On first publication, this uncommonly concise and readable account of Soviet Russia's clash with Nazi Germany utterly changed our understanding of World War II on Germany’s Eastern Front, immediately earning its place among top-shelf histories of the world war. Revised and updated to reflect recent Russian and Western scholarship on the subject, much of it the authors' own work, this new edition maintains the 1995 original's distinction as a crucial volume in the history of World War II and of the Soviet Union and the most informed and compelling perspective on one of the greatest military confrontations of all time. In 1941, when Pearl Harbor shattered America's peacetime pretensions, the German blitzkrieg had already blasted the Red Army back to Moscow. Yet, less than four years later, the Soviet hammer-and-sickle flew above the ruins of Berlin, stark symbol of a miraculous comeback that destroyed the Germany Army and put an end to Hitler's imperial designs. In swift and stirring prose, When Titans Clash provides the clearest, most complete account of this epic struggle, especially from the Soviet perspective. Drawing on the massive and unprecedented release of Soviet archival documents in recent decades, David Glantz, one of the world's foremost authorities on the Soviet military, and noted military historian Jonathan House expand and elaborate our picture of the Soviet war effort—a picture sharply different from accounts that emphasize Hitler's failed leadership over Soviet strategy and might. Rafts of newly available official directives, orders, and reports reveal the true nature and extraordinary scale of Soviet military operations as they swept across the one thousand miles from Moscow to Berlin, featuring stubborn defenses and monumental offensives and counteroffensives and ultimately costing the two sides combined a staggering twenty million casualties. Placing the war within its wider context, the authors also make use of recent revelations to clarify further the political, economic, and social issues that influenced and reflected what happened on the battlefield. Their work gives us new insight into Stalin's political motivation and Adolf Hitler’s role as warlord, as well as a better understanding of the human and economic costs of the war—for both the Soviet Union and Germany. While incorporating a wealth of new information, When Titans Clashed remains remarkably compact, a tribute to the authors' determination to make this critical chapter in world history as accessible as it is essential.
This text is the second of three volumes written by Colonel Glantz on the contribution of intelligence and deception operations to the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany. It examines the area where intelligence and operations overlap; the nature of co-ordination between the two; and the support provided by intelligence to operational planning and execution (or the absence of such support). This is not a study of intelligence work as such, but of how intelligence can improve the chances of success on the battlefield by facilitating the more effective and economical use of troops.
The confrontation between German and Soviet forces at Stalingrad was a titanic clash of armies on an unprecedented scale-a campaign that was both a turning point in World War II and a lasting symbol of that war's power and devastation. Yet despite the attention lavished on this epic battle by historians, much about it has been greatly misunderstood or hidden from view-as David Glantz, the world's foremost authority on the Red Army in World War II, now shows. This first volume in Glantz's masterly trilogy draws on previously unseen or neglected sources to provide the definitive account of the opening phase of this iconic Eastern Front campaign. Glantz has combed daily official records from both sides-including the Red Army General Staff, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, the German Sixth Army, and the Soviet 62nd Army-to produce a work of unparalleled detail and fresh interpretations. Jonathan House, an authority on twentieth-century warfare, adds further insight and context. Hitler's original objective was not Stalingrad but the Caucasus oilfields to the south of the city. So he divided his Army Group South into two parts-one to secure the city on his flank, one to capture the oilfields. Glantz reveals for the first time how Stalin, in response, demanded that the Red Army stand and fight rather than withdraw, leading to the numerous little-known combat engagements that seriously eroded the Wehrmacht's strength before it even reached Stalingrad. He shows that, although advancing German forces essentially destroyed the armies of the Soviet Southwestern and Southern Fronts, the Soviets resisted the German advance much more vigorously than has been thought through constant counterattacks, ultimately halting the German offensive at the gates of Stalingrad. This fresh, eye-opening account and the subsequent companion volumes-on the actual battle for the city itself and the successful Soviet counteroffensive that followed-will dramatically revise and expand our understanding of what remains a military campaign for the ages.
