From his early experiences in the French and Indian War to his first days as the Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Army, General George Washington displayed the character and drive needed to forge a nation. Several factors throughout this period would impact greatly on Washington and lead him to the formulation of a winning strategy for fighting the British. George Washington’s military experiences during the French and Indian War greatly assisted him during the Revolutionary War. His early frontier work instilled the toughness and backwoods savvy he would need to physically handle the stresses of wartime. He never forgot his passion for offensive action and his dislike for the defense. His experiences with the Indians and militia from numerous colonies taught him the fine art of coalition warfare and bringing different peoples together for one cause. His continuous requests for more and better supplies and men would give him insight into the huge burden faced by the Congress during the Revolutionary War. Finally, his cool-headed leadership under fire provided the framework on which an entire nation and its sole army would rest. All of his experiences throughout this period helped form the framework of his strategy for the War of Independence. General Washington became the Commander-in-Chief of the Colonial Army at the same time the British began planning the Campaign of 1776. Washington could not have possibly fathomed the immensity of the task that lay before him. From his knowledge of the British, he understood that England would hold almost every advantage in resources, manpower, and equipment over the newly formed Colonial Army. He knew that the British Army and Navy came from the world’s strongest empire and would present an adversary seemingly impossible to beat. He knew that he would have little help from his government in everything except strong words of encouragement. He knew this war was his to win or his to lose.
This work comprises an effort to answer the question of how an airman can be qualified to be a Joint Force Commander, using the biographical example of General Roy S. Geiger, USMC. Geiger was the fifth designated Marine Aviator, earning his wings in June of 1917. He then served as a squadron commander in the First Marine Aviation Force in World War I (WW I), where he flew combat sorties and earned his first Navy Cross. In the interwar years, he served in multiple command billets, acted as head of Marine Aviation, and performed with distinction as a student at the Army Command and General Staff School and the Army and Navy War Colleges. During World War II, Geiger commanded the First Marine Aircraft Wing and the CACTUS Air Force in the dark days of the Guadalcanal Campaign in 1942, where at age fifty-seven he again flew in combat, earning his second Navy Cross. He went on to serve as an Amphibious Corps Commander in the Pacific Theater, where he led campaigns at Bougainville, Guam, and Peleliu. Finally, he distinguished himself in the battle of Okinawa as the only Marine ever to command a field Army, the Tenth Army. After World War II, Lieutenant General Geiger continued to shape the Marine Corps in command of Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific until his premature death in 1947. The study is a chronological account of the life of Roy Geiger, with a focus on his leadership traits, extensive professional military education, remarkable joint relationships, and innovation, all of which contributed to his success as a Joint Force Commander. The author argues that Geiger was the most influential Marine aviator and among the most successful operational commanders in the history of the United States Marine Corps. Roy Geiger was the prototype for a Joint Force Commander.
This concise account of the evolution of Marine Corps staff organization is derived from official records and appropriate published historical works. It is published as a ready reference for those interested in the historical development of our modern Marine Corps staff organization and, in particular, the evolution of the staff at Headquarters Marine Corps. The final responsibility for the service of a command rests with its commander. If an organization is small and the scope of its activities limited, the commander can usually direct his organization and administer its affairs personally, with, perhaps, some routine clerical assistance. In the case of a larger military organization with a considerable range of functions, the commander brings together a group of people to provide him with evaluated information and recommendations for the best courses of action to follow. As the Marine Corps has grown in numbers in order to fulfill an increasing range and scope of responsibilities, the Commandant and his subordinate commanders have followed this latter thesis. When the Corps numbered less than 1,000 officers and enlisted men, it was possible for the Commandant, with but minimum assistance, to personally direct and administer its activities. Through the years, as the strength of the Marine Corps expanded to today's 240,000 men and women, it has been necessary that the staff assistance to the Commandant be correspondingly increased to help him direct and administer the Marine Corps in its world-wide responsibilities. This account of the evolution of Marine Corps staff organization, with emphasis on the development of the Headquarters staff, is published to show why and how the Marine Corps staff has grown from its 1798 infancy to its maturity of today.
