While most historians and critics have focused on the treatise, Judith Major gives equal emphasis to Downing's spirited monthly editorials in the Horticulturist. In the journal, Downing "spoke American" and encouraged his countrymen and women to practice economy, to use America's rich natural resources wisely yet artfully, to be content with a little cottage and a few fine native trees.
Over one hundred and eighty thousand black men fought for the Union during America’s Civil War. From infantrymen, to artillerist and cavalry soldiers, these soldiers combined to form one hundred and sixty-six Union regiments. On 29 October 1862 at Island Mound, Missouri, the First Kansas Colored Volunteers, an infantry regiment comprised mainly of blacks from Kansas and Missouri, became the first black regiment to experience combat during the Civil War. Their courage and outstanding performance in battle, as recorded, are unquestioned. What have been omitted from research thus far are their contributions to overall Union successes in the Trans-Mississippi West. Their accomplishments are remarkable, for they came in the face of extreme obstacles of prejudice and hatred. “No Quarter” was ever given and “No Quarter” was asked of the regiment’s black soldiers. The contributions of the First Kansas Colored Volunteers, in conjunction with those of the many regiments they served alongside of, resulted in a resounding Union victory in the Trans-Mississippi West.
This study is an analysis of Confederate cavalry operations in the Valley Campaign-5 November 1861 through 10 June 1862. In a campaign dominated by the leadership of Major General Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson and his “foot cavalry,” what role did his mounted arm play in the campaign? This study begins with a brief review of the historical evolution of American cavalry, explaining the differences between American and European cavalry. The study also includes background information on key issues of the campaign's cavalry leadership, organization, logistics, and tactics. The majority of the thesis discussion concerns the campaign's cavalry operations, including an evaluation of the cavalry's performance. The conclusion of the thesis is that Jackson’s cavalry arm significantly contributed to the Confederate success in the campaign. Cavalry contributions were strongest at the operational level of war. Despite their contributions, the cavalry was inefficient. Organizational turmoil, poor logistical support, high operations tempo, and limited training worked in concert to reduce efficiency. Although completed over one hundred years ago, the cavalry operations of Shenandoah Valley Campaign has some particular lessons-learned that still apply today. Among these are support for the soldier in the field, innovation and improvisation, combat leadership, leadership development, and training.
This work comprises an effort to answer the question of how an airman can be qualified to be a Joint Force Commander, using the biographical example of General Roy S. Geiger, USMC. Geiger was the fifth designated Marine Aviator, earning his wings in June of 1917. He then served as a squadron commander in the First Marine Aviation Force in World War I (WW I), where he flew combat sorties and earned his first Navy Cross. In the interwar years, he served in multiple command billets, acted as head of Marine Aviation, and performed with distinction as a student at the Army Command and General Staff School and the Army and Navy War Colleges. During World War II, Geiger commanded the First Marine Aircraft Wing and the CACTUS Air Force in the dark days of the Guadalcanal Campaign in 1942, where at age fifty-seven he again flew in combat, earning his second Navy Cross. He went on to serve as an Amphibious Corps Commander in the Pacific Theater, where he led campaigns at Bougainville, Guam, and Peleliu. Finally, he distinguished himself in the battle of Okinawa as the only Marine ever to command a field Army, the Tenth Army. After World War II, Lieutenant General Geiger continued to shape the Marine Corps in command of Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific until his premature death in 1947. The study is a chronological account of the life of Roy Geiger, with a focus on his leadership traits, extensive professional military education, remarkable joint relationships, and innovation, all of which contributed to his success as a Joint Force Commander. The author argues that Geiger was the most influential Marine aviator and among the most successful operational commanders in the history of the United States Marine Corps. Roy Geiger was the prototype for a Joint Force Commander.
Overshadowed in the popular imagination by the figure of Oliver Cromwell, historians are increasingly coming to recognize the importance of Thomas Fairfax, 3rd Lord Fairfax of Cameron, in shaping the momentous events of mid-seventeenth-century Britain. As both a military and political figure he played a central role in first defeating Charles I and then later supporting the restoration of his son in 1660. England’s Fortress shines new light on this significant yet surprisingly understudied figure through a selection of essays addressing a wide range of topics, from military history to poetry. Divided into two sections, the volume reflects key aspects of Fairfax’s life and career which are, nevertheless, as interconnecting as they are discrete: Fairfax the soldier and statesman, and Fairfax the husband, horseman and scholar. This fresh account of Fairfax’s reputations and legacy questions assumptions about neatly demarcated seventeenth-century chronological, geographic and cultural boundaries. What emerges is a man who subverts as much as he reinforces assumed characteristics of martial invincibility, political disengagement and literary dilettantism.