In Endgame at Stalingrad, the final volume of his acclaimed Stalingrad Trilogy, David Glantz completes his definitive account of one of World War II’s most infamous confrontations, the campaign that marked Germany’s failure on the Eastern Front and proved to be a turning point in the war. In documenting the last days of the Stalingrad campaign, in particular the Red Army’s counteroffensive known at Operation Uranus, Glantz takes on a plethora of myths and controversial questions surrounding these events, in particular, questions about why Operation Uranus succeeded and the German relief attempts failed, whether the Sixth Army could have escaped encirclement or been rescued, and who, finally was most responsible for its ultimate defeat. In addition to a wide variety of traditional sources, this volume makes use of two major categories of documentary materials hitherto unavailable to researchers. The first consists of extensive records from the combat journal of the German Sixth Army, which had been largely missing since the war’s end and were only recently rediscovered and published. The second is a vast amount of newly released Soviet and Russian archival material including excerpts from the Red Army General Staff’s daily operational summaries; a wide variety of Stavka (High Command), People’s Commissariat of Defense (NKO), and Red Army General Staff orders and directives; and the daily records of the Soviet 62nd Army and its subordinate divisions and brigades for most of the time fighting was underway in Stalingrad proper. Because of the persistent controversy and mythology characterizing this period, many of these documents are included verbatim in English translation in this companion volume, providing concrete evidence in support of the conclusions put forward in Volume Three. As such, the Companion contributes substantially to this final volume’s unprecedented detail and fresh perspectives, interpretations, and evaluations of the later stages of the Stalingrad campaign.
The campaign intended to secure the Wehrmacht’s flanks had proven one front too many for the German Army. And now the offensive at Stalingrad, the epic clash that marked Germany’s failure on the Eastern Front, was entering its grim final phase. In Book One of the third volume of his acclaimed Stalingrad Trilogy, David Glantz offers the definitive account—the “ground truth” to counter a half-century’s worth of myth and misinformation—of the beginning of the end of one of the most infamous battles of the Second World War, and one of the most costly in lives and treasure in the annals of history. When Volume Two left off, Germany’s vaunted Sixth Army, already deflected from its original goal—the Caucasus oil fields—had been drawn into a desperate war of attrition within the ravaged city of Stalingrad. In Volume Three, Book One, we see the ultimate consequences of the Germans’ overreach and the gathering force of the Red Army’s massive manpower and increasingly sophisticated command. After failing repeatedly to find and exploit the weaknesses in Axis defenses, Stalin and the Stavka (High Command) finally seized their chance in mid-November of 1942 by launching a bold and devastating counteroffensive, Operation Uranus. Glantz draws a detailed and vivid account of how, in Operation Uranus, the Red Army’s three fronts defeated and largely destroyed two Romanian armies and encircled the German Sixth Army and half of the German Fourth Panzer Army in the Stalingrad pocket—turning the Germans’ world on its head. Like its predecessor volumes, this one makes extensive use of sources previously out of reach or presumed lost, such as reports from the Sixth Army’s combat journal and newly released Soviet and Russian records. These materials (many cited at length or printed in their entirety in a companion volume) lend themselves to a strikingly new interpretation of the campaign’s planning and execution on both sides—a version of events that once and for all gets at the ground truth of this historic confrontation.
This book provides an in-depth study of the Soviet Army during the offensive operations that started with Battle of Stalingrad in December 1942 and went until Spring 1943. The lessons learned by the Soviet Army from these experiences helped design the military steamroller that decimated the German panzer divisions at Kursk in the Summer of 1943.
Barbarossa was the biggest German invasion of World War II. Comprehensively illustrated, this study explores the air campaign that spearheaded it, and how it evolved during the rest of 1941. The German invasion of the USSR, Operation Barbarossa, was the apex of Hitler's aggression. The strength of the Luftwaffe was gathered from across Europe for its opening strikes, where it faced a huge but badly equipped and ill-prepared Soviet Air Force (VVS) of 20,000 aircraft, which it quickly destroyed. In this book, Eastern Front expert William E. Hiestand examines this shattering first campaign, as well as how the Barbarossa air war developed over the following months. He describes how between June and December 1941, Luftwaffe losses rose and aircraft readiness steadily decreased under the pressure of combat. He also analyses the evacuation of Soviet industry – including aircraft production – to the Urals, and the rebuilding of the VVS; by the time German columns stalled 25km from Moscow, the VVS had more operational aircraft at the front than the Luftwaffe. He also covers aspects such as the abortive VVS strikes on Berlin and other strategic targets, and the Luftwaffe's strategic bombing raids on Moscow. With striking original artwork, 3D diagrams, maps and rare photos, this book reveals the full story of the aerial campaign in Barbarossa, as the devastation began in the most brutal theatre of World War II.
It was on the Eastern Front that Germany was bled white, and it was here that two-thirds of her armed forces stood and fought. This is the story of how a country seemingly brought to its knees by one of the finest armies the world has seen, survived and rebuilt itself to destroy that army.
