Richard Hughes was an artillery officer with the British Army in World War II. He was sent to Europe twice. The first assignment in 1940 was short lived, as he joined the hopelessly ill equipped and overwhelmed Allied forces in France. The superior German army pushed them back to the English Channel at Dunkirk, and Hughes was one of some 300,000 troops miraculously rescued from the beach by a flotilla of small boats. In 1944 he returned to France as apart of the Allied invasion, this time as a Major commanding a battery of field guns. The contrast is apparent. Now they were a well equipped, superbly trained and coldly efficient force. With his field battery and associated infantry battalion, Hughes fought numerous battles right through Europe to reach Hamburg, at the final surrender of Germany in May, 1945. In Sheldrake, Richard Hughes recalls many fascinating memories in his personal account of those traumatic years.
John Singleton Mosby led a successful partisan campaign during the American Civil War for the Confederacy. Prior to the war, Mosby was a frail nondescript lawyer. Entering the war as a private; Mosby eventually rose to the rank of Colonel. He organized, trained, and equipped the 43rd Virginia Cavalry, better known as Mosby’s Rangers. This unit grew from nine men to almost nine hundred at the war’s end, and conducted many daring celebrated raids on the Union forces and their supply lines. In addition to his raids Mosby provided accurate and timely intelligence to Major General J. E. B. Stuart and General Robert E. Lee throughout his service. This study is a leadership analysis of John Singleton Mosby using the U.S. Army’s Field Manual 22-1 00, Army Leadership. The study examines Mosby’s leadership development and evaluates him against the sixteen leadership dimensions that the Army currently uses to evaluate potential officers. The purpose of this study is to determine what leadership qualities Mosby possessed that contributed to his success. The study concludes that Mosby was able to influence subordinates, peers, superiors, and non-combatants; he provided a purpose and gave them direction and motivation; he also continuously sought ways to improve and expand the organization.
In June of 1942, Eighth Air Force deployed to the UK and began preparation for a bombing campaign. However, during the initial planning efforts it became apparent the staff lacked the expertise needed to analyze and recommend bombing targets. Colonel Richard Hughes, the Chief Planner for American Air Forces in Europe, recognized this deficiency and requested a team to assist with target selection. The Enemy Objectives Unit (EOU), a team of civilian economists, began arriving in London in September 1942 to support the Eighth Air Force. While formally assigned to the US Embassy in London, for practical purposes the team worked for Colonel Hughes. Using their economic expertise, EOU members studied the German industrial complex to identify vulnerabilities and then recommend to planners and senior leaders those industries the US Strategic Air Forces in Europe should target. Taking an effects-based approach, the team sought to maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of US airpower to produce the greatest effects on Germany’s war economy. The EOU’s target selection methodology required intelligence data on enemy targets, an awareness of United States Army Air Forces bombing capabilities, and most importantly an understanding of military and political aims. To ensure selected targets aligned with military and political aims, the EOU regularly collaborated with air planning staffs and senior leaders. Three case studies highlight the interaction and collaboration that occurred between the EOU and Army Air Forces planners and leaders: prioritizing targets for Operation POINTBLANK, development of an Oil Plan following “Big Week” in Feb. 1944, and the recommendation to strike bridges versus marshaling yards prior to Operation OVERLORD. Each of these case studies demonstrates that the integration and cooperation between the EOU and air force leaders and planning staffs ensured that targets selected for aerial bombardment supported political and military objectives.
