Includes the First World War Illustrations Pack – 73 battle plans and diagrams and 198 photos Major-General Ernest Swinton had already had a long and illustrious career in the British Army before the advent of the First World War in 1914. Appointed as the official war correspondent by the war Minister Lord Kitchener in 1914, his reporting home was the only way for the British people to follow the war as journalists were at that time banned at the front. In these dispatches from the front Swinton told the public of the bloody fighting in Flanders and the heroic efforts of the Allies to stop the German Juggernaut. The miserable conditions and bloody siege warfare of the trenches left a lasting impression on him and he looked to a scientific solution to the muddy stalemate of the Western Front. He would gain lasting fame as the architect of the “tank” project that was to revolutionize warfare in the First World War and for many years thereafter. In this volume of reminiscences he traces his involvement in the early years of the war and his later years as the driving force in the development and adoption of the tank.
Major-General Maurice, although a British officer, was fascinated by the American Civil War, and wrote a number of important works on the conflict; even editing and publishing for the first time, the famous memoirs of General Robert E. Lee’s aide de camp Colonel Marshall. In this volume he analyses the relationship between the statesmen and their generals; in both the Confederacy and the Union there was much friction between the generals in the field and their political masters. The author takes two relationships, one successful and the other disastrous, from both sides of the firing line to scrutinize. On the Confederate side the frictions and breaches of Jefferson Davis and General J. E. Johnston are contrasted with the former’s affinity and dependence on General Robert E. Lee. In the Union ranks the frustrations and goading of Lincoln and General McClellan are balanced by the support and trust of the President’s dealings with General U.S. Grant. In closing his work General Maurice also touches on his opinions for the conduct of successful relations between politicians and the military and illustrates them with examples from the more recent First World War.
Could Napoleon have won the battle of Waterloo? And what would have happened if he had? Or suppose Nelson had not destroyed the French fleet at Aboukir, would Napoleon have conquered India and become Emperor of the East? What if Hitler had not halted his panzer forces before Dunkirk and had entrapped the entire British Expeditionary Force? How would Churchill have then denied the Wehrmacht? If by chance Hitler had been assassinated in 1944 and the German General Staff taken control, would there have been a totally different kind of surrender? In examining these and other contingencies, Major General Strawson brings his experience of command in war and his skill as a military historian to present us with an enthralling catalogue of chance and speculation, while emphasising how profoundly the character of commanders influenced events and how events affected their character.
Includes the First World War Illustrations Pack – 73 battle plans and diagrams and 198 photos Major-General Sir Charles Edward Callwell KCB was an Anglo-Irish officer of the British Army, who served in the artillery, as an intelligence officer, and as a staff officer and commander during the Second Boer War. As a noted strategist and well known in military circles, he was recalled [aka ‘dug-out’] to the colours during the First World War, as part of the rapid expansion of the British Army from a small regular army to the mass volunteer army. He served as Director of Operations & Intelligence during the Gallipoli campaign and also on military missions to Russia and in staff posts in the Ministry of Munitions. In this memoir he recounts his experiences as a witness to the many successes, a few of the disasters and the unstinting effort of the high command of the British War effort during the First World War.
This study examines the history of the Jedburgh project from the origin of the concept, through development of the Jedburgh plan, to final preparations for deployment. It includes a study of the recruitment process used to man the force and the training program undertaken to prepare the Jedburghs for their unconventional warfare (UW) mission. The Jedburgh plan provided for 100 three-man teams composed of American, British, French, Belgian, and Dutch special forces personnel. These teams operated well behind German lines, with the primary mission of coordinating the activities of the various resistance elements to ensure that their operations supported the overall Allied campaign effort. These operations, indeed the very concept of a force designed to work directly with partisans in an occupied country in support of conventional forces, remain significant because they are the doctrinal basis for our current special forces. Today’s UW doctrine centers increasingly around the support of revolutionary insurgents in a low intensity conflict environment. U.S. Army Special Forces leaders must understand the different and complex nature of conducting UW with partisans in a mid to high intensity conflict, though, if they are to remain prepared to conduct these operations. The amount of lead time required to develop such a capability will probably not be available in future conflicts.
