The highly praised Western, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, has been used in many game-theory courses over the years and has also found its way into leading journals of this field. Using the rich material offered by this movie, alongside other elements from popular culture, literature and history, this book furthers this exploration into a fascinating area of economics. In his series of Schumpeter lectures, Manfred J. Holler uses his analysis of Sergio Leone’s movie as a starting point to argue that combinations of desires, secrets and second-mover advantages trigger conflicts but also allow for conflict resolution. Many people and organizations have a desire for secrecy, and this is often motivated by a desire to create a second-mover advantage, and by undercutting the second-mover advantage of others. This book demonstrates that the interaction of these three ingredients account for a large share of social problems and failures in politics and business but, somewhat paradoxically, can also help to overcome some of the problems that result by applying one or two of them in isolation. This book has been written for curious readers who want to see the world from a different perspective and who like simple mathematics alongside story telling. Its accessible approach means that it will be of use to students and academics alike, especially all those interested in decision making, game theory, and market entry.
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Homo Oeconomicus, Volume 31, Number 3 (2014)Multicriteria for MultidecidersLORENZO CIONIUsing Civil Servants for Rent Seeking: An Application of the Pay-and- Use ValueMARTIN KOHL AND HARALD WIESEA New CS Value for Team Games TOBIAS HILLERThe Contact Hypothesis and Its Application to Elections: Does it Pay for Political Parties to Contact Voters Directly or Not?ACHILLEFS PAPAGEORGIOUClashing Sensibilities in Politics and Literature: The Cases of Rex Warner and Czesław MiłoszLEONIDAS DONSKISWhy do Some, and Only Some, Artists Want a Droit de Suite? BJÖRN FRANKAttendance at/Participation in the Arts by Educational Level: Evidence and IssuesJOHN W. O’HAGANReview: Beyond and Behind Homo Economicus in Alternative Views of Public EconomicsFRANCESCO FORTEBack Issues Instructions for Contributors
This book introduces readers to basic game theory as a tool to deal with strategic decision problems, helping them to understand the complexity of such problems – to extract a solution, if possible – and to manage the complexity by revising the game if appropriate. The authors discuss basic decision situations modeled as Prisoners’ Dilemma, Chicken Game, and Stag Hunt Game, as well as concepts like the Nash equilibrium, Trembling Hand Perfectness, Rationalizable Strategies and the Theory of Moves to introduce game theoretic thinking. Further, the book presents pioneers of strategic thinking, e.g., Sun Tzu, Machiavelli, Adam Smith, and Goethe, and includes cases of conflict and cooperation to illustrate practical applications. Readers learn to apply game theory in business and in daily life – to manage their decision problems and to better understand the decision problems of others.
The highly praised Western, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, has been used in many game-theory courses over the years and has also found its way into leading journals of this field. Using the rich material offered by this movie, alongside other elements from popular culture, literature and history, this book furthers this exploration into a fascinating area of economics. In his series of Schumpeter lectures, Manfred J. Holler uses his analysis of Sergio Leone’s movie as a starting point to argue that combinations of desires, secrets and second-mover advantages trigger conflicts but also allow for conflict resolution. Many people and organizations have a desire for secrecy, and this is often motivated by a desire to create a second-mover advantage, and by undercutting the second-mover advantage of others. This book demonstrates that the interaction of these three ingredients account for a large share of social problems and failures in politics and business but, somewhat paradoxically, can also help to overcome some of the problems that result by applying one or two of them in isolation. This book has been written for curious readers who want to see the world from a different perspective and who like simple mathematics alongside story telling. Its accessible approach means that it will be of use to students and academics alike, especially all those interested in decision making, game theory, and market entry.
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