The Tower of Babel narrative is one of the most memorable accounts of the Bible, and its interpretative potential has produced a vast array of literary adaptations. Undoing Babel is the first extensive examination of the development of the Babel narrative amongst Anglo-Saxon authors from late antiquity to the eleventh century. Tristan Major’s illuminating and original insight into Anglo-Latin and Old English works, including the writings of Aldhelm, Bede, Alcuin, Ælfric, and Wulfstan, reveals the cultural ideologies and anxieties that transformed the Babel narrative. In doing so, Major argues that these Babel narratives provide a basis for understanding the world’s ethnic and linguistic diversity as well as a theological stimulus to evangelize non-Christian and non-European people. Undoing Babel highlights the depth of literary innovation in this period and disproves any notion of a single Anglo-Saxon reception of biblical sources.
Despite his significant influence as a courtier, diplomat, playwright and theatre manager, Thomas Killigrew (1612-1683) remains a comparatively elusive and neglected figure. The original essays in this interdisciplinary volume shine new light on a singular, contradictory Englishman 400 years after his birth. They increase our knowledge and deepen our understanding not only of Killigrew himself, but of seventeenth-century dramaturgy, and its complex relationship to court culture and to evolving aesthetic tastes. The first book on Killigrew since 1930, this study re-examines the significant phases of his life and career: the little-known playwriting years of the 1630s; his long exile during the 1640s and 1650s, and its personal, political and literary repercussions; and the period following the Restoration, when, with Sir William Davenant, he enjoyed a monopoly of the London stage. These fresh accounts of Killigrew build on the recent resurgence of interest in royalists and the royalist exile, and underscore literary scholars' continued fascination with the Restoration stage. In the process, they question dominant assumptions about neatly demarcated seventeenth-century chronological, geographic and cultural boundaries. What emerges is a figure who confounds as often as he justifies traditional labels of dilettante, cavalier wit and swindler.
Vivid, first-hand account of a unique and significant World War II all-black U.S. Army unit—the 597th Field Artillery Battalion, 92nd Division. The 597th Field Artillery Battalion, 92nd Division, was the first, last, and only all-black officered direct support field artillery battalion committed to combat in the history of the U.S. Army. It was the first all-black unit in a combat division and, together with the 600th Field Artillery Battalion, constituted the only all-black units in any combat division. Alongside impressive achievements on the battlefield in Italy in 1944–45, the unit provided more key command and staff positions exclusively for black field artillery officers than any other U.S. Army unit in combat, giving combat training and experience to more senior black field artillery officers than any of the other 16 black field artillery battalions during World War II. Colonel Wendell Derricks worked to shelter his troops from the worst of the racism exhibited during the war and, due to his ability to envision an integrated postwar army, he provided unique leadership opportunities for his senior officers. The alumni of the 597th Field Artillery Battalion have an impressive record of success, many of them were inducted into the Field Artillery Hall of Fame; some served at the Pentagon, including Lieutenant Colonel Clark; and others forged successful careers in the civilian world.
This thesis compares and contrasts the field artillery corps of the Army of Northern Virginia and the Army of Tennessee. The purpose is to determine which field artillery corps was more effective on the battlefield and why. To answer this question several areas will be examined. The foundation of each army and its field artillery corps is one of these areas. The foundation includes militia forces, strength, recruiting, and governmental roles in the foundation of each army. The senior leadership of each army and its relationship with the Confederate government will be reviewed. Ordnance, equipment, logistics, and training of each army’s field artillery corps are other areas that will be addressed. Finally, artillery leadership, organization, and tactics of each field artillery corps will be examined.
Barbara Crain Major and Joseph Barndt bring ninety combined years of experience as community organizers, teachers, and anti-racism trainers in community and church settings to this book. In Deconstructing Racism, they propose the deconstruction of racism's roots within systems and institutions that have been created, both structurally and legally, to serve white people. The authors propose that the deconstruction of racism must take place through the reconstruction of these systems and institutions. The authors seek to unmask the complexities of racism and the invisible patterns that keep it in place. There is no quick fix, but they believe racism can be deconstructed and undone. In order to do this, they identify and address race-based identity, history, and cultural issues rooted in current systems. Three chapters specifically address societal systems and provide anti-racism strategies for community organizers. Three chapters address racism as rooted in systems in the church and challenge people of faith to seek racial healing through understanding, honest confession, true reconciliation, and reconstructed church institutions. A final chapter outlines a way forward to and through a new era of anti-racist reconstruction. This way forward includes a new anti-racist mission statement, a new model of decision-making power, and new processes for accountability.