Includes the First World War Illustrations Pack – 73 battle plans and diagrams and 198 photos The epic story of the last campaign of the Allied armies that shattered the German Army on the Western Front in 1918 bringing the First World War to a close. Renowned military writer Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice brings together the stories of the victorious armies who advanced from the Belgian coastline to the Swiss frontiers in vivid detail. “WHO won the war? is a question that has been often asked. In the countries of all the great Allied Powers there have been found those who answered it to their own satisfaction as patriots, because it is easy to demonstrate that the war would not have been won, as and when it was won, had any of those countries failed to do what it actually achieved. Most of us, however, are agreed that victory was the result of combination, and I am convinced that that opinion will grow stronger the better the story is known... In this book I have sought to give a picture of Foch’s great campaign and to sketch in due proportion the parts which went to make up the whole. I have reduced my descriptions of the battles to the simplest terms, because my object is to explain the broad causes of success and of failure, and there is danger, in entering into details of operations on so vast a scale, of losing sight of the wood for the trees. As no story of a campaign can be complete unless it describes the intentions, aims and feelings of the enemy, at least at the most critical periods, I have collected the best information available on these points from captured documents or from publications in Germany. Fortunately, there has in that country been considerable public discussion between Hindenburg, Ludendorff and their critics as to the conduct of the former during the period with which I am here chiefly concerned, and material has not been lacking.”-Author’s Preface.
If in a short-term perspective the battle of Algiers was an operational success since the terrorist attacks ended by the of fall 1957, the different methods used to gather intelligence proved to be strategically counterproductive and left an open wound on the French Society. In 1956, both internal and international political situations favored the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN). In August, during a clandestine meeting in the Soummam valley (Kabylie), the FLN decided to direct the fighting against the European population in urban areas. Such an intensification of the conflict was aimed at winning a decisive battle: bringing the terror to Algiers was perceived as the last step before the independence. Facing a paralysis of regular courses of action, the French reacted to the terrorist wave by giving the military extraordinary police powers. Jacques Massu’s 10th Para Division implemented radical methods. From 20 January to 31 March 1957, it succeeded in disorganizing the whole insurgency (first battle). However, the tactical victory against terrorism was as blatant as it proved to be short-lived. Facing a resuming tactical threat, General Massu entrusted Colonel Yves Godard with the AOR of Algiers (second battle). If the first battle was fought using bloody swords, the second one, based on infiltration and disinformation operations, proved to be a surgical operation using scalpels. On 8 October 1957, the battle of Algiers ended. In a blurred conflict that belonged neither to police operations nor to conventional war, the legal black hole ineluctably led to the temptation of committing illegal acts. Paul Aussarresses and Yves Godard embodied the two opposite approaches that are distinguishable during the battle. Pushing the justification of illegal violence to the limit, Aussarresses represents the dark face of COIN operations while Godard repeatedly stated that there was no need to use torture.
The purpose of this paper is to answer two questions. The first question is: Is it feasible to use airborne forces to penetrate enemy airspace and to conduct a vertical envelopment to effect deep operational maneuver? If it is feasible, what are the employment options available for the use of such an airborne force in the conduct of a modern military campaign? To examine these questions, the paper begins with some definitions to provide a common frame of reference. The use of airborne forces in World War II is next examined to determine if the use of airborne forces to effect deep operational maneuver is historically feasible. Next, the contemporary threat is discussed as it is relevant to the employment of airborne forces in a modern context. Next, the feasibility of the use of airborne forces with some limitations to conduct deep operational maneuver is established in the context of the maneuver, firepower, and protection aspects of the combat power model. Next, the theory of deep operations and the use of airborne forces to conduct these kinds of deep maneuvers is examined in the theories of Clausewitz, Jomini, Tukhachevskiy, Triandafillov, and Simpkin. Next, six employment options for the use of airborne forces to conduct deep operations in a modern context are deduced. They are: (1) an airborne force can be used to create a second front within a theater of operations; (2) an airborne force can be used to operationally contain an enemy force targeted for destruction within a theater of operations; (3) an airborne force can be used to seize a “bridgehead”...; (4) an airborne force can conduct coups de main against high value targets within a theater of operations; (5) an airborne force can conduct light operations in a theater of operations to disrupt and disorganize the enemy’s rear facilities and networks and have a cumulative operational impact; and (6) an airborne force can conduct expeditionary operations to achieve political, strategic, and operational aims
