This study examines the operations of the 7th Armored Division from 16 December 1944 through 29 January 1945. The focus is on the nature of combat as seen from the perspective of battalion through division-level commanders. The 7th Armored Division provides data on defensive operations, withdrawal, reconstitution and offensive operations. This data is used to examine the validity of the AirLand Battle concepts of “agility,” “initiative,” “depth” and “synchronization.” The study illuminates the tremendous complexity of high-tempo, continuous operations and the validity of the AirLand Battle doctrine. The study reveals the key to success in such operations is the ability to cope with high levels of friction which stems from the clear communication of intent. The study raises questions on the ability of the US Army to fight at night, the Army’s doctrine for retrograde operations, and its artillery doctrine.
When the German Ardennes Offensive of December 1944 ruptured the front of the U.S. First Army, Major General Troy Middleton committed his VIII Corps to the defense of selected transportation bottlenecks in the path of the German advance. St. Vith, located in the central sector of the Ardennes battleground, was one of these. Although by passed by German spearheads bound for the Meuse River, the 7th Armored Division (plus major elements of three other divisions) held the position against major elements of two German Panzer armies. After six days of tenacious defense while practically encircled, the St. Vith force was ordered to withdraw. The defenders of St. Vith prevented the Germans from effectively supplying their armored spearheads, drew off their follow-on forces, and bought time for the U.S. First Army to consolidate its position on the north flank of the German penetration.
The end of the Cold War did not bring about the grand peace that was hoped for during four decades. Instead, the world has become more dangerous, with multiple complex problems. Military institutions worldwide must learn to adapt to the ever-changing face of the threat to fight the Global War on Terror. Services can no longer look within their own ranks to accomplish the mission; all operations must be joint in order to succeed in the contemporary operating environment. This monograph traces the thread between civil-military relations during two times of war for the U.S. The military must know what the civilian leadership requires and must, in return, articulate a clear path to achieve it, if feasible. The U.S. military never lost a battle in Vietnam and yet that conflict is looked upon as an American defeat. The war in Iraq began to look like a repeat performance. The military was clearly winning engagements on the battlefield but the talk at home, in the media, was of a “quagmire” and “stagnation” (two terms used to describe Vietnam) and ultimately, of defeat. Although this monograph uses two snapshots in time of civil-military relations, the significance of its findings apply, in general, to all students interested in civil-military relations, as well as decision making. Whether looking at times of war or peace, civil-military relations play a significant role in all matters pertaining to the running of our military; the decisions made by our civilian leadership can influence even the smallest facets of military life.
Given the focus on the Brigade Combat Team as the Army’s primary combat unit, the limited availability of U.S. Air Force airlift assets, and the U.S. Army history of employing predominantly medium sized airborne units, future airborne operations in support of operational level objectives will likely center around the Airborne Brigade Combat Team (ABCT). The combat airborne operations of the 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment will provide a case study to assess the elements of risk, surprise and the operational context of how the airborne unit contributed to the achievement the operational and strategic outcomes. The combat airborne operations discussed are the jump to re-take the island of Corregidor in the Philippines in February 1945, Operation Junction City in February 1967, and the airborne insertion of the 173d Airborne Brigade onto the Bashur airfield in Northern Iraq in March 2003. The intent of this monograph is to provide insights into the possible employment of the current ABCT and how to best use the resources and organization that we have, not necessarily to advocate a radically new airborne organization, propose new equipment, or recommend a new mission for airborne forces.
This study examines the concept of battle command from a modem historical perspective. It analyzes the decision making and leadership displayed by Lieutenant General Franks during the planning, preparation and execution of Operation Desert Storm to determine if General Franks exhibited the principles of battle command. Decision making and leadership are the two major components of battle command, a concept championed by Franks following Desert Storm, and, as such serve to frame the discussion. As the commander of the U.S. VII Corps during Operation Desert Storm, General Franks made decisions that had tactical, operational, and strategic implications. These decisions directly affected the lives and actions of the over 142,000 U.S. and British service-members assigned to his command. The results were overwhelmingly successful but many criticized him for being too cautious and conservative. This study investigates if the criticism founded in fact or whether General Franks was merely striking the best balance possible between decision making and leadership on the battlefield.
This study examines the role of U.S. Army Engineers fighting as infantry in AirLand Battle by analyzing the actions of the 1111th Engineer Combat Group during the Battle of the Bulge in Dec. 1944. By manning hasty defensive positions at Malmedy, Stavelot, and Trois Ponts, the 291st Engineers and C Company, 51st Engineers delayed the German advance long enough for 30th Infantry and 82d Airborne Divisions to reach the area and wrestle the initiative from Sixth Panzer Army. The defense of the Ourthe River line by elements of the 51st Engineers was instrumental in delaying 116th Panzer Division long enough for 3rd Armored and 84th Infantry Divisions to reach defensive positions in front of the Meuse River. Engineers were successful as infantry against mechanized forces for several reasons: 1) Infantry missions were limited in scope; 2) They were augmented with additional fire power; 3) They occupied good defensible terrain; 4) World War II engineer units received extensive combat training before deploying overseas. The Battle of the Bulge displays many of the characteristics of a Soviet attack on NATO. Like the Ardennes in Dec. 1944, NATO’s Central Front is held by units which are overextended, untested in combat, and locked into a rigid forward defense with limited tactical reserves and no operational reserves. Under these circumstances, if Soviet forces do penetrate the Main Battle Area, engineer units are likely to be committed as infantry to block or contain the penetration. Like the Battle of the Bulge, we can expect a non-linear battlefield with fragmented, isolated units-a battlefield dominated by confusion and uncertainty. It is in exactly this type of situation that the actions of a few brave, determined men can make the difference between victory and defeat. By manning small, isolated defensive positions, the men of the 1111th Engineer Group provided the extra measure of combat power that tipped the scales of victory in favor of the Allies in Dec. 1944.
Central to the waging of war at the tactical level is the interplay between leadership and doctrine. Within a doctrinal context, the Army must develop leaders capable of winning the next war. This study examines the balance between leadership and doctrine and identifies the characteristics that distinguish the great leader from the also-ran. The vehicle for this examination is a comparison of two American Civil war generals, Stonewall Jackson and George McClellan. Purporting to support the same doctrine, the two men achieved remarkably dissimilar results on the battlefield. This analysis demonstrates that the reasons for that difference lay primarily in the realm of leadership rather than in the implementation of doctrine, and identifies the leadership principles key to success at the tactical level of war.
This study examines the operations of the 7th Armored Division from 16 December 1944 through 29 January 1945. The focus is on the nature of combat as seen from the perspective of battalion through division-level commanders. The 7th Armored Division provides data on defensive operations, withdrawal, reconstitution and offensive operations. This data is used to examine the validity of the AirLand Battle concepts of “agility,” “initiative,” “depth” and “synchronization.” The study illuminates the tremendous complexity of high-tempo, continuous operations and the validity of the AirLand Battle doctrine. The study reveals the key to success in such operations is the ability to cope with high levels of friction which stems from the clear communication of intent. The study raises questions on the ability of the US Army to fight at night, the Army’s doctrine for retrograde operations, and its artillery doctrine.
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