Includes over 50 maps plans and illustrations. In this Research Survey, Major Timothy A. Wray provides an excellent survey of the intricacies of employing defensive tactics against a powerful opponent. Using after-action reports, unit war diaries, and other primary materials, Major Wray analyzes the doctrine and tactics that the Germans used on the Eastern Front during World War II. At the end of World War I, the Germans adopted the elastic defense in depth and continued to use it as their basic doctrine through the end of World War II. However, because of limitations caused by difficult terrain, severe weather, manpower and supply shortages, Soviet tactics, and Hitler’s order to stand fast, German commanders were unable to implement the Elastic Defense in its true form. Even so, innovative and resourceful unit commanders were able to adapt to the harsh realities of combat and improvise defensive methods that saved the German armies from complete annihilation. U.S. Army unit commanders on the future battlefield, while battling a motivated and aggressive force, will also face hard battlefield conditions. Therefore, these commanders, in applying the AirLand Battle tenets of initiative, depth, agility, and synchronization, will have to demonstrate the same type of innovativeness and resourcefulness as the Germans did in Russia. To operate on the AirLand Battlefield, U.S. soldiers must depend on sound doctrine and the ability to execute it intelligently. All Army officers will benefit from Major Wray’s new and vital assessment of how German doctrine was modified by the test of war.
Includes over 50 maps plans and illustrations. In this Research Survey, Major Timothy A. Wray provides an excellent survey of the intricacies of employing defensive tactics against a powerful opponent. Using after-action reports, unit war diaries, and other primary materials, Major Wray analyzes the doctrine and tactics that the Germans used on the Eastern Front during World War II. At the end of World War I, the Germans adopted the elastic defense in depth and continued to use it as their basic doctrine through the end of World War II. However, because of limitations caused by difficult terrain, severe weather, manpower and supply shortages, Soviet tactics, and Hitler’s order to stand fast, German commanders were unable to implement the Elastic Defense in its true form. Even so, innovative and resourceful unit commanders were able to adapt to the harsh realities of combat and improvise defensive methods that saved the German armies from complete annihilation. U.S. Army unit commanders on the future battlefield, while battling a motivated and aggressive force, will also face hard battlefield conditions. Therefore, these commanders, in applying the AirLand Battle tenets of initiative, depth, agility, and synchronization, will have to demonstrate the same type of innovativeness and resourcefulness as the Germans did in Russia. To operate on the AirLand Battlefield, U.S. soldiers must depend on sound doctrine and the ability to execute it intelligently. All Army officers will benefit from Major Wray’s new and vital assessment of how German doctrine was modified by the test of war.
This thesis examines the evolution of artillery tactics in World War II using General J. Lawton Collins’ U.S. VII Corps as a case study. This study first reviews artillery doctrine and tactics during World War I and during the 1920s and 1930s, in which time future leaders like General Collins were military students. In 1943, General Collins commanded an infantry division on Guadalcanal where he was one of the first American generals to implement the Army’s new doctrine of fire direction centers (FDCs) and massed fires using time on targets (TOTs). Collins then was selected to command the U.S. VII Corps for the invasion of Normandy and the subsequent breakout during OPERATION COBRA. From Normandy to the end of the war, Collins continued to hone his use of artillery based on his experience during the eleven-month campaign in Northwest Europe, contributing to his reputation as the best corps commander in World War II. This study looks at Army doctrine in 1944 to judge Collins’ artillery tactics and concludes that he used established doctrine and that his tactics are the foundation for today’s artillery tactics.
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