This study concerns an analysis of the Confederate defense of Vicksburg with respect to one of the nine principles of war, the principle of the offensive. The loss of Vicksburg in the American Civil War was a mortal blow to the Confederacy in that it split the south in two and resulted in the opening of the Mississippi River to the Union forces. During the Campaign for Vicksburg General Grant, leading a Union army engaged General Pemberton, commanding a Confederate army, and proceeded to win one of the most brilliant military successes in history. A distinct contrast in aggressiveness appeared to exist between Grant and Pemberton during this campaign; because once Grant landed his army in Confederate territory, he retained the initiative and kept Pemberton at his mercy. Pemberton was unable to overcome the difficulties he experienced and received little help from outside his command. Finally, because of despair among his men, he surrendered Vicksburg to the Union on July 4, 1863...Certain "actions" that can be taken by a commander relative to the principle of the offensive in the defense and certain "factors" which may prevent his taking these actions are identified and employed in the analysis. Among the more important conclusions of the thesis are: 1.) The Confederate commander at Vicksburg applied the principle of the offensive against Grant’s initial probes into Mississippi and against Federal cavalry raids into Vicksburg area. 2.) The Confederate commander at Vicksburg did not apply the principle of the offensive against Grant’s army during the final Union thrust for Vicksburg (May 1 to July 4, 1863). Several of General Pemberton’s subordinate commanders, however, did apply the principle during this same period. 3.) The primary reasons for Pemberton’s failures with respect to the application of the principle of the offensive were his lack of intelligence resulting from his lack of cavalry and interference with his command decisions from higher authority.
This thesis examines Brigadier General Henry A. Wise’s involvement in the Western Virginia Campaign of 1861. This Confederate defeat resulted in the Federal occupation of a large, strategically important section of the Confederacy in the first year of the Civil War. The author presents the reasons for this capitulation and, against the backdrop of Wise’s political career, evaluates the General’s performance as a military commander. This paper discusses the personal conflict which ensued between Henry Wise and John B. Floyd in the Kanawha Valley as a reason for the Confederate failure in western Virginia. The author presents the results of this capitulation to demonstrate how Wise, a popular ex-Governor of Virginia, significantly affected the course of the Civil War.
The air-sea-land forcible entry of Norway in 1940 utilized German operational innovation and boldness to secure victory. The Germans clearly met, and understood, the conditions that were necessary to achieve victory. The central research question of this thesis is: What lessons concerning setting the conditions for present day forcible entry operations can be gleaned from the successful German invasion of Norway in 1940? Forcible entry is the introduction of an aggregation of military personnel, weapons systems, vehicles, and necessary support, or a combination thereof, embarked for the purpose of gaining access through land, air, or amphibious operations into an objective area against resistance. This aggregation of military force attempts to set conditions that cripple the enemy’s ability to react decisively to, or interfere with, the forcible entry operation. The German emphasis on surprise and speed, an effective psychological campaign, and combined operations under a unified command in the invasion of Norway rendered the Norwegian and Allied intervention forces (including the Royal Navy which dominated the seas in the area) incapable of seriously interfering with the German forcible entry.
Contains 88 photos illustrations and maps. “We struck at Guadalcanal to halt the advance of the Japanese. We did not know how strong he was, nor did we know his plans. We knew only that he was moving down the island chain and that he had to be stopped. We were as well trained and as well armed as time and our peacetime experience allowed us to be. We needed combat to tell us how effective our training, our doctrines, and our weapons had been. We tested them against the enemy, and we found that they worked. From that moment in 1942, the tide turned, and the Japanese never again advanced.-A.A. Vandergrift, General U.S. Marine Corps” Major John L. Zimmerman, USMCR
This thesis is a historical analysis of Major General Philip H. Sheridan and his division during the Battle of Chickamauga. Sheridan led an experienced division onto the battlefield on 19 September 1863 after completing a march of over one hundred miles over mountainous terrain the previous seventeen days. The division was deployed by brigade to protect the Union right flank. One brigade took heavy casualties the first day, when attacking to repel an enemy advance. On the second day, while moving to reinforce Major General Thomas’ corps, the division was routed when Confederate forces attacked through a gap in the Union defense. Sheridan rallied his men, but inexplicably left the battlefield instead of returning to reinforce Thomas’ right flank as ordered. Sheridan later moved to reinforce Thomas’ left flank, after the battle was over. Sheridan’s performance was uncharacteristic for him, particularly his decision to leave the battlefield. Sheridan was not the subject of an official inquiry after the battle, although his actions were similar to other officers who were. Based on the analysis of the division’s actions, this study draws conclusions to determine the causes for the unit’s poor performance at Chickamauga: poor decision making, fatigue, and piecemeal employment.