George Bell was a young Irishman of only seventeen when he undertook his first campaign in the British Army. Recruits were sorely needed to fill the ranks after the sanguinary battle of Albuera in 1811. He joined his regiment, the 34th or Cumberland Gentlemen, forthwith and so his military career started in some of the hardest fighting of the Peninsular War. In the thick of it at the siege of Badajoz, Arroyo Molinos, and Vittoria, he was part of General Rowland Hill’s division as the British troops battled northward toward the French frontier. He was heavily engaged in the battles of the Pyrenees, the Nive, the Nivelle, Bayonne and Toulouse. Of each he leaves a good sketch of the action that he and his comrades took part in, but is careful only to record what he saw. Between the deadly engagements with the French, or “Johnny Crappo”, as Bell and his men know him, Bell leaves a rich account of the daily life of a young subaltern in the war: often ill-provided for, hungry, and frequently unable to find shelter, prey to petty thieves. Additionally, the misadventures of his men (or more often their wives, who accompanied the march) provided for much amusement and not a little trouble! After the successful conclusion of the Peninsular campaign, George returns to his native Ireland for a brief period of half-pay, champing at the bit to get back on full pay, and then sets off with his newly wed wife to India. His descriptions of the colonial life are vivid and varied, as he dodges sun-stroke, ill-intentioned servants, fever, disease and cobras. He travels far and wide leaving accounts of Seringaptam, Madras, Bangalore, Bombay, Burma, and Rangoon in particular. The local populace and their cultures are described in some detail, along with the buildings, religious practices, the political figures and royal families. Bell’s books brim with interesting and witty asides and anecdotes, and it is clear that he took to the lighter side of life during his many travels. He is not a stuffed shirt of the old breed, and avoids much of the Victorian coldness in his writing, although supremely confident of his superiority in religious contexts. An animated and vibrant read. Author – Major-General George Bell – (1794 - 1877)
This thesis is an analysis of General Van Cleve and his division to determine the proximate causes for their failure to withstand the brutal test of combat throughout the two-day battle. The thesis begins with a discussion of the importance of the study of war in order to draw out lessons which are still pertinent to today's officer. The thesis then briefly describes the weapons, tactics, organization, and staff available to a division commander during the American Civil War. The thesis continues with an examination of the backgrounds and combat experiences of Brigadier General Van Cleve, his staff, and his brigade and regimental commanders. The backgrounds and combat experiences of the regiments which comprised the division are also evaluated. Thereafter, the thesis analyzes the performance of General Van Cleve and his division beginning with their first combat action at the Battle of Stones River and culminates with an in-depth study of the division's performance at Chickamauga. The fog of war impacted negatively on Van Cleve's ability to control his men, yet his own personal shortcomings ultimately doomed the division to failure.
These two volumes form the official biography of Sir Henry Wilson, a key figure in the British Army during the First World War, who was a passionate “Westerner” and advocate of the Anglo-French alliance. Major-General C. E. Callwell recounts the story of the outspoken, opinionated and well connected Field Marshal using extensive quotes from his diary, often dripping with acerbic wit, in the greatest of detail. “Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, an Irishman who in June 1922 was assassinated on his doorstep in London by Irish republicans, was one of the most controversial British soldiers of that age. Before 1914 he did much to secure the Anglo-French alliance and was responsible for the planning which saw the British Expeditionary Force successfully despatched to France after the outbreak of war with Germany. A passionate Irish unionist, he gained a reputation as an intensely ‘political’ soldier, especially during the ‘Curragh crisis’ of 1914 when some officers resigned their commissions rather than coerce Ulster unionists into a Home Rule Ireland. During the war he played a major role in Anglo-French liaison, and ended up as Chief of the Imperial General Staff, professional head of the army, a post he held until February 1922. After Wilson retired from the army, he became an MP and was chief security adviser to the new Northern Ireland government. As such, he became a target for nationalist Irish militants, being identified with the security policies of the Belfast regime, though wrongly with Protestant sectarian attacks on Catholics. He is remembered today in unionist Northern Ireland as a kind of founding martyr for the state. Wilson’s reputation was ruined in 1927 with the publication of an official biography, which quoted extensively and injudiciously from his entertaining, indiscreet, and wildly opinionated diaries, giving the impression that he was some sort of Machiavellian monster.”-Professor Keith Jeffrey.