This book seeks to recount the air experience and development before World War II, to describe the objectives, plans and effects of strategic air warfare in Europe and in the Pacific, and to offer criticism, opinion, and lessons of that great conflict. MAJOR GENERAL HAYWOOD S. HANSELL, JR., USAF (Retired), is a native of Atlanta, Georgia. A graduate of Georgia Institute of Technology (1924), he entered the U.S. Army Air Corps in 1928. Trained as a fighter pilot, he flew in the Air Corps Aerobatic and Demonstration Team (1932) led by Captain Claire Chennault. In the mid-1930s Hansell specialized in strategic bombardment, teaching tactics and doctrine at the Air Corps Tactical School from 1935 to 1938. Just prior to World War II, he went to Army Air Forces Headquarters where he helped draft the fundamental war requirements plan for the service. In 1942 he became Commanding General, Third Bombardment Wing (B-26s), Eighth Air Force, in the European Theater. Subsequently General Hansell commanded the First Bombardment Division (B-17s), Eighth Air Force, and in 1944-45 the XXI Bomber Command (B-29s), Twentieth Air Force, in the Pacific. The latter command was one of only two long-range B-29 commands conducting strategic air warfare against Japan. In 1946 he retired, suffering from a physical disability. During the Korean War (1950-53), the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force recalled him to active duty, assigning him as Chief, Military Assistance Program Headquarters, USAF, and subsequently as Air Member Review Board, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, reporting to the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Research and Development and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. After four years as a senior program manager and advisor, General Hansell retired again. He is the author of The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler (1972) and Strategic Air War Against Japan (1980).
Includes over 50 photos and 35 maps. THIS IS THE CONCLUDING VOLUME of a five-part series dealing with operations of United States Marines in Korea between 2 August 1950 and 27 July 1953. Volume V provides a definitive account of operations of the 1st Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing during 1952–1953, the final phase of the Korean War. At this time the division operated under Eighth U.S. Army in Korea (EUSAK) control in the far western sector of I Corps, while Marine aviators and squadrons functioned as a component of the Fifth Air Force (FAF). “MENTION THE KOREAN WAR and almost immediately it evokes the memory of Marines at Pusan, Inchon, Chosin Reservoir, or the Punchbowl. Americans everywhere remember the Marine Corps’ combat readiness, courage, and military skills that were largely responsible for the success of these early operations in 1950–1951. Not as dramatic or well-known are the important accomplishments of the Marines during the latter part of the Korean War. In March 1952 the 1st Marine Division redeployed from the East-Central front to West Korea. This new sector, nearly 35 miles in length, anchored the far western end of I Corps and was one of the most critical of the entire Eighth Army line. Here the Marines blocked the enemy’s goal of penetrating to Seoul, the South Korean capital. Northwest of the Marine Main Line of Resistance, less than five miles distant, lay Panmunjom, site of the sporadic truce negotiations. Whatever guise the enemy of the United States chooses or wherever he draws his battleline, he will find the Marines with their age-old answer. Today, as in the Korean era, Marine Corps readiness and professionalism are prepared to apply the cutting edge against any threat of American security.”-Gen. Chapman
This study investigates the history of the Confederate Army of Tennessee from formation under command of Braxton Bragg through the eve of Chickamauga. The specific question to be answered is whether the Army of Tennessee was presented opportunities to destroy the Union Army of the Cumberland prior to Chickamauga, and if so why they were not taken advantage of. Answering this question requires an examination of the history of the Army of Tennessee prior to September 1863, with emphasis on Braxton Bragg’s personality and abilities. Between September 9th and 10th 1863 Bragg had a concrete opportunity to destroy a large part of the Army of the Cumberland in McLemore’s Cove, and over succeeding days he identified other favorable situations that might have led to successful attacks on isolated Union Corps. He was, however, unable to orchestrate a successful strike against the separated Federal units. A key contributor to the failures was the poor Confederate command climate that had developed in the Army of Tennessee over the preceding year. Bragg’s Corps commanders and some Division commanders lacked confidence in Bragg’s abilities. This led them to hesitate when prompt obedience was called for. Bragg himself grew frustrated by his inability to compel heartfelt cooperation from his principal subordinates and became unwilling to take a bold risk when opportunity appeared.