In his classic work, On War, Carl von Clausewitz wrote, “As we shall show, defense is a stronger form of fighting than attack.” A generation of nineteenth century officers, nurtured on the study of the experiences of Napoleon and conditioned by the wars of German unification, had little reason to accept that view. The offensive spirit swept through European armies and manifested itself in the regulations, plans, and mentality of those armiehe events of 1939, 1940, and 1941 in Poland, France, and Russia respectively again challenged Clausewitz’ claim of the superiority of the defense and prompted armies worldwide to frantically field large armored forces and develop doctrines for their use. While blitzkrieg concepts ruled supreme, it fell to that nation victimized most by those concepts to develop techniques to counter the German juggernaut. The Soviets had to temper a generation of offensive tradition in order to marshal forces and develop techniques to counter blitzkrieg. In essence, the Soviet struggle for survival against blitzkrieg proved also to be a partial test of Clausewitz’ dictum. In July 1943, after arduous months of developing defensive techniques, often at a high cost in terms of men and material, the Soviets met blitzkrieg head-on and proved that defense against it was feasible. The titanic, grinding Kursk operation validated, in part, Clausewitz’ views. But it also demonstrated that careful study of force organization and employment and application of the fruits of that study can produce either offensive or defensive victory. While on the surface the events of Kursk seemed to validate Clausewitz’ view, it is often forgotten that, at Kursk, the Soviets integrated the concept of counteroffensive into their grand defensive designs. Thus the defense itself was meaningless unless viewed against the backdrop of the renewed offensive efforts and vice versa. What Kursk did prove was that strategic, operational, and tactical defenses could counter blitzkrieg.
David Glantz examines the Soviet study of war, the re-emergence of the operation level, the evolution of the Soviet theory of operations in depth before 1941, and its application in the European theatre and the Far East between 1941 and 1945.
Immense in scope, ferocious in nature, and epic in consequence, the Battle of Kursk witnessed (at Prokhorovka) one of the largest tank engagements in world history and led to staggering losses-including nearly 200,000 Soviet and 50,000 German casualties-within the first ten days of fighting. Going well beyond all previous accounts, David Glantz and Jonathan House now offer the definitive work on arguably the greatest battle of World War II. Drawing on both German and Soviet sources, Glantz and House separate myth from fact to show what really happened at Kursk and how it affected the outcome of the war. Their access to newly released Soviet archival material adds unprecedented detail to what is known about this legendary conflict, enabling them to reconstruct events from both perspectives and describe combat down to the tactical level. The Battle of Kursk takes readers behind Soviet lines for the first time to discover what the Red Army knew about the plans for Hitler's offensive (Operation Citadel), relive tank warfare and hand-to-hand combat, and learn how the tide of battle turned. Its vivid portrayals of fighting in all critical sectors place the famous tank battle in its proper context. Prokhorovka here is not a well-organized set piece but a confused series of engagements and hasty attacks, with each side committing its forces piecemeal. Glantz and House's fresh interpretations demolish many of the myths that suggest Hitler might have triumphed if Operation Citadel had been conducted differently. Their account is the first to provide accurate figures of combat strengths and losses, and it includes 32 maps that clarify troop and tank movements. Shrouded in obscurity and speculation for more than half a century, the Battle of Kursk finally gets its due in this dramatic retelling of the confrontation that marked the turning point of the war on the Eastern Front and brought Hitler's blitzkrieg to a crashing halt.
In Book Two of the third volume of his magisterial Stalingrad Trilogy, David Glantz continues and concludes his definitive history of one of the most infamous battles of World War Two, the Stalingrad campaign that signaled Germany’s failure on the Eastern Front and marked a turning point in the war. Book Two finds Germany’s most famous army—General Friedrich Paulus’s Sixth—in dire straits, trapped in the Stalingrad kessel, or pocket, by a Red Army that has seized the initiative in what the Soviets now term the Great Patriotic War. The Red Army’s counteroffensive, Operation Uranus, is well underway, having largely destroyed the bulk of two Romanian armies and encircled the German Sixth and half of the German Fourth Panzer Army. Drawing on materials previously unavailable or believed lost, Glantz gives a closely observed account of the final ten weeks of Germany’s ill-fated Stalingrad campaign. In short order, the Red Army parried and then defeated two German attempts to rescue the Sixth Army, crushed the Italian Eighth and Hungarian Second Armies, severely damaged the German Fourth Panzer and Second Armies, and finally destroyed the German Sixth Army in the ruins of Stalingrad. With well over half-a-million soldiers torn from its order of battle, Hitler’s Axis could only watch in horror as its status abruptly changed from victor to vanquished. This book completes a vivid and detailed picture of the Axis defeat that would prove decisive as a catastrophe from which Germany and its Wehrmacht could never recover. As in the preceding volumes, Glantz extensively mines newly available materials to provide a clearer and more accurate picture of what actually happened at Stalingrad at this crucial moment in World War II—a “ground truth” that gets beyond the myths and misinformation surrounding this historic confrontation. And this concluding chapter, relating events even more steeped in myth than those that came before, is especially bracing as it takes on controversial questions about why Operation Uranus succeeded and the German relief attempts failed, whether the Sixth Army could have escaped encirclement or been rescued, and who, finally was most responsible for its ultimate defeat. The answers Glantz provides, embedded in a fully-realized account of the endgame at Stalingrad, make this book the last word on one of history’s epic clashes.