Contains 58 photos and 10 maps and charts. “The return of Allied forces to the Philippines in the fall of 1944 further throttled Japan’s already tenuous pipe line to the rich resources of Malaya and the Netherlands Indies, and with it the last vestige of her ability to meet the logistical requirements of a continuing war. The Battle for Leyte Gulf marked the end of Japan as a naval power, forcing her to adopt the desperation kamikaze tactic against the United States Fleets. The Philippine victories were primarily Army and Navy operations. Marines, comprising only a fraction of the total forces engaged, played a secondary but significant role in the overall victory. The campaign was important to the Corps in that the Marine aviators, who had battled two years for air control over the Solomons, moved into a new role, their first opportunity to test on a large scale the fundamental Marine doctrine of close air support for ground troops in conventional land operations. This test they passed with credit, and Marine flyers contributed materially to the Philippine victory. Lessons learned and techniques perfected in those campaigns form an important chapter in our present-day close air support doctrines.”-C. B. CATES, GENERAL, U.S. MARINE CORPS, COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS
On the outcome of the Battle of Saipain hung the fate of the Pacific War, if the Japanese were to lost this island then the Home Islands would finally be in range of serious American bombing. As the fanatical resistance of the Japanese was raised to fever pitch by the exhortations of the high command, whilst the Marines who had learnt hard lessons on assault landings knew that the capture of Saipan could shorten the war immeasurably; so was set one of the bloodiest battles of the entire Pacific Campaign. The Japanese fought with insane courage, leading to massed banzai charges and civilian suicides; matches by the gritty determination of the experienced Marines to conquer. Contains 103 photos and 24 maps and charts. “SAIPAN was one of the key operations in the Pacific War; key because it unlocked vast potentialities to the United States in projecting its might against the Japanese homeland; key because it opened the door of distance which had meant security to the Empire. Invasion of Saipan provided the supreme challenge in which the enemy was forced to select one of two alternatives: conserve his naval resources for a later decision, leaving uncontested this penetration of his inner defense; or lash out in a vicious, showdown fight. The fact that he chose the latter course, and suffered a resounding defeat, is now history. The conquest of Saipan was, among Pacific operations up to that time, the most clear-cut decisive triumph of combined arms of the United States over the Japanese. By June 1944, U. S. forces, long superior in quality of personnel and organization, were finally greatly superior in materiel with which to fight. Victory at Saipan made this apparent to all.”-C. B. CATES, GENERAL, U. S. MARINE CORPS., COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS.
This study examines General James N. Mattis's staffing philosophies, the influence of history on his operational planning and execution, and his general command and leadership philosophies using Task Force 58 as a formative base. A brief look at his time commanding the 1st Marine Division in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) examines whether his philosophies and concepts evolved or remained consistent. A chapter dedicated to his command philosophies and leadership explores common themes that were present during both periods and their influence on his later generalship. General Mattis is an iconic figure in recent Marine Corps history and is known by many nicknames sucsh as Mad Dog and the Warrior Monk. He gets the latter because of his intense love and study of military history, leadership, and the art of war. He had humble beginnings; born in a small town in the Pacific Northwest at the base of the Columbia River which had deep-rooted agricultural ties and a nuclear industry.
“United States Marine Corps Air-Ground Integration in the Pacific Theater” addresses how the United States Marine Corps dealt with the challenge of air support for the infantry in the Second World War. Sources for research included primary documents on doctrine and personal interviews from the United States Air Force Historical Research Agency. Periodicals written before and immediately after the war provided additional information. The research indicated that the Marines developed an effective means for air-ground integration during the Second World War. A great deal of this success was due to the Marine Corps' philosophy of airpower as well as to experience gained during the interwar years, particularly in Nicaragua. In addition, the unique environment in the Pacific influenced many of the procedures that were developed. Finally, the Marines learned a great deal during the course of the Pacific campaign itself. The battles of Guadalcanal, Bougainville, and Luzon illustrate the significant innovations and improvements that were made during the war.
This paper traces the development of close air support (CAS) by the United States Marine Corps in World War II. The study examines how the Marines started developing their doctrine in the 1930s and adapted their (CAS) system based on the outcome of battles on Guadalcanal, Tarawa, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa, as well as during operations in support of the U.S. Army in the Philippines. Particular emphasis is placed on the development of Marine CAS doctrine, liaison organizational structures, aircraft, and air-to-ground weapons. This study is pertinent because it describes how the Marines developed a very effective weapon that greatly increased the potency of its amphibious operations. Additionally, this was initially accomplished during a period of very limited financial resources (before the start of World War II) and then limited time resources (during the war crisis). This study also shows how the Marines worked to support the forces on the ground with the best CAS system possible despite the opposition.
Contains 86 photos and 42 maps and charts. The story of part played by the United States Marines in the largest amphibious assault of the entire Pacific War during World War II. The battle lasted an exhausting and bloody 82 days from early April until mid-June 1945. The legendarily tough defence of the Japanese soldiers and citizens was matched by the American troops in the last major campaign that had led all the way from Pearl Harbor to the Home Islands of Japan. “After a long campaign of island hopping, the Allies were approaching Japan, and planned to use Okinawa, a large island only 340 mi (550 km) away from mainland Japan, as a base for air operations on the planned invasion of Japanese mainland (coded Operation Downfall). Four divisions of the U.S. 10th Army (the 7th, 27th, 77th, and 96th) and two Marine Divisions (the 1st and 6th) fought on the island while the 2nd Marine Division remained as an amphibious reserve and was never brought ashore. The invasion was supported by naval, amphibious, and tactical air forces. The battle has been referred to as the "typhoon of steel" in English, and tetsu no ame ("rain of steel") or tetsu no bōfū ("violent wind of steel") in Japanese. The nicknames refer to the ferocity of the fighting, the intensity of kamikaze attacks from the Japanese defenders, and to the sheer numbers of Allied ships and armored vehicles that assaulted the island. The battle resulted in the highest number of casualties in the Pacific Theater during World War II. Japan lost over 100,000 soldiers, who were either killed, captured or committed suicide, and the Allies suffered more than 65,000 casualties of all kinds. Simultaneously, tens of thousands of local civilians were killed, wounded, or committed suicide. The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki caused Japan to surrender less than two months after the end of the fighting at Okinawa.”-Wiki
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