In the first volume to collect the paintings and drawings of Clarence Major, readers are offered six decades of unique, colorful, and compelling canvases and works on paper—works of singular beauty and social relevance. These works represent Major’s personal painterly journey of passionate commitment to art. This generous selection of more than 150 paintings and drawings shows us the melding of rich ideas and fertile images, the braiding of imagination and motif. With their pleasing arrangement of elements, the works come vividly to life. Major often juxtaposes a decorative scheme with his own unique choice of color combinations, reinforced with rigorous brushstrokes that release chromatic energy. The paintings complement and challenge the great traditions of Realism, Impressionism, and Expressionism. Major is primarily a figurative and landscape painter. Here we find landscapes of singular vitality, rich in color and design, dramatic landscapes, and cityscapes representing, among other things, Major’s extensive travels in America and Europe. We are also treated to Major’s signature figurative work. In these paintings, he ventures fearlessly into familiar yet unexpected areas of richness. Also included is an introductory essay, “The Education of a Painter,” written by the artist, which further sheds light on and helps to lay a biographical, social, and historical foundation for this essential volume, reflecting a lifetime of serious commitment to painting at its best.
This study examines the operational insights offered by the analysis of the Tullahoma, or Middle Tennessee, Campaign of 1863. The thesis uncovers these operational insights by examining how Major General William S. Rosecrans, commander of the Army of the Cumberland, and General Braxton Bragg, commander of the Army of Tennessee, planned for and conducted the nine day campaign. This study of both commanders planning and execution of a campaign characterized by maneuver, rather than large scale battles, highlights five important insights into operational warfighting. These insights include the translation of strategic guidance into an operational plan, offensive and defensive operational planning, the importance of deception, the effects of sustainment on an operation, and the influence of leadership on the planning and conduct of a campaign.
This book outlines how to reorganize the U.S. Army into a fully 2 and 3-Dimensional maneuver capable, ground force with terrain-agile, armored fighting vehicles sized to rapidly deploy by fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft to the scene of world conflicts and strike at the heart of freedom‚s enemies. The plan to build the Army into Air-Mech-Strike Forces, exploiting emerging information-age technologies, as well as America‚s supremacy in aircraft and helicopter delivery systems---at the lowest cost to the taxpayers, is described in detail. These Army warfighting organizations, using existing and some newly purchased equipment, will shape the battlefield to America‚s advantage, preserving the peace before it is lost; if not, then winning fights that must be fought quickly. The dangerous world we live in moves by the speed of the AIR, and the 21st Century U.S. Army 2D/3D combat team will dominate this medium by Air-Mech-Strike!
Scarlet to Green details the ‘boom and bust’ cycles of the Canadian Army’s intelligence organization from its inception in 1903 to 1963, the eve of the Integration of the Canadian Armed Forces. The book analyzes the role of intelligence in Canadian Army operations in World Wars I and II, and the Korean War, as well as its activities in Canada. The influence of intelligence on operational decision-making, the development of new intelligence collection techniques, and the challenges of countering enemy espionage and subversion are some of the enduring aspects of military intelligence explored. Elliot draws particular attention to the imperatives for having a highly capable and professional military intelligence organization and staff, and shows the challenges when the situation is otherwise, in both peace and war. With a new Foreword and Afterword by Dr. David A. Charters (Professor of Military History (retd) and Senior Fellow at The Gregg Centre for the Study of War and Society, University of New Brunswick), this second edition commemorates the 35th Anniversary of the Canadian Intelligence Branch, the 75th Anniversary of the formation of the Army’s Canadian Intelligence Corps, and the latter’s formal re-instatement in December 2016.
With more than 1,500,000 members and adherents in 109 countries, there is hardly anyone nowadays who is not familiar with the Salvation Army. And while many have been directly affected by its activities in health, relief, and community service, it is rare that one knows much about this unique Christian movement, which was founded in London in 1865 by William Booth_its first 'General'_and has continued growing ever since. Whether merely curious, impressed by its work, or among its members, the Historical Dictionary of the Salvation Army provides a wealth of information for those who want to know more. This excellent source on all varieties of aspects related to the Salvation Army_its history, organization, structure, beliefs, and activities around the world_sums them all up in a broad introduction. It then presents the information in greater detail in hundreds of cross-referenced dictionary entries, while nearly a century-and-a-half of history is traced in the chronology, and further reading is indicated by two extensive bibliographies. This volume, written by more than 150 contributors_all specialists on different aspects and countries_under the direction of Major John G. Merritt, concludes with nine appendixes, including the first-ever published list of the more than 425 men and women who have attained the rank of Commissioner.