A first-hand account by one of the participants in the epoch shaping battle of Austerlitz, in December 1805. Accounted by many to be Napoleon's finest victory, this account is alleged to contain his own commentaries in the text by Major-General von Stutterheim. Von Stutterheim's text is balanced and free from bias despite being written by a serving member of the Austrian military. Added to the text are the notes of a “French officer”, most likely to have been Napoleon himself, who dissects the decisions that he and his opponents took during the battle giving the book an insight into the mind of the world’s greatest general.
This is the most complete guide to the First World War Battlefield of Ypres that has ever been published. Tonie and Valmai Holt, have condensed the knowledge gained from almost a quarter of a century of researching, writing about, visiting and conducting groups around Ypres into this remarkable book. Here are concise descriptions of the military elements of the battles woven into a kaleidoscope of human, literary and travel information. There are recommended, timed itineraries, in each itinerary representing one day's travelling. Every stop on the routes has an accompanying description and often a tale of heroic or tragic action.Memorials large and small, private and official, sites of memorable conflict, the resting places of personalities of note - they are all here and joined together by a sympathetic and understanding commentary that gives the reader a sensitivity toward the events of 1914-1918 that can only be matched by visiting the battlefield itself. This is a guide book written by people who, because they have been directly involved in taking tours themselves, know the form and type of information that best serves the visitor to the battlefield. NEW, FULLY UPDATED EDITION PACKAGED WITH A FREE, FULL COLOUR FOLD-OUT MAP WORTH '3.99
This book outlines how to reorganize the U.S. Army into a fully 2 and 3-Dimensional maneuver capable, ground force with terrain-agile, armored fighting vehicles sized to rapidly deploy by fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft to the scene of world conflicts and strike at the heart of freedom‚s enemies. The plan to build the Army into Air-Mech-Strike Forces, exploiting emerging information-age technologies, as well as America‚s supremacy in aircraft and helicopter delivery systems---at the lowest cost to the taxpayers, is described in detail. These Army warfighting organizations, using existing and some newly purchased equipment, will shape the battlefield to America‚s advantage, preserving the peace before it is lost; if not, then winning fights that must be fought quickly. The dangerous world we live in moves by the speed of the AIR, and the 21st Century U.S. Army 2D/3D combat team will dominate this medium by Air-Mech-Strike!
Includes more than 14 maps and Illustrations Armies of the North and South fought the Battle of Wilson’s Creek about ten miles southwest of Springfield, Missouri, on Saturday, 10 Aug. 1861...While the action at Wilson’s Creek was small compared to that at Gettysburg or Chickamauga, it remains significant and useful to students of military history. ...The Union defeat in battle and the death of General Nathaniel Lyon, so closely following the disaster at First Bull Run, caused the North to adopt a more serious attitude about the war and to realize that victory would come only with detailed planning and proper resourcing. Thus, the Union reinforced Missouri with soldiers and weapons during the fall and winter of 1861-62, while the Confederacy applied its scanty resources elsewhere. Although the exiled pro-Confederate state government voted to secede and sent delegates to Richmond, Virginia, Missouri effectively remained in the Union. Any questions about Missouri’s fate were settled at the Battle of Pea Ridge in March 1862, when Union forces turned back the last significant Confederate threat to Missouri. Wilson’s Creek was a “first battle” for most of the soldiers who fought there. First battles often provide armies with special insights into the application of military art and science, and Wilson’s Creek was no exception. The Mexican War model of organization and combined arms battle was generally confirmed, but some key observations relating to technology and command and control emerged as well...In addition, artillery proved decisive at several key moments during the fighting. Cavalry, on its part, proved to be much less valuable, and this fact hinted at lessons to be learned later in the Civil War. Ultimately, the infantry of both sides played out the drama, and many of the most useful insights came from that branch.
