Forrester discusses animal rights, obligations concerning future generations, abortion, limiting medical treatment, and euthanasia. Persons are defined as individuals who ought to be treated in accordance with all sound moral principles. The author develops an account of what moral principles are sound, how we can apply them to complex situations, and what makes it reasonable to treat individuals in accordance with particular moral principles. This discussion puts the book's practical conclusions on a sounder basis than much other work on practical ethics. Most such authors state some general principles, but say little about why these principles should be accepted. Moreover, they rarely show how general principles can generate answers to specific dilemmas. Some even maintain that general principles are irrelevant. Since Forrester is both a nurse practitioner and a philosopher, she has had direct acquaintance with many agonizing situations in medicine. Summaries of the theoretical conclusions are included to enable nonprofessionals to follow the discussion of practical issues. The book will thus interest not only professional philosophers, but also non-philosophers concerned with problems in medical and environmental ethics, abortion, and animal rights.
Some time ago I wrote a book (Moral Language, 1982) in which I argued that moral judgments are capable of being true ('truth-apt,' to use a current phrase, or descriptive and having truth-value, to use a more traditional term), that the methods of discovering moral facts are fundamentally similar to those of discovering non-moral facts, and that moral judgments may be true. What I did not do at that time was to develop a moral theory which would demonstrate how the method of discovering moral truths would work and what the criteria of truth actually are. In a later work (Persons, Animals, and Fetuses, 1996) I did propose a moral theory as to what the criteria for moral truth are; however, I presented it primarily as an introduction to the discussion of several practical ethical issues and did not argue fully for that theory. It is high time that I did so, because without showing that such a theory can be developed my defense of moral realism is incomplete. It is all very well to say that we can discover what moral beliefs are true, but unless we can demonstrate just which beliefs are true, the thesis that we can discover this truth cannot be fully defended. For this reason the biggest (although not the only) challenge to showing that ethical objectivity is possible is the presence of moral disagreement - and the contention of many that such disagreement cannot be definitively resolved.
When she is born to a manipulative mother and alcoholic father, Keira unwittingly becomes part of her parents’ abusive relationship. After numerous attempts to escape, Keira becomes deeply depressed. But what she does not know is that she has a unique destiny. After her mother murders her abusive husband and becomes involved with a self-professed sorcerer, Keira is assaulted in the middle of the night by a man who, while attempting to escape through a window, allegedly falls to his death. Unfortunately, her traumatic experiences continue as her younger brother is hit and killed by a drunk driver. But when she learns she may be in some way responsible for the horrific events, Keira becomes receptive to deception and uses her anger as the fuel to endure her challenges. As she practices her own brand of justice not based on the courts, she transforms into the judge, jury, executioner, and incubus’s daughter who must battle her own darkness, all while searching for a soul mate. Whom Shall I Serve? is the thrilling tale of a young woman’s dark journey to claim her destiny and retrieve what was taken from her as a child.
Decision making in health care involves consideration of a complex set of diagnostic, therapeutic and prognostic uncertainties. Medical therapies have side effects, surgical interventions may lead to complications, and diagnostic tests can produce misleading results. Furthermore, patient values and service costs must be considered. Decisions in clinical and health policy require careful weighing of risks and benefits and are commonly a trade-off of competing objectives: maximizing quality of life vs maximizing life expectancy vs minimizing the resources required. This text takes a proactive, systematic and rational approach to medical decision making. It covers decision trees, Bayesian revision, receiver operating characteristic curves, and cost-effectiveness analysis, as well as advanced topics such as Markov models, microsimulation, probabilistic sensitivity analysis and value of information analysis. It provides an essential resource for trainees and researchers involved in medical decision modelling, evidence-based medicine, clinical epidemiology, comparative effectiveness, public health, health economics, and health technology assessment.
The book provides a comprehensive review of mental health in refugees by discussing its multiple dimensions, and analyzing epidemiology, etiology, and culturally adapted assessment and treatment. Key topics include why certain refugees cope successfully with traumatic experiences while others do not, and the biological, psychological, and social processes underlying posttraumatic stress disorder, common mental disorders, substance abuse and personality disorders. The text examines topics such as complexities of diagnosis, treatment, and recovery for refugees. Furthermore, the roles of culture, social support, and mental health workers in the process of overcoming mental health problems in refugees are discussed. Together, the chapters provide an in-depth examination of the current understood causes, and impacts of mental health problems and treatment of refugees to inform future work in the field. The book gives its readers a solid basis for understanding mental health problems of refugees and sets out to present practitioners with a state-of-the-art summary of all the latest developments and practical guidance. Furthermore, this book provides the practitioner with instructions on how culturally adapted treatments can be used not only with adults, but also with children and young people to help the practitioner to prepare for working with this difficult client group. Drawing from a range of different fields of study, this text will appeal to readers across psychological, mental health, medical, and academic disciplines.
Forrester discusses animal rights, obligations concerning future generations, abortion, limiting medical treatment, and euthanasia. Persons are defined as individuals who ought to be treated in accordance with all sound moral principles. The author develops an account of what moral principles are sound, how we can apply them to complex situations, and what makes it reasonable to treat individuals in accordance with particular moral principles. This discussion puts the book's practical conclusions on a sounder basis than much other work on practical ethics. Most such authors state some general principles, but say little about why these principles should be accepted. Moreover, they rarely show how general principles can generate answers to specific dilemmas. Some even maintain that general principles are irrelevant. Since Forrester is both a nurse practitioner and a philosopher, she has had direct acquaintance with many agonizing situations in medicine. Summaries of the theoretical conclusions are included to enable nonprofessionals to follow the discussion of practical issues. The book will thus interest not only professional philosophers, but also non-philosophers concerned with problems in medical and environmental ethics, abortion, and animal rights.
Some time ago I wrote a book (Moral Language, 1982) in which I argued that moral judgments are capable of being true ('truth-apt,' to use a current phrase, or descriptive and having truth-value, to use a more traditional term), that the methods of discovering moral facts are fundamentally similar to those of discovering non-moral facts, and that moral judgments may be true. What I did not do at that time was to develop a moral theory which would demonstrate how the method of discovering moral truths would work and what the criteria of truth actually are. In a later work (Persons, Animals, and Fetuses, 1996) I did propose a moral theory as to what the criteria for moral truth are; however, I presented it primarily as an introduction to the discussion of several practical ethical issues and did not argue fully for that theory. It is high time that I did so, because without showing that such a theory can be developed my defense of moral realism is incomplete. It is all very well to say that we can discover what moral beliefs are true, but unless we can demonstrate just which beliefs are true, the thesis that we can discover this truth cannot be fully defended. For this reason the biggest (although not the only) challenge to showing that ethical objectivity is possible is the presence of moral disagreement - and the contention of many that such disagreement cannot be definitively resolved.
Proceedings of the 20th annual conference for the Australasian Association for Engineering Education, held at the University of Adelaide in December 2009. Papers were presented by Australian and international delegates. The conference was focused on the engineering curriculum in higher education.
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