Maintaining the United States' strong lead in information technology will require continued federal support of research in this area, most of which is currently funded under the High Performance Computing and Communications Initiative (HPCCI). The Initiative has already accomplished a great deal and should be continued. This book provides 13 major recommendations for refining both HPCCI and support of information technology research in general. It also provides a good overview of the development of HPCC technologies.
Gen. Helmuth von Moltke, the Chief of the Prussian General Staff during the Franco-Prussian War, defined Auftragstaktik as the actions a subordinate took in the absence of orders that supported the senior commander’s intent. The use of mission tactics allowed subordinate commanders like Crown Prince Frederick Karl, Gen. Konstantin von Alvensleben, and Gen. Karl von Steinmetz to interpret how best to achieve the commander’s intent based upon their understanding of the tactical situation. The Prussian use of decentralized command during the Franco-Prussian War acknowledged the risk inherent in this system of command. Despite what modern military theorists often write, Auftragstaktik and mission command are not synonymous terms. Most authors ignore the historical environment that the Prussian military operated in during the Franco-Prussian War. This study examines the influence of the Prussian concept of Auftragstaktik on the modern US Army notion of mission command as defined within the published doctrine. It utilizes archival records and pertinent published histories from the August 1870 battles on the Franco-Prussian frontier, Moltke’s 1869 Instructions for Large Unit Commanders, as well as writings from the 1980s to describe the influence of Prussian system on the modern concept of mission command.
Includes more than 14 maps and Illustrations Armies of the North and South fought the Battle of Wilson’s Creek about ten miles southwest of Springfield, Missouri, on Saturday, 10 Aug. 1861...While the action at Wilson’s Creek was small compared to that at Gettysburg or Chickamauga, it remains significant and useful to students of military history. ...The Union defeat in battle and the death of General Nathaniel Lyon, so closely following the disaster at First Bull Run, caused the North to adopt a more serious attitude about the war and to realize that victory would come only with detailed planning and proper resourcing. Thus, the Union reinforced Missouri with soldiers and weapons during the fall and winter of 1861-62, while the Confederacy applied its scanty resources elsewhere. Although the exiled pro-Confederate state government voted to secede and sent delegates to Richmond, Virginia, Missouri effectively remained in the Union. Any questions about Missouri’s fate were settled at the Battle of Pea Ridge in March 1862, when Union forces turned back the last significant Confederate threat to Missouri. Wilson’s Creek was a “first battle” for most of the soldiers who fought there. First battles often provide armies with special insights into the application of military art and science, and Wilson’s Creek was no exception. The Mexican War model of organization and combined arms battle was generally confirmed, but some key observations relating to technology and command and control emerged as well...In addition, artillery proved decisive at several key moments during the fighting. Cavalry, on its part, proved to be much less valuable, and this fact hinted at lessons to be learned later in the Civil War. Ultimately, the infantry of both sides played out the drama, and many of the most useful insights came from that branch.
This thesis investigates the role Union logistics played during the American Civil War and examines the effectiveness of logistics support in Sherman’s Carolina Campaign. Discussion begins with an overview of Union logistic operations in the war focusing on the logistics functions of supply, transportation, and combat health support. Next it proceeds to examine the role of logistics during the campaign by first discussing the impact logistics operations had on General Sherman’s preparations prior to initiating the campaign. It then further discusses logistics operations carried out during the conduct of the campaign in the Carolinas. Finally, it examines logistics operations in the Carolina Campaign in terms of today’s logistics doctrine. Logistics played a critical role in the success of the campaign. The logisticians in support of Sherman’s Army overcame difficulties at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels to provide effective support. There were significant problems with the support concept, especially in the areas of casualty evacuation and uniform resupply. This thesis investigates these problems as well as the logistics successes that helped make Sherman’s Carolina Campaign the triumphant it is remembered as.
