Could Napoleon have won the battle of Waterloo? And what would have happened if he had? Or suppose Nelson had not destroyed the French fleet at Aboukir, would Napoleon have conquered India and become Emperor of the East? What if Hitler had not halted his panzer forces before Dunkirk and had entrapped the entire British Expeditionary Force? How would Churchill have then denied the Wehrmacht? If by chance Hitler had been assassinated in 1944 and the German General Staff taken control, would there have been a totally different kind of surrender? In examining these and other contingencies, Major General Strawson brings his experience of command in war and his skill as a military historian to present us with an enthralling catalogue of chance and speculation, while emphasising how profoundly the character of commanders influenced events and how events affected their character.
Could Napoleon have won the battle of Waterloo? And what would have happened if he had? Or suppose Nelson had not destroyed the French fleet at Aboukir, would Napoleon have conquered India and become Emperor of the East? What if Hitler had not halted his panzer forces before Dunkirk and had entrapped the entire British Expeditionary Force? How would Churchill have then denied the Wehrmacht? If by chance Hitler had been assassinated in 1944 and the German General Staff taken control, would there have been a totally different kind of surrender? In examining these and other contingencies, Major General Strawson brings his experience of command in war and his skill as a military historian to present us with an enthralling catalogue of chance and speculation, while emphasising how profoundly the character of commanders influenced events and how events affected their character.
This study is an historical analysis of the operational methods of two men who commanded large military formations with great success during World War II: Colonel-General Heinz W. Guderian of the German Army; and General George S. Patton, Jr. of the American Army. The focus of the study is on each man’s conduct of operational art, the connecting link between tactics and strategy. The study analyzes the writings and campaigns of Guderian and Patton and attempts to identify the tenets or principles by which each man guided his conduct of Operational art. The study then compares the tenets each man applied in his conduct of warfare to discover whether there were any principles common to their operational methods. Finally, the study suggests what implications common tenets at the operational level of war might have for Airland Battle Doctrine. The study concludes that Guderian and Patton shared six common tenets in their conduct of operational art and suggests that the American Army’s current organizations at the division and corps levels may not be suitable to conduct the sort of agile operations that will be required on a future battlefield. As well, we must ensure that doctrinal foundations for joint operations involving air and ground forces-as a minimum-are in place before war breaks out. It also suggests that we need to get together with our European Allies and adopt a common doctrinal approach to warfighting in Western Europe, one that supports a common theater strategy. Finally, the study concludes that the American Army should continue to study the history of warfare and learn its lessons.
Specially trained teams, known as Jedburghs, were inserted into France in conjunction with Operation “Overlord,” to help liberate it from German occupation. The Jedburghs were three-man allied teams, comprised of two commissioned officers, (at least one French) and a non-commissioned officer in charge of the radio (wireless telegraphy). All Jedburghs were volunteers. They received highly specialized training in guerrilla warfare. Jedburghs served in harm’s way, deep behind enemy lines. They were subordinate to the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), and its commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Their covert mission in Operation “Overlord” helped pave the way for the liberation of France, and ultimately resulted in a campaign to free Europe from Nazi rule. This study explores the origins, purpose, training and missions of the Jedburghs. I will examine the actual operations of seven Jedburgh teams in Eastern Brittany. Their actions and effectiveness will be compared with operations of other Jedburgh teams.
Includes the War in North Africa Illustration Pack - 112 photos/illustrations and 21 maps. This study analyzes the Army’s doctrinal definition of the battlefield framework through examination of British operations against the Italians in North Africa during the period, June 1940 through February 1941. This example illustrates how commanders can consider the battlefield framework in organizing combat power. The study examines how commanders at the tactical and operational levels of war use the concepts of area of operations, battle space, and battlefield organization. This study also shows why tactical and operational commanders must consider each other’s battlefield framework. It shows how actions in one commander’s framework affects the other’s. This study analyzes, through the battlefield framework, General Wavell’s actions as the operational commander and their effects on the tactical commander, Lieutenant General O’Connor. Additionally, the study analyzes Lieutenant General O’Connor’s battlefield framework and how actions at the tactical level created opportunities for the operational commander.
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