Continuing his magisterial account of the Eastern Front campaigns, the writer cited by The Atlantic as “indisputably the West's foremost expert on the subject” focuses here on the Red Army's operations from the fall of 1943 through the April 1944. David M. Glantz chronicles the Soviet Army's efforts to further exploit their post-Kursk gains and accelerate a counteroffensive that would eventually take them all the way to Berlin. The Red Army's Operation Bagration that liberated Belorussia in June 1944 sits like a colossus in the annals of World War II history. What is little noted in the history books, however, is that the Bagration offensive was not the Soviets' first attempt. Battle for Belorussia tells the story of how, eight months earlier, and acting under the direction of Stalin and his Stavka, three Red Army fronts conducted multiple simultaneous and successive operations along a nearly 400-mile front in an effort to liberate Belorussia and capture Minsk, its capital city. The campaign, with over 700,000 casualties, was a Red Army failure. Glantz describes in detail the series of offensives, with their markedly different and ultimately disappointing results, that, contrary to later accounts, effectively shifted Stalin's focus to the Ukraine as a more manageable theater of military operations. Restoring the first Belorussian offensive to its place in history, this work also reveals for the first time what the later, successful Bagration operation owed to its forgotten precursor.
Beginning with Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, this volume draws upon eye-witness German accounts supplemented with German archival and detailed Soviet materials. Formerly classified Soviet archival materials has been incorporated.
[Includes 19 tables, 7 figures, 41 maps] To be successful, a strategic military operation requires careful planning and meticulous execution. History applauds the commander who orchestrates the operation, and major subordinate commanders share in the glory. In reality, however, commanders and soldiers at the operational and tactical levels play an even more critical role in achieving battlefield success. History often accords them little attention. Practitioners of war must study war at all levels. An understanding of the strategic aspects of military operations is essential in order to provide a context for a more detailed and equally critical understanding of precise operational and tactical techniques. Few officers practice war at the strategic level. The majority wrestle with the myriad of problems associated with implementing those strategic plans. Leavenworth Paper no. 8. through the medium of detailed case studies, examines the operational and tactical aspects of a major strategic operation—the Soviet offensive m Manchuria in 1945. The case studies, which involve army, corps, division, regimental, and battalion operations, focus on the many problems commanders and soldiers at that level face. Constrained by time, a desperate enemy, rugged terrain, and severe climatic conditions—the realities of war— Soviet commanders devised find implemented techniques that produced victory. This paper highlights those techniques in the knowledge that Soviet theorists have likewise studied them in detail, both historically and in a contemporary context.
David Glantz examines the Soviet study of war, the re-emergence of the operation level and its connection with deep battle, the evolution of the Soviet theory of operations in depth before 1941, and its refinement and application in the European theatre and the Far East between 1941 and 1945.
This critical examination of the final Soviet strategic offensive operation during World War II seeks to chip away at two generally inaccurate pictures many Westerners have of the war. Specifically, Westerners seem to think that only geography, climate, and sheer numbers negated German military skill and competency on the eastern front, a view that relegates Soviet military accomplishments to oblivion.
With the defeat and destruction of German Sixth Army at Stalingrad all but certain at the end of 1942, the war on the Eastern Front took a definitive turn as the Germans struggled to erect a new defensive front to halt the Soviet juggernaut driving west. Operation Don’s Main Attack is the first detailed study of the dramatic clash of armies that followed, unfolding inexorably over the course of two months across an expanse of more than 1,600 kilometers. Using recently released Russian archival material never before available to researchers, David M. Glantz provides a close-up account, from both sides, of the planning and conduct of Operation Don—the Soviet offensive by the Red Army's Southern front that aimed to capture Rostov in January–February 1943. His book includes a full array of plans, candid daily reports, situation maps, and strength and casualty reports prepared for the forces that participated in the offensive at every level. Drawing on an unprecedented and comprehensive range of documents, the book delves into many hitherto forbidden topics, such as unit strengths and losses and the foibles and attitudes of command cadre. Glantz’s work also presents rare insights into the military strategy, combat tactics, and operational art of such figures as Generals Eremenko and Malinovsky and Field Marshal Erich von Manstein. A uniquely informed study of a critical but virtually forgotten Soviet military operation, Operation Don’s Main Attack offers a fresh perspective on the nature of the twentieth century’s most terrible of wars.