Overshadowed in the popular imagination by the figure of Oliver Cromwell, historians are increasingly coming to recognize the importance of Thomas Fairfax, 3rd Lord Fairfax of Cameron, in shaping the momentous events of mid-seventeenth-century Britain. As both a military and political figure he played a central role in first defeating Charles I and then later supporting the restoration of his son in 1660. England’s Fortress shines new light on this significant yet surprisingly understudied figure through a selection of essays addressing a wide range of topics, from military history to poetry. Divided into two sections, the volume reflects key aspects of Fairfax’s life and career which are, nevertheless, as interconnecting as they are discrete: Fairfax the soldier and statesman, and Fairfax the husband, horseman and scholar. This fresh account of Fairfax’s reputations and legacy questions assumptions about neatly demarcated seventeenth-century chronological, geographic and cultural boundaries. What emerges is a man who subverts as much as he reinforces assumed characteristics of martial invincibility, political disengagement and literary dilettantism.
The thesis of this study is that the Continental artillery in the American Revolution, despite its ad hoc beginning and wartime challenges, gradually developed into a professional organization by the end of the war. Rather than operational history of the organization, its focus is on the growth of the organization over time, in terms of its cultural beginnings, its doctrinal development, and the leadership and career paths of some of its middle ranking leaders. The first chapter lays out the structural framework and statutory authorizations for the organization. The second chapter describes its early cultural shift from its pre-war legacy of provincialism to a trajectory toward professionalism. This chapter uses a cultural analysis to argue that Washington’s decision to replace the aged Richard Gridley with Henry Knox as the commander of the Continental artillery ushered in a cultural shift away from an older provincial organizational culture to one that sought professionalism. The third chapter portrays the development of a battlefield tactical doctrine described in books that gradually took hold in informal ways. It takes a comparative theory and practice approach to argue that the kernel of an emerging doctrine existed in available European books and from those kernels, a consistent and effective doctrine developed over time. The fourth chapter uses a collective biographical approach to show organizational development in the careers of its middle ranking leaders. The concluding chapter summarizes findings and ties the professionalization of the corps of artillery to the military establishments of the new republic.
This thesis will use a comparative study of the German Storm trooper battalions and the Canadian trench raiders in order to examine the dynamics of the World War I battlefield, the role of military culture in adaptation in order to acknowledge and act on the requirements of battlefield innovation. The purpose is to determine what key factors contributed to the tactical effectiveness of specialized assault units on the Western Front. The military cultures of these armies comprised the logical and innovative principles that were fundamental in the tactical effectiveness of these elite assault units by making revolutionary developments in force structure, institutional support, personnel selection, decentralized leadership, and training on small-unit tactics and advanced weaponry. Did these tactics create similar or different effects for each army? What factors did these armies use to organize and employ these assault units? To answer these questions, several areas will be examined: (1) force structure, (2) institutional support, (3) personnel selection, and (4) training on decentralized leadership, small unit infiltration tactics, and advanced weaponry. Both armies had different backgrounds and situations. The German Army’s Sturm battalions represented an army-wide institutionalization of organization, selection and technique. The Canadian Corps’ trench raiders were based on the Canadian Corps’ homogeneous structure that separated itself from the BEF in developing its own doctrine, training schools, organization, and tactical innovations.
