The paper provides evidence that fiscal rules can limit the political budget cycle. It focuses on the application of the Italian fiscal rule at the sub-national level over the period 2004-2006 and shows that: 1) municipalities are subject to political budget cycles in capital spending; 2) the Italian subnational fiscal rule introduced in 1999 has been enforced by the central government; 3) municipalities subject to the fiscal rule show more limited political budget cycles than municipalities not subject to the rule. In order to identify the effect, we rely on the fact that the domestic fiscal rule does not apply to municipalities below 5,000 inhabitants. We find that the political budget cycle increases real capital spending by about 35 percent on average in the years prior to municipal elections and that the sub-national fiscal rule reduces these figures by about two thirds.
Fiscal multipliers are important tools for macroeconomic projections and policy design. In many countries, little is known about the size of multipliers, as data availability limits the scope for empirical research. This note provides general guidance on the definition, measurement, and use of fiscal multipliers. It reviews the literature related to their size, persistence and determinants. For countries where no reliable estimate is available, the note proposes a simple method to come up with reasonable values. Finally, the note presents options to incorporate multipliers in macroeconomic forecasts.
This paper studies the effect of sovereign debt restructurings with external private creditors on growth during the period 1970-2010. We find that there are bad and good (or not so bad) debt restructurings for growth. While growth generally declines in the aftermath of a sovereign debt restructuring, agreements that allow countries to exit a default spell (final restructurings) are associated with improving growth. The impact can be significant. In general, three years after restructuring, growth is about 5 percent lower compared to countries that did not face restructuring over the same period. The exception is for final restructurings, which result in positive growth in the years immediately after the restructuring. Final restructurings tend to be better for growth because they reduce countries’ debt, with the strongest effect for countries that exit restructurings with relatively low debt levels.
This paper compiles and compares recent and past measures introduced to contain the public wage bill in a number of emerging and advanced economies to assess their effectiveness in bringing down expenditure in a sustained way. In the aftermath of the Great Recession a number of countries have approved measures on the wage bill as part of fiscal consolidation efforts. These recent episodes are compared to past cases implemented in advanced economies over the period 1979–2009. Findings suggest that public wage bill consolidation episodes pre and post 2009 are similar in many respects. Moreover, typically countries that were able to achieve more sustained reductions in the wage bill have implemented to larger extent structural measures, and/or these measures were accompanied with substantial social dialogue and consensus.
We assess the macroeconomic effects of a sovereign restructuring in a small economy belonging to a monetary union by simulating a dynamic general equilibrium model. In line with the empirical evidence, we make the following three key assumptions. First, sovereign debt is held by domestic agents and by agents in the rest of the monetary union. Second, after the restructuring the sovereign borrowing rate increases and its increase is fully transmitted to the borrowing rate paid by the domestic agents. Third, the government cannot discriminate between domestic and foreign agents when restructuring. We show that the macroeconomic effects of the restructuring depend on: (a) the share of sovereign bonds held by residents in the country as compared to that held by foreign residents, (b) the increase in the spread paid by domestic agents and (c) its net foreign asset position at the moment of the restructuring. Our results also suggest that the sovereign restructuring implies persistent reductions of output, consumption and investment, that can be large, in particular if the share of public debt held domestically is large, the private foreign debt is high and the spread paid by the government and the households does increase.
Several models establish a positive association between public debt ratios and long-term real yields, but the empirical evidence is not always conclusive. We reconsider this issue, focusing in particular on possible spillover effects of large advanced economies' debt levels to other economies' borrowing yields, especially in emerging markets. We extend the existing literature by using real time expectations of fiscal and other macroeconomic variables for a large sample of advanced and emerging economies. We show that an increase in the public debt levels of large advanced economies - especially the United States - spills over to both emerging markets and other advanced economies' long-term real yields and that this effect is significant at the current levels of advanced economies' debt ratios.
We investigate the pricing of sovereign credit risk over the period 2008-2010 for selected advanced economies by examining two widely-used indicators: sovereign credit default swap (CDS) and relative asset swap (RAS) spreads. Cointegration analysis suggests the existence of an imperfect market arbitrage relationship between the cash (RAS) and the derivatives (CDS) markets, with price discovery taking place in the latter. Likewise, panel regressions aimed at uncovering the fundamental drivers of the two indicators show that the CDS market, although less liquid, has provided a better signal for sovereign credit risk during the period of the recent financial crisis.
Using a dataset covering a large sample of emerging economies (EMEs), we study the relationship between debt and economic performance in bad times. While previous research has shown that private debt buildups exacerbate the duration and intensity of recessions in advanced economies (AEs), we document that this effect is very pronounced in EMEs as well. Moreover, although rapid public debt buildups are unlikely to be the primary trigger of financial crises, in EMEs they are associated with deeper and longer recessions than in AEs. Part of this difference is explained by a less supportive fiscal policy in EMEs during crises.
To better understand the contemporary world, the world of innovation and technology, science should try to synthesize and assimilate social science in the development of our civilization. Does the new era require new knowledge? Does the age of globalization demand new education, new human attitudes? This books tries to clarify these questions. The book New Knowledge in a New Era of Globalization consists of 16 chapters divided into three sections: Globalization and Education; Globalization and Human Being; Globalization and Space. The Authors of respective chapters represent a great diversity of disciplines and methodological approaches as well as a variety of academic culture. This book is a valuable contribution and it will certainly be appreciated by a global community of scholars.
The paper provides evidence that fiscal rules can limit the political budget cycle. It focuses on the application of the Italian fiscal rule at the sub-national level over the period 2004-2006 and shows that: 1) municipalities are subject to political budget cycles in capital spending; 2) the Italian subnational fiscal rule introduced in 1999 has been enforced by the central government; 3) municipalities subject to the fiscal rule show more limited political budget cycles than municipalities not subject to the rule. In order to identify the effect, we rely on the fact that the domestic fiscal rule does not apply to municipalities below 5,000 inhabitants. We find that the political budget cycle increases real capital spending by about 35 percent on average in the years prior to municipal elections and that the sub-national fiscal rule reduces these figures by about two thirds.
Using a dataset covering a large sample of emerging economies (EMEs), we study the relationship between debt and economic performance in bad times. While previous research has shown that private debt buildups exacerbate the duration and intensity of recessions in advanced economies (AEs), we document that this effect is very pronounced in EMEs as well. Moreover, although rapid public debt buildups are unlikely to be the primary trigger of financial crises, in EMEs they are associated with deeper and longer recessions than in AEs. Part of this difference is explained by a less supportive fiscal policy in EMEs during crises.
We assess the macroeconomic effects of a sovereign restructuring in a small economy belonging to a monetary union by simulating a dynamic general equilibrium model. In line with the empirical evidence, we make the following three key assumptions. First, sovereign debt is held by domestic agents and by agents in the rest of the monetary union. Second, after the restructuring the sovereign borrowing rate increases and its increase is fully transmitted to the borrowing rate paid by the domestic agents. Third, the government cannot discriminate between domestic and foreign agents when restructuring. We show that the macroeconomic effects of the restructuring depend on: (a) the share of sovereign bonds held by residents in the country as compared to that held by foreign residents, (b) the increase in the spread paid by domestic agents and (c) its net foreign asset position at the moment of the restructuring. Our results also suggest that the sovereign restructuring implies persistent reductions of output, consumption and investment, that can be large, in particular if the share of public debt held domestically is large, the private foreign debt is high and the spread paid by the government and the households does increase.
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