“The story of the division from formation in Ireland in August 1914 to departure from Gallipoli for Macedonia in October 1915. This history covers the period from the raising of the division to its departure from Gallipoli for Macedonia in October 1915. It was the first divisional history to appear in print, and it is a matter for regret that its scope is so narrow a one. As a history its limitation is that it is based mainly on the author’s memory (he served in the division with 5th Connaught Rangers), on other officers’ accounts and on other books in print at the time (February 1917). A later publication would have benefitted from the availability of more official documentation and other material. Nevertheless, this book’s informal style makes it an easy read and it is a tribute to the first Irish Division as such to take its place in the order of battle of the British Army, and the first to go into action. Appendices list Staff officer casualties and infantry officer casualties by battalions; all those mentioned in Hamilton’s despatches of January and February 1916, and those who received honours and awards. The division was the second of Kitchener’s First New Army and began to form in Ireland at the end of August 1914 with battalions from the North and South. It sailed for Gallipoli in July 1915, landed at Suvla on 6th/7th August and went straight into action at the capture of Chocolate hill and later in the fighting for Hill 60. In early October it embarked for Macedonia and by the end of the month it had landed at Salonika, minus its artillery left at Suvla. Casualties at Gallipoli amounted to some 2,100. ”—N&M Press Reprint
“The story of the division from formation in Ireland in August 1914 to departure from Gallipoli for Macedonia in October 1915. This history covers the period from the raising of the division to its departure from Gallipoli for Macedonia in October 1915. It was the first divisional history to appear in print, and it is a matter for regret that its scope is so narrow a one. As a history its limitation is that it is based mainly on the author’s memory (he served in the division with 5th Connaught Rangers), on other officers’ accounts and on other books in print at the time (February 1917). A later publication would have benefitted from the availability of more official documentation and other material. Nevertheless, this book’s informal style makes it an easy read and it is a tribute to the first Irish Division as such to take its place in the order of battle of the British Army, and the first to go into action. Appendices list Staff officer casualties and infantry officer casualties by battalions; all those mentioned in Hamilton’s despatches of January and February 1916, and those who received honours and awards. The division was the second of Kitchener’s First New Army and began to form in Ireland at the end of August 1914 with battalions from the North and South. It sailed for Gallipoli in July 1915, landed at Suvla on 6th/7th August and went straight into action at the capture of Chocolate hill and later in the fighting for Hill 60. In early October it embarked for Macedonia and by the end of the month it had landed at Salonika, minus its artillery left at Suvla. Casualties at Gallipoli amounted to some 2,100. ”—N&M Press Reprint
The modern tank was invented in 1916 as a means to mechanically overcome the stalemate of trench warfare brought on by the increased lethality of fires employed during World War I. Its introduction received mixed reviews among British leaders. Some advocated its continued role supporting infantry and artillery attacks. Others envisioned it as a revolutionary weapon with the potential to effect decisive results at an operational and strategic level. Still others viewed it as a useless and unnecessary drain on already-scarce resources of men and materiel. Ultimately, the tank was an ancillary sideshow and failed to produce a decisive knock-out punch leading to Allied victory in World War I. The purpose of this paper is to examine the reasons why the tank failed to become the decisive weapon of World War I. It specifically focuses on the genesis of logistics, maintenance, training, and production infrastructure, studying the interaction of development, employment, acceptance or lack thereof, and subsequent frictions which negatively influenced the ascent of tanks as the decisive weapon of World War I. By examining the British efforts to design support systems while simultaneously producing, fielding and employing multiple iterations of the tank, this paper seeks to promote a deeper understanding of the potential challenges facing other armed forces that are rapidly upgrading or replacing combat systems in the midst of the Global War on Terror.
The German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 sparked a guerilla resistance unparalleled in modern history in scale and ferocity. In the wake of the initial invasion, the German Army began its struggle to secure a territory encompassing one million square miles and sixty-five million people and to pacify a growing partisan resistance. The German endeavor to secure the occupied areas and suppress the partisan movement in the wake of Operation Barbarossa illustrates the nature of the problem of bridging the gap between rapid, decisive combat operations and “shaping” the post-major conflict environment-securing populations and infrastructure and persuading people to accept the transition from a defeated government to a new one. In this regard, the German experience on the Eastern Front following Operation Barbarossa seems to offer a number of similarities to the U.S. experience in Iraq in the aftermath of OIF. This study highlights what may be some of the enduring qualities about the nature of the transition between decisive battle and political end state-particularly when that end state is regime change. It elaborates on the notion of decisive battle, how the formulation of resistance movements can be explained as complex adaptive systems, the potential of indigenous security forces and the influence of doctrine, cultural appreciation and interagency cooperation on operational-level transition planning.
Includes over 50 photos and 35 maps. THIS IS THE CONCLUDING VOLUME of a five-part series dealing with operations of United States Marines in Korea between 2 August 1950 and 27 July 1953. Volume V provides a definitive account of operations of the 1st Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing during 1952–1953, the final phase of the Korean War. At this time the division operated under Eighth U.S. Army in Korea (EUSAK) control in the far western sector of I Corps, while Marine aviators and squadrons functioned as a component of the Fifth Air Force (FAF). “MENTION THE KOREAN WAR and almost immediately it evokes the memory of Marines at Pusan, Inchon, Chosin Reservoir, or the Punchbowl. Americans everywhere remember the Marine Corps’ combat readiness, courage, and military skills that were largely responsible for the success of these early operations in 1950–1951. Not as dramatic or well-known are the important accomplishments of the Marines during the latter part of the Korean War. In March 1952 the 1st Marine Division redeployed from the East-Central front to West Korea. This new sector, nearly 35 miles in length, anchored the far western end of I Corps and was one of the most critical of the entire Eighth Army line. Here the Marines blocked the enemy’s goal of penetrating to Seoul, the South Korean capital. Northwest of the Marine Main Line of Resistance, less than five miles distant, lay Panmunjom, site of the sporadic truce negotiations. Whatever guise the enemy of the United States chooses or wherever he draws his battleline, he will find the Marines with their age-old answer. Today, as in the Korean era, Marine Corps readiness and professionalism are prepared to apply the cutting edge against any threat of American security.”-Gen. Chapman
David Demarest or des Marets married Marie Sohier in 1643 in Middleburg the Netherlands. They emigrated in about 1663 and settled first in New York and later in New Jersey.
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