Education has been the foundational cornerstone to every profession and continues to be so in the 21st Century. As a profession, the military is obligated to conduct not only training but also education of the keepers of the profession, the officer corps. Since the rise of large military bodies enabled by the levee en masse and industrialization, armies have required educated officers skilled in both command and staff functions. The Prussian-German model of staff officer education embodied in the Kriegsakademie of the Nineteenth and first half of the Twentieth Century’s, was highly regarded and much copied. The education officer received at the Kriegsakademie directly contributed to an efficiently organized and employed Prussian-German Army at the tactical and operational levels. The investment in Kriegsakademie officer education paid huge dividends at Gravelotte-St Privat and Sedan 1870, Tannenberg 1914, Battle of Poland 1939, and the Battle of France 1940, critical first battles. With the rearming of Germany in 1955 came the need for the fledgling Bundeswehr to educate general staff officers. This need was met by establishing the Führungsakademie (German Armed Forces Command and Staff College). The Führungsakademie was created with the same time honored principles that had served general staff officer training previously: careful selection of the most highly qualified and promising officers and a broad based education rigorously applied. However, little information on the current Führungsakademie Education System is available in the English language. This monograph attempts to address this void. The author conducted research and interviews with the faculty, staff, and students at the Führungsakademie in Hamburg, Germany in order to understand and assess the education given to German general staff officer aspirants. The central general staff officer’s education course is the National General/Admiral Staff Officers Course.
Between 1600 and 1800 around 4,000 Catholic women left England for a life of exile in the convents of France, Flanders, Portugal and America. These closed communities offered religious contemplation and safety, but also provided an environment of concentrated female intellectualism. The nuns’ writings from this time form a unique resource.
This two-volume history of the Royal Artillery is one of the earliest published on that subject, and covers the period from its formation in 1716 to Waterloo, a hundred years of history. This volume takes the history of the Regiment to Waterloo and the defeat of Napoleon, and in connection with performance of the Artillery in that battle the author devotes an Appendix to a letter from Wellington to Lord Mulgrave, then Master-General of the Ordnance, in which he wrote: "To tell you the truth, I was not very well pleased with the Artillery in the Battle of Waterloo" and when the French cavalry charged "they ran off the field entirely, taking with them limbers, ammunition and everything." Major Duncan angrily refutes, in detail, the accuracy of such a statement, based as it was on false reports, implying the Iron Duke was talking through his cocked hat. This makes a lively conclusion to a most entertaining account of a further thirty-two years in the history of the Gunners. Operations described include the ill-fated expedition against the French in Flanders, led by the Duke of York, but the main focus is on the Napoleonic Wars - the campaign in S America, the Walcheren campaign, a malaria-infested island where battle casualties amounted to a little over 200 while thousands died of sickness, and the Peninsular War culminating in the Battle of Waterloo. Descriptions include detailed order of battle of artillery units involved with strengths and names of all the officers in each unit. But just as impressive is the wealth of information on the continuing development of the Regiment, beginning with the raising of the Royal Horse Artillery in January 1793. We read all about equipment, dress, pay, in fact there is a statement of the Artillery Forces of Great Britain in the year 1810, according to the establishment laid down in the King's Warrant, listing every unit, with numbers in each rank and daily pay of each rank. To finish, the author provides a tabular statement showing date of formation and former designation of every battery now (1879) in the Service. There is a good index. These two volumes, telling the story of the first hundred years of the Royal Regiment of Artillery, are an invaluable source of information and essential reading for any historian, student or enthusiast.
Prize Possession is a history of United States policy towards the Panama Canal, focusing principally on the first two generations of American tenure of the Canal Zone between 1904 and 1955. John Major also provides an extensive look at the nineteenth-century background, the making of the 1903 canal treaty with Panama, the move after 1955 towards the new treaty settlement of 1977, and the crucial significance of the Canal to American policy-makers and their public. The book is based for the most part on the hitherto largely untapped sources of US government agencies, namely, the State, War, and Navy Department, and the Canal Zone administration, as well as on the papers of notable dramatis personae such as Theodore and Franklin Roosevelt and Philippe Bunau-Varilla. As such it makes an important and original contribution to our knowledge and understanding of a subject which has not yet received its due from historians.
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