This monograph offers a new perspective on an old subject. That is why did Napoleon’s marshals, so successful in corps command, fail when given an independent army command? It examines in detail the defeats of Marshal Nicolas Charles Oudinot at Gross Beeren, Marshal Etienne MacDonald at Katzbach, and Marshal Michel Ney at Dennewitz. Many authors have speculated why these marshals failed in independent tactical command. They have offered such reasons as lack of talent, lack of guidance from Napoleon or the failure to understand the nature of Napoleonic warfare. While these reasons are valid, they are contributing factors rather than the primary reason for the failure of napoleon’s marshals. A thorough analysis of Napoleon’s Correspondences for the period 10 August through 8 September 1813 reveals that Napoleon did provide adequate guidance to his subordinate commanders. A detailed study of the actions of all three marshals in both movement to and conduct during battle reveals that they in fact understood the nature of Napoleonic warfare. Certainly lack of talent was not the problem as each had been very successful in combat for twenty-two years. The primary reason that these marshals failed was their inability to command and control their forces. Lack of adequate staffs and an inability to make the intellectual leap from corps to army command proved to be their downfall.
The United States’ current strategic environment is increasingly complex, with security, economic, and humanitarian interests around the world. Consequently, the United States’ military may be called upon at any time to perform missions ranging from peacekeeping to total war, in environments ranging from the desserts of South West Asia to the jungles of Central America, against enemies ranging from Somali warlords to Chinese divisions. This uncertainty prevents the United States’ military from organizing, equipping, and training for any specific situation. Therefore, to be successful the United States military must be capable of quickly adapting to the particulars of its mission when called. In the late 1800’s England found itself in much the same position, with its military engaged around the world protecting its diverse and widely-dispersed interests. In 1899 when it went to war against the Boers it found its military unsuited for the South African terrain, the effects of modern weaponry, and the unconventional Boer tactics. This paper examines the British military’s strategy and tactics, and how they changed throughout the war. Ultimately it determines that the British failed to adapt their strategy and tactics effectively throughout the war. Although their performance varied from commander to commander, and from unit to unit, the British typically resisted change, for various reasons, even when the need for change was pressing.
As Adolf Hitler conquered most of the European continent in 1939-1941, the small island of Crete in the Mediterranean Sea became vital to future operations in the Mediterranean region for both the Axis and Allied powers. If the Allies controlled Crete, their air and sea superiority would not allow the Germans a strategic military foothold in the region. For the Germans, Crete would secure the Aegean Sea for Axis shipping, loosen Great Britain’s grasp in the eastern Mediterranean Sea and provide air bases to launch offensives against British forces in Egypt. Therefore, the central research question is: Did the results of the German campaign in Crete justify its execution? The operational results of the German campaign in Crete and the strategic advantages gained from its success did not justify the execution of the battle. Although Germany’s conquest of Crete achieved all of the strategic advantages, Hitler did not accomplish the strategic objectives set forth at the beginning of the campaign. Crete was not used as a staging base from which to engage the British in offensive operations against the Suez Canal or North Africa. German losses to the highly trained air corps were staggering and Hitler never again employed parachutists on a large-scale airborne operation. Future war efforts were deprived of this elite, highly mobile striking force. Hitler did not capitalize on the hard fought victory in Crete by using the island as a stepping-stone, ultimately controlling the eastern Mediterranean region because he was hypnotized by the invasion of Russia.
The German victory in France at the onset of the Second World War was sudden, brutal and brilliant; by contrast the British and French preparations were miserable, faulty, badly carried through and fraught with mistrust. In the midst of these Allied responses was the eminent liaison officer Major-General Sir Edward Louis Spears, sent by the new prime Minister Winston Churchill to be his representative to the French Prime Minister. Spears was very well suited to his role as he had seen much military service and he had served in a senior liaison capacity between the British and French armies during the First World War. Keenly observant, well connected, urbane and respected by many of the French politicians and generals, his two volume memoirs are justly famous.
This study details the events of 10 May 1940 at Fort Eben Emael, Belgium, and the elements which led to the successful seizure of the fort by the German military. The central focus of this thesis is the following question: Was the use of emerging technologies the key to victory at Fort Eben Emael? First, the study focuses on the technologies themselves. Secondly, this study examines the leadership and training of the German unit assigned the mission at Fort Eben Emael. Lastly, this study examines administration and personnel issues that existed for the Belgians stationed at Fort Eben Emael. This study determined that the glider did afford troops the advantage of surprise; however, the hollow charge failed to live up to its reputation as it was most effective when used in such a way that it was no different than a conventional charge. Further, the German unit’s training and leadership was exemplary and contributed more to the mission’s success than the technologies the unit employed. Additionally, Fort Eben Emael was faced with serious internal issues that prevented a successful defence of the fort. Therefore, this thesis concludes that emerging technologies were not the most crucial component contributing to mission success.
