Illustrated with 23 maps and plans of the campaign and engagements at Chickamauga. Probably the most unpredictable variable in the "Fog of War" next to leadership, is the command and control process, comprised of three components: organizations, process, and facilities. Organizations include the formulation of staffs by the commander to accomplish the mission. Incorporated in the organization of the staffs are the roles, responsibilities, and functions. Large Civil War armies like the Army of the Cumberland and the Army of the Tennessee required significant numbers of staff officers to support the armies logistically and to maneuver them operationally. During the Campaign and Battle of Chickamauga, these staff officers often played major roles and were instrumental in determining the outcome of the battle. The roles and functions performed by these staff officers evolved through the history of conflict. This study is an analysis of the roles, responsibilities, and functions of General Rosecrans’ staff prior to and during the Chickamauga campaign, using lessons learned in comparison to current Army doctrine on command and control. Primary sources for staff information on the Army of the Cumberland are the Official Records and actual telegrams from the staffs during this period. Doctrinal manuals on senior level staffs did not exist; therefore, these staffs were composites of regimental and War Department staff positions and ad hoc positions. The study uses evolving doctrine from Command and General Staff College that defines an outstanding staff as one that informs, anticipates, coordinates and executes the commander’s guidance with enthusiasm and innovation. This study concludes that Rosecrans’ staff was significant to the outcome of the Battle of Chickamauga. Although none of the staff functions developed critical deficiencies during the campaign, their inability to relieve the commander of administrative burdens compelled him to abandon the battlefield.
This thesis examines intelligence operations conducted by Major General Rosecrans’ Army of the Cumberland during the initial phases of the Chickamauga Campaign (11 August to 16 September 1863). The thesis methodology is a detailed analysis of all intelligence reports received by the headquarters and a detailed examination of all outgoing correspondence from the headquarters intended to identify the analytical process used and the impact of intelligence on Rosecrans’ decision making during the campaign. The record shows that contrary to popular historical opinion there was significant intelligence available indicating the probable Confederate course of action. General Rosecrans and his staff actively discounted information that did not conform to their pre-conceived expectation or template of the enemy with tragic results for the Army of the Cumberland. This thesis highlights several timeless lessons of relevance to the modern military officer: the importance of focused intelligence collection operations, the requirement for clear thinking and disciplined analysis of intelligence reporting, the dangers of over-confidence and preconceptions, the hazard of focusing on one’s plan instead of the enemy, and the importance of avoiding “group-thinking” among a staff.
This is a study of the logistical system that supported the Union armies in the Civil War, focusing on the Army of the Cumberland under the command of Major General William S. Rosecrans in 1863. It begins with a description of the logistical bureaus in the War Department in Washington, D.C. and the challenges they had in developing the national logistical support structure in the first years of the war. Next, the support structure in the Department of the Cumberland is described, to include the challenges in maintaining the rail link from Nashville, Tennessee, back to Louisville, Kentucky. Finally, the performances of the commanders and logisticians in the field during the Tullahoma and Chickamauga Campaigns are explored, with an emphasis on the problems with transportation. This study concludes that the logisticians overcame enormous problems to create a logistical system that allowed the commanders to win the war. In the Army of the Cumberland, the support was exceptional when compared to the challenges that were faced. Logistics became a limiting factor because of the senior leadership’s poor planning, disregarded orders, and unrealistic expectations which doomed both the Tullahoma and Chickamauga Campaigns from achieving decisive results even before they had begun. This study attempts to put the rarely explored, but extremely significant, field of logistics in its proper place of importance in the study of military history. Logistics is inextricably tied with strategy and tactics; without logistics, victory is not possible.
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