opinion page that ignores national politics could help local newspapers push back against political polarization.
The Republican Party is the vehicle of an ideological movement whereas the Democratic Party is a coalition of social groups with concrete policy concerns. Democrats prefer a more moderate party leadership that makes compromises, whereas Republicans favor a more conservative party leadership that sticks to principles. Each party finds popular support for its approach because the American public simultaneously favors liberal positions on specific policy issues and conservative views on the broader role of government.
Official 6 x 9 Version (with ISBN for retailers) -- Is it time? Are we ready? It is time, and ready or not, Matthew 10:10 Travels of an Awareness is here! Returning humanity to its most fundamental questions of existence, Winfield blazes forward with his introduction of Secular Energeticism. For over 300,000 years, flawed ideologies, incongruent with the nature of reality, have prevailed. The human race has arrived, together, at a point of departure from these ancient ideologies. We know now, much that we did not know when we created our own understandings. What is Matthew 10:10 Travels of an Awareness about? It's about the Universe, Existence, and our position within it all. This book is about us, and it's about time. This copy is printed on professional grade paper and it looks great! That's the added value compared to the other version. Buy it here at Lulu and go to www.matthew1010.com today!
Does interpersonal political communication improve the quality of individual decision making? While deliberative theorists offer reasons for hope, experimental researchers have demonstrated that biased messages can travel via interpersonal social networks. We argue that the value of interpersonal political communication depends on the motivations of the people involved, which can be shifted by different contexts. Using small-group experiments that randomly assign participants' motivations to seek or share information with others as well as their motivations for evaluating the information they receive, we demonstrate the importance of accounting for motivations in communication. We find that when individuals with more extreme preferences are motivated to acquire and share information, collective civic capacity is diminished. But if we can stimulate the exchange of information among individuals with stronger prosocial motivations, such communication can enhance collective civic capacity. We also provide advice for other researchers about conducting similar group-based experiments to study political communication.
Why is Congress mired in partisan polarization? The conventional answer is that members of Congress and their constituencies fundamentally disagree with one other along ideological lines. But Gregory Koger and Matthew J. Lebo uncover a more compelling reason that today’s political leaders devote so much time to conveying their party’s positions, even at the expense of basic government functions: Both parties want to win elections. In Strategic Party Government, Koger and Lebo argue that Congress is now primarily a forum for partisan competition. In order to avoid losing, legislators unite behind strong party leaders, even when they do not fully agree with the policies their party is advocating. They do so in the belief that party leaders and voters will reward them for winning—or at least trying to win—these legislative contests. And as the parties present increasingly united fronts, partisan competition intensifies and pressure continues to mount for a strong party-building strategy—despite considerable disagreement within the parties. By bringing this powerful but underappreciated force in American politics to the forefront, Koger and Lebo provide a new interpretation of the problems facing Congress that is certain to reset the agenda for legislative studies.
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