Adopted at Cambridge University Essential Medical Genetics provides students, clinicians, counsellors and scientists with the up-to-date information they need regarding the basic principles underlying medical genetics. It also provides guidance on how to apply current knowledge in clinical contexts, covering a wide variety of topics: from genome structure and function to mutations, screening and risk assessment for inherited disorders. This sixth edition has been substantially updated to include, for instance, the latest information on the Human Genome Project as well as several new molecular genetic and chromosome analysis techniques. In full colour throughout, it includes a number of brand new features, including: a large number of self-assessment questions; 'Essentials' chapter summaries; further reading suggestions; and case study scenarios introducing clinical situations. An invaluable new section gives illustrated practical advice regarding how to choose the best available online genetic databases and also, importantly, how to most easily and most efficiently use them, for a wide range of purposes. Essential Medical Genetics is the perfect resource for a course on medical genetics, and is now accompanied by a regularly updated website and the FREE enhanced Wiley Desktop Edition (upon purchase of the book). The companion website at www.wiley.com/go/tobias features figures from the book in PowerPoint format and a link to the authors' website with regularly updated links to genetic databases and additional self-test questions. This title is also available as a mobile App from MedHand Mobile Libraries. Buy it now from iTunes, Google Play or the MedHand Store.
How engineers and clinicians developed the ultrasound diagnostic scanner and how its use in obstetrics became controversial. To its proponents, the ultrasound scanner is a safe, reliable, and indispensable aid to diagnosis. Its detractors, on the other hand, argue that its development and use are driven by the technological enthusiasms of doctors and engineers (and the commercial interests of manufacturers) and not by concern to improve the clinical care of women. In some U.S. states, an ultrasound scan is now required by legislation before a woman can obtain an abortion, adding a new dimension to an already controversial practice. Imaging and Imagining the Fetus engages both the development of a modern medical technology and the concerted critique of that technology. Malcolm Nicolson and John Fleming relate the technical and social history of ultrasound imaging—from early experiments in Glasgow in 1956 through wide deployment in the British hospital system by 1975 to its ubiquitous use in maternity clinics throughout the developed world by the end of the twentieth century. Obstetrician Ian Donald and engineer Tom Brown created ultrasound technology in Glasgow, where their prototypes were based on the industrial flaw detector, an instrument readily available to them in the shipbuilding city. As a physician, Donald supported the use of ultrasound for clinical purposes, and as a devout High Anglican he imbued the images with moral significance. He opposed abortion—decisions about which were increasingly guided by the ultrasound technology he pioneered—and he occasionally used ultrasound images to convince pregnant women not to abort the fetuses they could now see. Imaging and Imagining the Fetus explores why earlier innovators failed where Donald and Brown succeeded. It also shows how ultrasound developed into a "black box" technology whose users can fully appreciate the images they produce but do not, and have no need to, understand the technology, any more than do users of computers. These "images of the fetus may be produced by machines," the authors write, "but they live vividly in the human imagination.
The BSE Inquiry was set up to: establish and review the history of the emergence and identification of BSE and variant CJD in the United Kingdom, and of the action taken in response to it up to 20 March 1996; reach conclusions on the adequacy of that response, taking into account the state of knowledge at the time; and to report on these matters to the Government. This executive summary presents the overview of the key findings and conclusions. BSE developed into an epidemic as a consequence of an intensive farming practice - the recycling of animal protein in ruminant feed. The report states that in the years up to March 1996 most of those responsible for responding to the challenge posed by BSE emerge with credit. However, there were a number of shortcomings in the way things were done. The Government took measures to address both the hazard to animal health and human health, but these were not always timely nor adequately implemented and enforced. The Inquiry found that the rigour with which policy measures were implemented for the protection of human health was affected by the belief of many prior to early 1996 that BSE was not a potential threat to human life. The Government was anxious to act in the best interests of human and animal health. To this end it sought and followed the advice of independent scientific experts - sometimes when decisions could have been reached more swiftly and satisfactorily within government. At times officials showed a lack of rigour in considering how policy should be turned into practice, to the detriment of the efficacy of the measures taken, and on occasion the bureaucratic processes resulted in unacceptable delay in giving effect to policy. The report demonstrates that the Government introduced measures to guard against the risk that BSE might be a matter of life and death not merely for cattle but also for humans, but the possibility of a risk to humans was not communicated to the public or to those whose job it was to implement and enforce the precautionary measures. The Inquiry concludes that the Government did not lie to the public about BSE. It believed that the risks posed by BSE to humans were remote. The Government was preoccupied with preventing an alarmist over-reaction to BSE because it believed that the risk was remote. It is stated that the campaign of reassurance was a mistake. When on 20 March 1996 the Government announced that BSE had probably been transmitted to humans, the public felt that they had been betrayed. Confidence in government pronouncements about risk was a further casualty of BSE. Cases of a new variant of CJD (vCJD) were identified by the CJD Surveillance Unit and the conclusion that they were probably linked to BSE was reached as early as was reasonably possible. The link between BSE and vCJD is now clearly established, though the manner of infection is not clear. This volume is accompanied by a CD ROM which contains the Inquiry's full report.
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