First Published in 1973. Forming part of a collection on general African studies, this text presents records of the Gold Coast Settlements from 1750 to 1874, by the Colonial Secretary of Sierra Leone, Major Crooks. It covers the period from the formation of the last African Company of Merchants in 1750 until the conclusion of the third Ashantee War in 1874.
Includes over 50 photos and 35 maps. THIS IS THE CONCLUDING VOLUME of a five-part series dealing with operations of United States Marines in Korea between 2 August 1950 and 27 July 1953. Volume V provides a definitive account of operations of the 1st Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing during 1952–1953, the final phase of the Korean War. At this time the division operated under Eighth U.S. Army in Korea (EUSAK) control in the far western sector of I Corps, while Marine aviators and squadrons functioned as a component of the Fifth Air Force (FAF). “MENTION THE KOREAN WAR and almost immediately it evokes the memory of Marines at Pusan, Inchon, Chosin Reservoir, or the Punchbowl. Americans everywhere remember the Marine Corps’ combat readiness, courage, and military skills that were largely responsible for the success of these early operations in 1950–1951. Not as dramatic or well-known are the important accomplishments of the Marines during the latter part of the Korean War. In March 1952 the 1st Marine Division redeployed from the East-Central front to West Korea. This new sector, nearly 35 miles in length, anchored the far western end of I Corps and was one of the most critical of the entire Eighth Army line. Here the Marines blocked the enemy’s goal of penetrating to Seoul, the South Korean capital. Northwest of the Marine Main Line of Resistance, less than five miles distant, lay Panmunjom, site of the sporadic truce negotiations. Whatever guise the enemy of the United States chooses or wherever he draws his battleline, he will find the Marines with their age-old answer. Today, as in the Korean era, Marine Corps readiness and professionalism are prepared to apply the cutting edge against any threat of American security.”-Gen. Chapman
Includes more than 30 maps, plans and diagrams The world-renowned military expert Major-General J.F.C. Fuller DSO, noted for his many works on military strategy, tactics and history, turns his attention to the famed Royal Tank Corps of World War I. He was in a particularly good position to write such a work as he served from 1916 as part of the Tanks Corps and planned the famous tank attack at Cambrai in 1917, he also took a leading role in the planning of the 1918 autumn offensives that broke the back of German resistance and ended the War. He covers in comprehensively the development of the tank, mechanical characteristics of early British tanks, particularly the Mark I, as well as the early battles at the Somme and Ancre. He also describes the growth of the Tank Corps itself, tank tactics, tank engineering plus the tank battles in 1917-1918. There are also appreciations of German, French and American tank activities.
From the day he was born until the day he dies, author Louis W. Prentiss Jr., a retired major general, will have been a member of the Army; it's an integral part of his life. In Memories of a Life in the Army, he shares a collection of vignettes collected from his career in the military service. Humorous, poignant, and interesting, the stories and anecdotes narrate the path of Prentiss' life's journey through the military-from California to Omaha, Reno, Virginia, Germany, Korea, Peru, Vietnam, and Maryland. He details his memories of his family, the venues in which he lived, his schooling at West Point as an Army Cadet, and some of the places he served during his thirty-one year career. With photos included, Memories of a Life in the Army provides insight into a young man who grew up in a unique environment at that time in history.
The German victory in France at the onset of the Second World War was sudden, brutal and brilliant; by contrast the British and French preparations were miserable, faulty, badly carried through and fraught with mistrust. In the midst of these Allied responses was the eminent liaison officer Major-General Sir Edward Louis Spears, sent by the new prime Minister Winston Churchill to be his representative to the French Prime Minister. Spears was very well suited to his role as he had seen much military service and he had served in a senior liaison capacity between the British and French armies during the First World War. Keenly observant, well connected, urbane and respected by many of the French politicians and generals, his two volume memoirs are justly famous.
