An intriguing examination of one of the most important unresolved problems in social choice theory: how do we best understand people's decision to pay the cost of a public good?
This Brief uses game-theoretic analysis to debunk the turnout paradox and offers an alternative economic model to elucidate the patterns behind the socioeconomic bias in turnout. The author argues that the turnout paradox—the idea that rational, strategic actors would not vote in an election—is an overstated problem, and that, contrary to widespread belief, game-theoretic models of elections with highly realistic parameters are compatible with high turnout. The author applies the method of stability sets to the study of voting games so as to characterize the behavior of electoral turnout in response to the game’s structural parameters. To illustrate the power and potential of this framework, the author then develops a politico-economic model that generates testable theories about the way in which the modern welfare state and redistribution of wealth can shape the patterns of biased turnout that exist in most democracies. By turning a classic problem of rational choice into a source of new methods of analysis this Brief allows game theory to intervene in relevant conversations about the political economy of electoral participation, creating an opportunity for formal methods to make a welcome contribution to the discipline. As such, this Brief will be of use to scholars and student of political science, economics, political economy, and public policy, especially those who work in the tradition of formal methods.
An intriguing examination of one of the most important unresolved problems in social choice theory: how do we best understand people's decision to pay the cost of a public good?
This Brief uses game-theoretic analysis to debunk the turnout paradox and offers an alternative economic model to elucidate the patterns behind the socioeconomic bias in turnout. The author argues that the turnout paradox—the idea that rational, strategic actors would not vote in an election—is an overstated problem, and that, contrary to widespread belief, game-theoretic models of elections with highly realistic parameters are compatible with high turnout. The author applies the method of stability sets to the study of voting games so as to characterize the behavior of electoral turnout in response to the game’s structural parameters. To illustrate the power and potential of this framework, the author then develops a politico-economic model that generates testable theories about the way in which the modern welfare state and redistribution of wealth can shape the patterns of biased turnout that exist in most democracies. By turning a classic problem of rational choice into a source of new methods of analysis this Brief allows game theory to intervene in relevant conversations about the political economy of electoral participation, creating an opportunity for formal methods to make a welcome contribution to the discipline. As such, this Brief will be of use to scholars and student of political science, economics, political economy, and public policy, especially those who work in the tradition of formal methods.
The notion that groups form and act in ways that respond to objective, external costs and benefits has long been the key to accounting for social change processes driven by collective action. Yet this same notion seems to fall apart when we try to explain how collectivities emerge out of the choices of individuals. This book overcomes that dilemma by offering an analysis of collective action that, while rooted in individual decision making, also brings out the way in which objective costs and benefits can impede or foster social coordination. The resulting approach enables us to address the causes and consequences of collective action with the help of the tools of modern economic theory. To illustrate this, the book applies the tools it develops to the study of specific collective action problems such as clientelism, focusing on its connections with economic development and political redistribution; and wage bargaining, showing its economic determinants and its relevance for the political economy of the welfare state. "Medina's study is a great step forward in the analytics of collective action. He shows the inadequacies of currently standard models and shows that straightforward revisions reconcile rational-choice and structural viewpoints. It will influence all future work." -Kenneth Arrow, Stanford University "Olson, Schelling, and now Medina. A Unified Theory deepens our understanding of collective action and contributes to the foundations of our field. A major work." -Robert H. Bates, Harvard University "Medina thinks that the main problem of social action is not whether or not to cooperate but how to do it. To this end he has produced an imaginative approach to analyzing strategic coordination problems that produces plausible predictions in a range of circumstances." -John Ferejohn, Stanford University Luis Fernando Medina is Associate Professor in the Department of Politics at the University of Virginia.
This book outlines the transitions between cultured and natural land cover/vegetation types and their implications in the search for alternatives to reverse the trend of anthropogenic environmental degradation. It also elaborates on the proposed “standardized hierarchical Mexican vegetation classification system” and geobotanical mapping, a critical transversal environmental issue. The first chapter consists of an historical review of the common approaches to the study of vegetation both in Mexico and in other regions of the world. The second chapter concisely analyzes the existing schools of thought that have led to the development of vegetation classification systems based on physiognomic, structural and floristic approaches. The focal point of the book is the “standardized hierarchical Mexican vegetation classification system” (SECLAVEMEX – “Sistema jerárquico estandarizado para la clasificación de la vegetación de México”). Chapter 3 describes the system’s organizational levels along with the criteria defining them and the nomenclatural basis for the denomination of each type of vegetation. It also includes a series of tables explaining and precisely defining the meaning of each concept, criterion, character and element used to help readers successfully identify the type of vegetation in a determined area. The fourth chapter highlights SECLAVEMEX's inclusive character as evidenced through its compatibility with other systems currently used around the globe. Three concepts are critically reviewed: land cover, land use and vegetation. These are often the study subject of the contrasting disciplines geography, agronomy and ecology, which all rely upon plant species assemblages. As such, the final chapter focuses on a critical transversal environmental issue – geobotanical mapping. Geobotanical mapping offers a baseline for land cover/use planning and provides critical information on ecological, economic and cultural attributes, which can be used as a basis for environmental-policy decisions. The proposed SECLAVEMEX was applied to Mexico as an example of land cover, land use and vegetation patterns intermingling as the result of a long human influence. SECLAVEMEX, however, can be adapted and hopefully adopted globally as a baseline for consistently comparing geobotanical patterns and their transitions.
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