This study provides economic models of the sustainability and affordability of renewable energy support schemes alongside operational advice on how the regulatory design may need to be modified to minimize the impact on the budget and be affordable to the poor, as well as how to identify and fill the financing gap.
Given the chronic power shortages faced by numerous developing countries, and the need everywhere to keep pace with demand, understanding the drivers of public private partnerships (PPPs) in energy is critical. While many private electricity projects have been delayed and financing costs have increased, the impact of the global financial crisis was less severe than that of previous crises that originated in developing countries. This resilience stems from developing countries’ need to expand generation capacity, electricity sector reforms and better regulatory frameworks, and short-term solutions (such as rental power plants). The study reports the evidence from statistical analysis and a sample of case studies selected based. It proposes a novel analytical approach to model PPPs, using a two-stage procedure based on Heckman’s sample selection distinguishing between those factors that determine whether private investment in energy takes place, and those that influence the volume of investment. The results of the analysis provide the following conclusions: • Both general governance and regulatory instrument primarily affect investors’ decisions to enter the various power sector markets, not the subsequent level of investment – indicating that investors seem to be adequately protected against risks. • Support mechanisms, like feed-in tariffs, are crucial for attracting investors in renewable generation, but they do not succeed in displacing fossil fuel investment and they could play a bigger role in affecting the level of investment in renewables. • There is a significant trade-off between effectiveness and efficiency of alternative instruments for deploying renewables. Feed-in tariffs tended to be quite effective but to be set on the high side, reducing incentives to cut costs and posing significant strains on already stripped national budgets. Competitive auctions, on the other hand have tended to be efficient but initially low and not always the most effective instrument. • Countries can scale up renewables following different paths. For Brazil, the move from feed-in tariffs to auctions enabled it to both reduce costs and deploy additional capacity. Peru followed in Brazil’s path, opting for auctions instead of introducing feed-in tariffs. On the other hand, China’s move from competitive tenders to feed-in tariffs allowed for discovery effects to determine the right level of prices to attract private investment in renewables.
Poorly implemented energy subsidies are economically costly to taxpayers and damage the environment. This book aims to provide lessons from a sample of twenty case studies to help policymakers address implementation challenges and overcome political economy and affordability constraints.
The current distribution of power markets around intermediate structures that fall between the two extremes of full integration and unbundling suggests that there has not been a linear path to power market structure reform. Rather, many developing countries may retain intermediate structures into the foreseeable future. This possibility exposes a gap in the understanding of power market structures, since most theoretical work has focused on the two extreme possibilities and there is limited evidence of the impact of unbundling for developing countries. Power Market Structure takes a novel analytical approach to modeling market structure, together with ownership and regulation, in determining performance across several indicators, including access, operational and financial performance, and environmental sustainability. Its conclusions--which will be of particular interest to policy makers, academics, and development practitioners--reflect evidence drawn from statistical analysis and a representative sample of 20 case studies, selected based on initial conditions such as income and power system size. The key result of the analysis is that unbundling delivers results when used as an entry point to implementing broader reforms, particularly introducing a sound regulatory framework, and reducing the degree of concentration of the generation and distribution segments of the market by attracting additional public and private players and greater private sector participation. In addition, there seems to be a credible empirical basis for selecting a threshold power system size and per capita income level below which unbundling of the power supply chain is not expected to be worthwhile. Partial forms of vertical unbundling do not appear to drive improvements. The most likely reason is that the owner was able to continue exercising control over the affairs of the sector and hinder the development of competitive pressure within the power market.
This study provides economic models of the sustainability and affordability of renewable energy support schemes alongside operational advice on how the regulatory design may need to be modified to minimize the impact on the budget and be affordable to the poor, as well as how to identify and fill the financing gap.
Poorly implemented energy subsidies are economically costly to taxpayers and damage the environment. This book aims to provide lessons from a sample of twenty case studies to help policymakers address implementation challenges and overcome political economy and affordability constraints.
Given the chronic power shortages faced by numerous developing countries, and the need everywhere to keep pace with demand, understanding the drivers of public private partnerships (PPPs) in energy is critical. While many private electricity projects have been delayed and financing costs have increased, the impact of the global financial crisis was less severe than that of previous crises that originated in developing countries. This resilience stems from developing countries’ need to expand generation capacity, electricity sector reforms and better regulatory frameworks, and short-term solutions (such as rental power plants). The study reports the evidence from statistical analysis and a sample of case studies selected based. It proposes a novel analytical approach to model PPPs, using a two-stage procedure based on Heckman’s sample selection distinguishing between those factors that determine whether private investment in energy takes place, and those that influence the volume of investment. The results of the analysis provide the following conclusions: • Both general governance and regulatory instrument primarily affect investors’ decisions to enter the various power sector markets, not the subsequent level of investment – indicating that investors seem to be adequately protected against risks. • Support mechanisms, like feed-in tariffs, are crucial for attracting investors in renewable generation, but they do not succeed in displacing fossil fuel investment and they could play a bigger role in affecting the level of investment in renewables. • There is a significant trade-off between effectiveness and efficiency of alternative instruments for deploying renewables. Feed-in tariffs tended to be quite effective but to be set on the high side, reducing incentives to cut costs and posing significant strains on already stripped national budgets. Competitive auctions, on the other hand have tended to be efficient but initially low and not always the most effective instrument. • Countries can scale up renewables following different paths. For Brazil, the move from feed-in tariffs to auctions enabled it to both reduce costs and deploy additional capacity. Peru followed in Brazil’s path, opting for auctions instead of introducing feed-in tariffs. On the other hand, China’s move from competitive tenders to feed-in tariffs allowed for discovery effects to determine the right level of prices to attract private investment in renewables.
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