The performance of an army is often evaluated by its achievements as a whole, or by that of its commanders or perhaps even its divisions. Often lost in the equation is the small unit. After the great plans are complete and the logistics preparations are accomplished, it is the collective performance of the small unit that ultimately decides the battle. This thesis analyses the campaigns, soldiers, organization, equipment, and performance of just one regiment: the 48th Tennessee Volunteer Infantry. Material concerning the 48th includes numerous primary sources: the Official Records, Confederate Veteran, The Southern Historical Papers, Southern Bivouac, local histories, and the CARL microfiche library of unit histories (Note: the 48th is not included in these unit histories). Other primary references include war diaries of two officers, three enlisted men, and copies of the 48th's Quartermaster records. This thesis concludes that, while training and equipment of the 48th was sometimes poor, it was effective in numerous engagements, despite its relative small size. The ultimate demise of the unit was due to personnel losses.
This study is a historical analysis of Major General Patrick R. Cleburne’s Division during the Battle of Chickamauga. Cleburne’s Division earned a reputation as one of the best divisions in either army. This reputation also carried with it lofty expectations. This study analyzes how Cleburne’s Division performed at Chickamauga and what the effects of its actions were on the overall outcome of the battle. The Battle of Chickamauga has suffered its share of historical neglect. Fought in the forests and mountains of northern Georgia and southeastern Tennessee, the battle has not been immortalized by any stirring fictional works, nor has it inspired any feature films, but the story of the men who fought there is worth studying. Cleburne’s Division did not distinguish itself at Chickamauga. It launched a confused, disjointed night attack to close out the first day of the battle, but determined leaders succeed in capturing their objectives. Day two of the battle saw Cleburne’s Division attack four hours late. It was quickly repulsed while suffering horrific casualties. While the Confederate left wing routed the Union Army, Cleburne’s Division nursed their wounds before finally advancing at sunset, as the Union withdrew from the battlefield.
The performance of an army is often evaluated by its achievements as a whole, or by that of its commanders or perhaps even its divisions. Often lost in the equation is the small unit. After the great plans are complete and the logistics preparations are accomplished, it is the collective performance of the small unit that ultimately decides the battle. This thesis analyses the campaigns, soldiers, organization, equipment, and performance of just one regiment: the 48th Tennessee Volunteer Infantry. Material concerning the 48th includes numerous primary sources: the Official Records, Confederate Veteran, The Southern Historical Papers, Southern Bivouac, local histories, and the CARL microfiche library of unit histories (Note: the 48th is not included in these unit histories). Other primary references include war diaries of two officers, three enlisted men, and copies of the 48th's Quartermaster records. This thesis concludes that, while training and equipment of the 48th was sometimes poor, it was effective in numerous engagements, despite its relative small size. The ultimate demise of the unit was due to personnel losses.
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