This thesis examines intelligence operations conducted by Major General Rosecrans’ Army of the Cumberland during the initial phases of the Chickamauga Campaign (11 August to 16 September 1863). The thesis methodology is a detailed analysis of all intelligence reports received by the headquarters and a detailed examination of all outgoing correspondence from the headquarters intended to identify the analytical process used and the impact of intelligence on Rosecrans’ decision making during the campaign. The record shows that contrary to popular historical opinion there was significant intelligence available indicating the probable Confederate course of action. General Rosecrans and his staff actively discounted information that did not conform to their pre-conceived expectation or template of the enemy with tragic results for the Army of the Cumberland. This thesis highlights several timeless lessons of relevance to the modern military officer: the importance of focused intelligence collection operations, the requirement for clear thinking and disciplined analysis of intelligence reporting, the dangers of over-confidence and preconceptions, the hazard of focusing on one’s plan instead of the enemy, and the importance of avoiding “group-thinking” among a staff.
This thesis analyzes the intelligence collection and dissemination in urban environments at the maneuver battalion. The methodology attempts to assess the organic intelligence assets and capabilities within a maneuver battalion, the training of the maneuver battalion officers on the employment of intelligence assets, and the availability of doctrinal literature about urban operations. The war in Iraq presents the Army with an operational environment that is unfamiliar to a force that has trained for conventional warfare in open terrain. The commanders, especially at battalion level and below, need an efficient and effective intelligence system. The focus of the research will be on the shortcomings and solutions for the intelligence systems supporting operations at the tactical level. The FM 3-0, Operations, dated February 2008, is the capstone doctrine for the U.S. Army for the current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and for future prolonged conflicts as an expeditionary force. Discussion among the maneuver and intelligence communities on how to improve the intelligence collection and dissemination in urban environments is worthy of research. The historic perspective of the urban environment complexities and their military significance provide lessons learned on how military intelligence plays an important role in successful operations in such terrain.
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