In 1954 the French Armed Forces began a campaign in Algeria against the insurgent Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) which had started a bloody uprising against French sovereignty. Initially, the French military did not have a viable counterinsurgency doctrine that was effective in defeating the FLN and destroying its network. It took them four years of trial and error to develop a doctrine and operational concept able to defeat the FLN inside Algeria and prevent outside assistance from reconstituting the FLN. By 1960 it was apparent the FLN could not win the liberation of Algeria militarily. However, the political situation respective to France and Algeria internally and internationally by then had changed to the point that military operations in the field were not going to affect the political outcome in Algeria. The French Armed Forces took too long to adopt an effective doctrine to combat the insurgent threat and by the time they were effective it was irrelevant. Currently the U.S. is in occupation of Iraq and exercising sovereignty in that state. The U.S. Armed Forces are conducting counterinsurgency operations to defeat and dismantle the Former Regime Loyalists and various Islamic fundamentalist organizations inside the country. U.S. Armed Forces do not have an overarching counterinsurgency doctrine that is applicable to their operations in Iraq and similar to the French in Algeria they are going through a learning process. It is the author’s assertion that by studying the French experience in Algeria the U.S. Armed Forces can learn from the mistakes and victories of the French and hasten the learning process for counterinsurgency operations in Iraq. The French experience in Algeria demonstrates what can happen when a military takes too long to adapt to a changed battlefield.
The home my family occupied after we moved to Kingston was situated along the route taken by dignitaries on their way to Jamaica House, the Prime Ministers official residence. As a result of this fortuitous bit of luck, we never had to join the throng at the airport eagerly awaiting Queen Elizabeth, Emperor Haile Selassie or other important visitors to our island; we merely had to wait by our gate for the motorcade and wave furiously as they drove by, escorted by the police and a line of other official cars. I was a teenager then and although the excitement was undeniable, other issues held my attention. Jamaica was changing, an independent country gradually shedding the mantle of colonialism and on the cusp of forging a new identity. The Black Green and Gold was everywhere along with a sense of pride and all the possibilities the future held and I needed to find my place in this new country. Little did I know then how much my life would change, that in time I would be a part of that inner circle greeting official guests to Jamaica and meeting with the Prime Minister at his residence. This then is my story, written not only as an observer but an active participant in events of the still unfolding tale that is Jamaica. To my humble parents who without treasure gave the best they had to give, a love that has solidified the bond between their children; to my wife and sons and finally to the men and women of the Jamaica Defense Force with whom I served proudly for more than half of my life. And to the active soldiers and reservists who continue to serve in this their finest calling, to defend the honor of their country.
The seminal treatise on Generalship, by Major-General Fuller, reputed to have been the most formative book in General Patton’s military training which he kept with him at all times. “IN the summer of 1921 I was lunching at the Restaurant la Rue with the Deputy Chief of the French General staff when he told me the following story: At the battle of Waterloo, Colonel Clement, an infantry commander, fought with the most conspicuous bravery; but unfortunately was shot through the head. Napoleon, hearing of his gallantry and misfortune, gave instructions for him to be carried into a farm where Larrey the surgeon-general was operating. One glance convinced Larrey that his case was desperate, so taking up a saw he removed the top of his skull and placed his brains on the table. Just as he had finished, in rushed an aide-de-camp, shouting: ‘Is General Clement here?’ Clement, hearing him, sat up and exclaimed: ‘No! but Colonel Clement is.’ ‘Oh, mon général,’ cried the aide-de-camp, embracing him, ‘the Emperor was overwhelmed when we heard of your gallantry, and has promoted you on the field of battle to the rank of General,’ Clement rubbed his eyes, got off the table, clapped the top of his skull on his head and was about to leave the farm, when Larrey shouted after him: ‘Mon général—your brains!’ To which the gallant Frenchman, increasing his speed, shouted back: ‘Now that I am a general I shall no longer require them!’ In this modest study, my object is to prove that, though Clement was wrong about brains, without his courage there can be no true generalship.”-Foreword.
This work is a detailed historical study of the Second World War’s little known Aleutian Campaign in the North Pacific, commonly referred to as the “Forgotten War.” After describing the events that transpired in the North Pacific throughout the war, this work focuses on the strategic reasons why the United States and Japan decided to dedicate critical and limited resources to a secondary effort in the North Pacific. The strategies are compared to determine which country dedicated a higher percentage of available manpower and resources to the region and which country gained an advantage from their respective propaganda efforts. Despite the United States’ tactical and operational victories in the North Pacific, the Japanese benefited at the strategic level. Secondary theaters of operations, like the Aleutians during World War II, produced many lessons that were applied to other theaters during the war and remain relevant today in the Global War on Terrorism.
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