This book studies policymaking in the Latin American electricity and telecommunication sectors. Murillo's analysis of the Latin American electricity and telecommunications sectors shows that different degrees of electoral competition and the partisan composition of the government were crucial in resolving policymakers' tension between the interests of voters and the economic incentives generated by international financial markets and private corporations in the context of capital scarcity. Electoral competition by credible challengers dissuaded politicians from adopting policies deemed necessary to attract capital inflows. When electoral competition was low, financial pressures prevailed, but the partisan orientation of reformers shaped the regulatory design of market-friendly reforms. In the post-reform period, moreover, electoral competition and policymakers' partisanship shaped regulatory redistribution between residential consumers, large users, and privatized providers.
During the 1990s Argentina was the only country in Latin America to combine radical economic reform and full democracy. In 2001, however, the country fell into a deep political and economic crisis and was widely seen as a basket case. This book explores both developments, examining the links between the (real and apparent) successes of the 1990s and the 2001 collapse. Specific topics include economic policymaking and reform, executive-legislative relations, the judiciary, federalism, political parties and the party system, and new patterns of social protest. Beyond its empirical analysis, the book contributes to several theoretical debates in comparative politics. Contemporary studies of political institutions focus almost exclusively on institutional design, neglecting issues of enforcement and stability. Yet a major problem in much of Latin America is that institutions of diverse types have often failed to take root. Besides examining the effects of institutional weakness, the book also uses the Argentine case to shed light on four other areas of current debate: tensions between radical economic reform and democracy; political parties and contemporary crises of representation; links between subnational and national politics; and the transformation of state-society relations in the post-corporatist era. Besides the editors, the contributors are Javier Auyero, Ernesto Calvo, Kent Eaton, Sebasti&án Etchemendy, Gretchen Helmke, Wonjae Hwang, Mark Jones, Enrique Peruzzotti, Pablo T. Spiller, Mariano Tommasi, and Juan Carlos Torre.
This book studies policymaking in the Latin American electricity and telecommunication sectors. Murillo's analysis of the Latin American electricity and telecommunications sectors shows that different degrees of electoral competition and the partisan composition of the government were crucial in resolving policymakers' tension between the interests of voters and the economic incentives generated by international financial markets and private corporations in the context of capital scarcity. Electoral competition by credible challengers dissuaded politicians from adopting policies deemed necessary to attract capital inflows. When electoral competition was low, financial pressures prevailed, but the partisan orientation of reformers shaped the regulatory design of market-friendly reforms. In the post-reform period, moreover, electoral competition and policymakers' partisanship shaped regulatory redistribution between residential consumers, large users, and privatized providers.
Calvo and Murillo consider the non-policy benefits that voters consider when deciding their vote. While parties advertise policies, they also deliver non-policy benefits in the form of competent economic management, constituency service, and patronage jobs. Different from much of the existing research, which focuses on the implementation of policy or on the delivery of clientelistic benefits, this book provides a unified view of how politicians deliver broad portfolios of policy and non-policy benefits to their constituency. The authors' theory shows how these non-policy resources also shape parties' ideological positions and which type of electoral offers they target to poorer or richer voters. With exhaustive empirical work, both qualitative and quantitative, the research documents how linkages between parties and voters shape the delivery of non-policy benefits in Argentina and Chile.
Explores how non-policy resources, including administrative competence, patronage, and activists' networks, shape both electoral results and which voters get what.
Though parity is still rare, presidential cabinets contain more women than ever before. Who are these women and what types of political capital resources do they bring to the administration? Are they new types of political players or very much like the men who have traditionally run the government? And once they gain office, are they treated equally in the cabinet? Do they have the capacity to be as effective as their male counterparts? Drawing on data from five presidential democracies -- Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, and the United States -- Women in Presidential Cabinets examines the backgrounds, connections and credentials of all full-rank cabinet ministers in presidential administrations over the course of two decades to determine if women and men bring similar numbers and diversity of political capital resources to the administration. Maria C. Escobar-Lemmon and Michelle M. Taylor-Robinson find that, with a few notable exceptions, presidents select men and women with similar work and education backgrounds, political experience, and linkages to related interest groups. There are, however, differences across types of posts and countries. They evaluate the treatment and effectiveness of similarly credentialed male and female ministers on four benchmarks. Specifically, they examine whether women with equal qualifications can really obtain all posts or whether glass ceilings persist in some areas. They then turn to the ability of women to hold onto a post, considering the nature and circumstances surrounding their departures from office and how long they remain in office. In doing so, they uncover evidence that female ministers in Latin America stand on an unequal playing field when it comes to the ability to enact policy through legislation. Ultimately, Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson show conclusively that while women lack numerical equality, they are no longer tokens, instead appearing positioned to exercise power at the highest levels within the executive branch.
Quick and easy to consult, the principal features of interest are described in the main Sights From A To Z section, with each entry cross-referenced to the large folded map that completes this handy map and guide pack. Detailed background information sets the scene: facts and figures about the people, religion, climate and economy, its culture and history, plus a round-up of associated famous people. Special features, colour photographs, superb colour maps and plans are found throughout the book and the well-organised Practical Information section ensures you can make the most of your stay.
Shows that electoral competition and partisan government helped balance the conflicting demands of voters' interests with the financial pressures generated by capital scarcity.
This Element introduces the concept of institutional weakness, arguing that weakness or strength is a function of the extent to which an institution actually matters to social, economic or political outcomes. It then presents a typology of three forms of institutional weakness: insignificance, in which rules are complied with but do not affect the way actors behave; non-compliance, in which state elites either choose not to enforce the rules or fail to gain societal cooperation with them; and instability, in which the rules are changed at an unusually high rate. The Element then examines the sources of institutional weakness.
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