This is the definitive account of the history of the U.S. Army’s 11th Airborne Division (The Angels) from 1943-1946, by then-Major Edward M. Flanagan, Jr. who served with that division in the Pacific War. “The Division was activated at Camp Mackall, N. Carolina on Feb. 25, 1943, and was composed of former glider and veteran Airborne troops. Upon activation, the Division began intensive training to get the glider troops jump-qualified, and the Division was ready to move overseas in early 1944. Sent first to New Guinea for training in jungle combat, the Division took part in the Leyte landings in the Philippines in Nov. 1944. Moving inland, the unit relieved the battle-weary 24th and 37th Inf. Divs. with the mission to clear a mountain pass from Burauen to Ormoc. It took 3 months of bitter fighting, often hand-to-hand, to drive the Japanese defenders from the pass and surrounding heights. In late January, 1945, the 11th went back into action after a short rest, landing at Nasgubu Beach, Luzon, 70 miles from Manila. Their objective was to remove enemy opposition from a major highway and link with Allied forces attacking Manila. After capturing Fort McKinley and Nichols field, the 11th launched their assault on Manila joining the 1st Cav. Div. and the 37th Inf. Div. who were attacking from the North. Once the capitol was secured, the 11th made a daring raid behind enemy lines and freed more than 2,100 Allied civilian and military POWs from the Los Baños Internment Camp, considered one of the most successful rescues in military history. Following the Los Baños raid, the 11th Airborne spent the next few weeks mopping up resistance in southern Luzon. In May, 1945, the Division began preparations for the expected invasion of Japan, but with Japan's surrender in August, the Division instead moved to Okinawa to escort Gen. Douglas MacArthur into Japan. The 11th Airborne remained in Japan until 1949 before returning to the U.S.”-print ed.
This is the definitive account of the history of the U.S. Army’s 11th Airborne Division (The Angels) from 1943-1946, by then-Major Edward M. Flanagan, Jr. who served with that division in the Pacific War. “The Division was activated at Camp Mackall, N. Carolina on Feb. 25, 1943, and was composed of former glider and veteran Airborne troops. Upon activation, the Division began intensive training to get the glider troops jump-qualified, and the Division was ready to move overseas in early 1944. Sent first to New Guinea for training in jungle combat, the Division took part in the Leyte landings in the Philippines in Nov. 1944. Moving inland, the unit relieved the battle-weary 24th and 37th Inf. Divs. with the mission to clear a mountain pass from Burauen to Ormoc. It took 3 months of bitter fighting, often hand-to-hand, to drive the Japanese defenders from the pass and surrounding heights. In late January, 1945, the 11th went back into action after a short rest, landing at Nasgubu Beach, Luzon, 70 miles from Manila. Their objective was to remove enemy opposition from a major highway and link with Allied forces attacking Manila. After capturing Fort McKinley and Nichols field, the 11th launched their assault on Manila joining the 1st Cav. Div. and the 37th Inf. Div. who were attacking from the North. Once the capitol was secured, the 11th made a daring raid behind enemy lines and freed more than 2,100 Allied civilian and military POWs from the Los Baños Internment Camp, considered one of the most successful rescues in military history. Following the Los Baños raid, the 11th Airborne spent the next few weeks mopping up resistance in southern Luzon. In May, 1945, the Division began preparations for the expected invasion of Japan, but with Japan's surrender in August, the Division instead moved to Okinawa to escort Gen. Douglas MacArthur into Japan. The 11th Airborne remained in Japan until 1949 before returning to the U.S.”-print ed.
Given the focus on the Brigade Combat Team as the Army’s primary combat unit, the limited availability of U.S. Air Force airlift assets, and the U.S. Army history of employing predominantly medium sized airborne units, future airborne operations in support of operational level objectives will likely center around the Airborne Brigade Combat Team (ABCT). The combat airborne operations of the 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment will provide a case study to assess the elements of risk, surprise and the operational context of how the airborne unit contributed to the achievement the operational and strategic outcomes. The combat airborne operations discussed are the jump to re-take the island of Corregidor in the Philippines in February 1945, Operation Junction City in February 1967, and the airborne insertion of the 173d Airborne Brigade onto the Bashur airfield in Northern Iraq in March 2003. The intent of this monograph is to provide insights into the possible employment of the current ABCT and how to best use the resources and organization that we have, not necessarily to advocate a radically new airborne organization, propose new equipment, or recommend a new mission for airborne forces.
This study investigates what effect the evolution of urban combat from World War II to the present has had on current urban combat doctrine. Urban combat operations have played a pivotal role in the conflicts of the twentieth century, and will continue to be a crucial part of future U.S. power projection operations. It is imperative that lessons learned from previous urban combat operations be studied for applicability to current urban combat doctrine. The study analyzes the urban battles of Aachen, Manila, Seoul, Hue, JUST CAUSE, and Mogadishu to identify salient lessons for conducting successful offensive urban combat operations; then reviews current U.S. Army urban combat doctrine. The study then evaluates current doctrine using identified salient lessons to determine their effect. The study finds that the primary impacts of previous urban combat operations on current doctrine are that doctrine now embraces the idea of varied conditions for urban combat and validates the concept of fighting as a combined arms team in a built-up area. The study further finds that FM 90-10, Military Operations on Urban Terrain is obsolete, and that key procurement decisions have left U.S. forces without critical weapons that have proven decisive in urban combat.
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