The Huainanzi has in recent years been recognized by scholars as one of the seminal works of Chinese thought at the beginning of the imperial era, a summary of the full flowering of early Taoist philosophy. This book presents a study of three key chapters of the Huainanzi, "The Treatise on the Patterns of Heaven," "The Treatise on Topography," and "The Treatise on the Seasonal Rules," which collectively comprise the most comprehensive extant statement of cosmological thinking in the early Han period. Major presents, for the first time, full English translations of these treatises. He supplements the translations with detailed commentaries that clarify the sometimes arcane language of the text and presents a fascinating picture of the ancient Chinese view of how the world was formed and sustained, and of the role of humans in the cosmos.
During the American Revolution, as the Commander in Chief of the Continental Army, George Washington was responsible for determining the military strategy of the rebellious colonies. Throughout the war, diplomatic, social, and economic factors prevented Washington and his subordinate commanders from developing a strategy that allowed militia soldiers to fight in the same formations as soldiers of the Continental Army. During the conflict, the Continental Congress took measures to maintain control of the Continental Army, which hampered Washington’s ability to plan and execute military strategy. Although recruiting problems, training challenges, and complications with the command structure limited Washington’s ability to form strategy and employ the Continental Army, by 1778, Washington and his subordinate commanders successfully developed a professional force that was capable of fighting against the British Army. Despite the militia’s lack of discipline, inconsistent regulations and limited training, over time, Washington cleverly used the militia in specific roles to enhance his strategy. Once Washington understood how diplomatic, social, and economic factors restricted his strategy, he combined the military capabilities of the Continental Army in a complimentary manner with the strengths of the militia which enabled the rebellious Americans, with the support of European allies, to defeat the British.
This paper examines the role of British intelligence operations during the American Revolutionary War as they apply to the British defeat at Yorktown. It begins with a brief history of British intelligence prior to the war, discusses strategic collection against the burgeoning French-American alliance, examines preconceptions during the planning of the southern campaign, and analyses the tactical intelligence operations of Lord Charles Cornwallis’ army from the British victory at Charleston in 1780, through the defeat at Yorktown in 1781. It concludes that at the strategic level British intelligence accurately monitored French assistance to the Americans but had difficulty using the information to effect meaningful action on the American continent. At the operational level, General Sir Henry Clinton developed an accurate, reliable intelligence system in the northern colonies but was unable to transfer those successes to the southern theater. At the tactical level, General Cornwallis suffered from initial misconception about the degree of loyalist support in the South, lacked a general knowledge of the physical terrain in the southern colonies and failed to conduct proactive, deep reconnaissance during operations.
Mariana Griswold Van Rensselaer (1851–1934) was one of the premier figures in landscape writing and design at the turn of the twentieth century, a moment when the amateur pursuit of gardening and the increasingly professionalized landscape design field were beginning to diverge. This intellectual biography—the first in-depth study of the versatile critic and author—reveals Van Rensselaer’s vital role in this moment in the history of landscape architecture. Van Rensselaer was one of the new breed of American art and architecture critics, closely examining the nature of her profession and bringing a disciplined scholarship to the craft. She considered herself a professional, leading the effort among women in the Gilded Age to claim the titles of artist, architect, critic, historian, and journalist. Thanks to the resources of her wealthy mercantile family, she had been given a sophisticated European education almost unheard of for a woman of her time. Her close relationship with Frederick Law Olmsted influenced her ideas on landscape gardening, and her interest in botany and geology shaped the ideas upon which her philosophy and art criticism were based. She also studied the works of Charles Darwin, Alexander von Humboldt, Henry David Thoreau, and many other nineteenth-century scientists and nature writers, which influenced her general belief in the relationship between science and the imagination. Her cosmopolitan education and elevated social status gave her, much like her contemporary Edith Wharton, access to the homes and gardens of the upper classes. This allowed her to mingle with authors, artists, and affluent patrons of the arts and enabled her to write with familiarity about architecture and landscape design. Identifying over 330 previously unattributed editorials and unsigned articles authored by Van Rensselaer in the influential journal Garden and Forest—for which she was the sole female editorial voice—Judith Major offers insight into her ideas about the importance of botanical nomenclature, the similarities between landscape gardening and idealist painting, design in nature, and many other significant topics. Major’s critical examination of Van Rensselaer’s life and writings—which also includes selections from her correspondence—details not only her influential role in the creation of landscape architecture as a discipline but also her contribution to a broader public understanding of the arts in America.
Thank you for visiting our website. Would you like to provide feedback on how we could improve your experience?
This site does not use any third party cookies with one exception — it uses cookies from Google to deliver its services and to analyze traffic.Learn More.