The ‘‘Aral Sea Encyclopedia’’ is the first one in the new series of encyclopedias about the seas of the former Soviet Union. Preparing it we faced certain difficulties. The thing is that this encyclopedia is a monument to the sea that is disappearing during our lifetime. The world community considers the situation with the Aral Sea and all changes that occurred in its whereabouts in the recent decades as one of the most serious, if not disastrous anthropogenic environmental crises of the 20th century. Before 1960, this was a water-abundant sea-lake that was fourth among world lakes after the Caspian Sea (USSR, Iran), the Great Lakes (USA, Canada) and Victoria Lake (Africa). This was a real ‘‘pearl’’ among the sands of the largest deserts, the Karakums and the Kyzylkums. Navigation between the sea ports Muinak and Aralsk and fisheries famous for the Aral breams, barbells, sturgeons, shemaya, and others were developed here. One could find beautiful recreational zones and beaches here. The deltas of the Amudarya, the major river of Central Asia, and the Syrdarya bringing their waters into the Aral Sea were famous for their biodiversity, fishery, muskrat rearing, reed prod- tion. The local population found occupations related to the water infrastructure.
[Includes 36 maps and 10 tables] Deep battle, a major element in both U.S. and Soviet doctrine, is a tenet that emphasizes destroying, suppressing, or disorganizing enemy forces not only at the line of contact, but throughout the depth of the battlefield. Airborne forces are a primary instrument to accomplish this type of operation. While the exploits of German, British, and American paratroops since 1940 are well known to most professional soldiers, the equivalent experience of the Soviet Union has been largely ignored—except in the Soviet Union. There, the Red Army’s airborne operations have become the focus of many recent studies by military theorists. Lieutenant Colonel David M. Glantz has done much to remedy this gap in our historical literature. The Soviet Airborne Experience examines the experiences of the Red Army in World War II and traces Soviet airborne theory and practice both before and since the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45. Airborne warfare emerges as an essential part of the high-speed offensive operations planned by Soviet commanders. Because Lieutenant Colonel Glantz examines airborne operations within the larger context of Soviet unconventional warfare, the implications of this study reach beyond one specialized form of maneuver. This study, in demonstrating the ability of Russian airborne and partisan forces to survive and fight behind German lines for months at a time, provides us with an instructive example of how Soviet special operations troops probably plan to operate in future wars. The Soviet Airborne Experience is an important reference for anyone concerned with planning and conducting operations.
On 1 January 1943, with German Sixth Army about to be destroyed in the Stalingrad pocket, the Stavka (Soviet High Command) launched Operation Don, a strategic offensive conducted by the Red Army’s Southern, Southwestern, and Trans-Caucasus Fronts aimed at demolishing German defenses in the southern Soviet Union and decisively turning the war’s tide. Critical to this ambitious operation was the mission assigned to the Trans-Caucasus Front—to isolate and destroy German Army Group A in the northern Caucasus region in cooperation with the Southern Front. Operation Don’s Left Wing is the first detailed study of this crucial but virtually overlooked Soviet military operation. Because of the priority given to the assault on German Sixth Army at Stalingrad, the Red Army Southwestern, Southern, and Trans-Caucasus Fronts were compelled to execute their missions with scant resources—inadequate logistical support, personnel replacements, and reinforcing equipment. Based on newly released Red Army archival operational documents, David M. Glantz constructs a clear, comprehensive account of how, despite such constraints, the Trans-Caucasus Front nonetheless pursued and severely damaged German First Panzer Army—although it failed to encircle and destroy the panzer army as hoped. These documents include candid daily orders and reports, periodic situation maps, a full array of ever-changing operational plans, and strength and casualty reports prepared by Soviet formations and units throughout the offensive. With unprecedented access to these documents, Glantz delves into previously forbidden topics such as unit strengths and losses and the foibles and attitudes of commanders at every level. Following Glantz’s Operation Don’s Main Attack, this documentary study expands our understanding of a pivotal operation in the Soviet triumph over Nazi Germany and a decisive moment in the history of World War II on the Eastern Front.
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