This study is an historical analysis of the Soviet operational use of tank and mechanized corps, and tank armies, in the deliberate defense at the Battle of Kursk in 1943. It centers on the question of how effective was the Red Army in employing these units during this momentous battle. Events that shaped the battle and a brief comparison of forces set the stage. A discussion of the actual battle on the Central and Voronezh Fronts is followed by an analysis of the effectiveness of the employment of the operational armored units. The battle analysis methodology as promulgated by the Combat Studies Institute at the United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, established the guidelines for the study. Both Western and Soviet sources were utilized. Objectivity and compatibility of all available source material were of paramount importance in establishing the validity and accuracy of various accounts. The study concludes the Soviets prepared superbly for the operational battle; however, execution fell short of expectations. Because this was the first time the Soviets used tank armies in battle, an analysis of Kursk serves as an excellent catalyst for subsequent examination of present Soviet defensive doctrine and the use of tank armies in defense.
When the German Ardennes Offensive of December 1944 ruptured the front of the U.S. First Army, Major General Troy Middleton committed his VIII Corps to the defense of selected transportation bottlenecks in the path of the German advance. St. Vith, located in the central sector of the Ardennes battleground, was one of these. Although by passed by German spearheads bound for the Meuse River, the 7th Armored Division (plus major elements of three other divisions) held the position against major elements of two German Panzer armies. After six days of tenacious defense while practically encircled, the St. Vith force was ordered to withdraw. The defenders of St. Vith prevented the Germans from effectively supplying their armored spearheads, drew off their follow-on forces, and bought time for the U.S. First Army to consolidate its position on the north flank of the German penetration.
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